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notion	 of	 agency	 that	 also	 takes	 into	 account	 dimensions	 (such	 as	 the	 importance	 of	
perceptions	and	emotions)	that	are	sometimes	overlooked	in	forced	migration	studies,	
thereby	 contributing	 (or	 so	 I	 hope)	 to	 a	 more	 informed	 and	 subtle	 view	 of	 asylum	
seekers’	movements	 and	of	 their	 interaction	with	 their	 surrounding	 environment.	My	
fieldwork	 demonstrates	 that	 perceptions	 and	 emotions	 play	 an	 important	 role	 in	





of	 peculiar	 characteristics	 that	 are	 relevant	 in	 explaining	 Eritrean	 asylum	 seekers’	
strategies	for	coping	with	the	challenges	of	the	asylum	system.	The	second	part	of	this	
project	 focuses	 on	 asylum	 journeys,	 and	 specifically	 on	 the	 various	 trajectories	
developed	by	asylum	seekers,	on	the	circulation	of	rumours	and	on	the	way	perceptions	
about	 destination	 countries	 evolve.	 The	 last	 part	 examines	 the	 Italian	 asylum	 and	
reception	 systems	 and	 provides	 some	 examples	 of	 the	 strategies	 adopted	 by	 asylum	
seekers	to	overcome	problems	and	obstacles;	it	also	explores	the	factors	that	shape	the	











This	 thesis	 is	 an	 exploratory	 study	 on	 the	 role	 of	 perceptions	 and	 emotions	 in	
shaping	 asylum	 seekers’	 agency.	 Taking	 as	 a	 case	 study	 Eritrean	 asylum	 seekers	 and	
Italy	and	its	asylum	system,	it	tries	to	explore	how	perceptions	of	Italy	and	its	asylum	
system	 impact	 on	 Eritrean	 asylum	 seekers	 strategies	 at	 different	 stages	 of	 their	
migration	path.		
In	 order	 to	 pursue	 this	 aim,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 first	 address	 issues	 that	 are	
particularly	 relevant	 to	 this	 research	 and	 that	 continue	 to	 shape	 the	 debate	 among	
migration	 scholars	 and,	 in	particular,	 in	 the	 field	of	 refugee	 studies	 and	unauthorised	
migration.	In	this	section,	I	will	therefore	develop	a	literature	review	of	key	issues	that	
are	useful	 to	develop	a	conceptual	 framework	apt	 to	 interpret	 the	data	collected	from	
the	field.	In	particular,	I	will	describe	the	general	trends	along	which	the	literature	has	
developed	 in	 refugee	 studies	 and	 argue	 that	 a	 deeper	 understanding	 of	 the	 agentic	
dimension	of	refugee	is	necessary	as	it	helps	to	shed	light	on	interesting	dynamics	that	
influence	 migration	 trajectories	 and	 the	 way	 asylum	 seekers	 cope	 with	 the	 asylum	
system	 in	 the	host	 country.	 	 I	will	 then	 focus	on	 the	 long-standing	debate	around	 the	
relation	between	agency	and	structure,	as	it	informed	many	of	the	studies	that	tried	to	
look	 at	 the	 agentic	 dimension	 in	 migration	 studies.	 Furthermore,	 a	 review	 of	 the	
relevant	literature	on	decision-making	processes	is	deemed	relevant	here;	in	particular,	
agent-based	 models	 of	 migration	 provide	 a	 set	 of	 key	 concepts	 that	 will	 be	 further	
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In	 migration	 studies,	 due	 to	 the	 emphasis	 on	 the	 forced	 nature	 of	 asylum	
migration,	 asylum-seekers	 and	 refugee’s	 agentic	 dimension	 has	 been	 somehow	
neglected.	As	De	 Jong	 and	Fawcett	 point	 out,	 ‘forced	migration	 is	 of	 course	 a	 topic	 of	
considerable	interest	and	significance,	but	not	to	respect	to	individual	decision	making’	
(1981:	 45).	 On	 the	 same	 line,	 Bakewell	 (2010)	 argues	 ‘we	 may	 try	 to	 explore	 the	
political,	 economic	 social	 factors	which	 forced	 them	 to	move,	 but	we	 do	 not	 need	 to	
explain	 them	 in	 terms	 of	 their	 exercising	 agency’.	 In	 a	 way,	 many	 could	 argue	 that	
considering	 asylum	 seekers’	 agency	 equals	 denying	 the	 very	 nature	 of	 asylum	
movements,	which	are	forced	in	character.	According	to	this	view,	asylum	seekers	flee	
immediate	 dangers	 and	 persecution	 on	 the	 grounds	 of	 the	 1951	 Geneva	 Convention;	
they	seek	refuge	in	safe	countries	and	any	argument	that	might	imply	that	there	is	more	
to	 just	 safety	 in	asylum	seekers	 flows	 is	 seen	as	undermining	 the	distinction	between	
asylum	seekers	and	other	kinds	of	migrants.		
As	a	result,	the	literature	has	mostly	developed	in	three	directions.	The	first	one	
addresses	 the	 issue	 of	 distinguishing	 between	 refugees	 and	 other	migrants.	 A	 certain	
degree	of	dissimilarity	exists	in	scholars’	opinions	about	what	are	the	identifying	traits	
of	the	refugee.	According	to	Koser	(1997),	it	is	possible	to	distinguish	scholars	between	
realists	 and	 nominalists.	 The	 first	 group	 sees	 refugee	 movements	 as	 provoked	 by	
political	 factors	–	rather	 than	economic	ones	–	and	as	 involuntary.	For	example,	Kunz	
(1973)	 claims	 that	 refugee	movements	 are	 kinetic	 in	 nature.	 In	 fact,	 it	 is	 possible	 to	
distinguish	 them	 from	 voluntary	migration	movements	 because	 of	 the	 ‘reluctance	 to	
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involuntary	 nature	 of	 refugee	 movements,	 also	 points	 out	 the	 complexity	 of	 the	
distinction	 between	 refugees	 and	 other	migrants.	 Indeed,	 in	 her	 view,	 the	 dichotomy	
between	voluntary	and	involuntary	movements	cannot	be	the	only	criterion	to	identify	
the	 refugee;	 in	 contrasting	 this	 figure	with	 the	 ‘economic	migrant’	 she	 enumerates	 a	
series	of	dissimilarities	that	somehow	spotlight	the	refugee’s	own	characteristics.	First	
of	 all,	 the	 refugee	 is	 pushed	 to	 leave	 his/her	 home	 country	 by	 political	 reasons.	
Secondly,	 the	 decision	 of	 leaving	 the	 country	 of	 origin	 is	 charged	 with	 negative	
associations.	Thirdly,	refugee	movements	are	generally	collective,	as	they	are	started	by	
dramatic	changes	in	the	refugee’s	home	country;	as	a	consequence,	their	flight	is	often	
unplanned	 and	 refugees	 face	 it	 unprepared.	 Fourthly,	 the	 refugee’s	 often	 traumatic	
experience,	 his/her	 suffering	 prior	 to	 the	 flight,	 has	 strong	 repercussion	 on	 his/her	
present	and	future,	and	the	settlement	in	the	host	society	is	made	even	more	difficult	as	
he/she,	 differently	 from	 other	 migrants,	 is	 not	 always	 able	 to	 choose	 the	 country	 of	
destination.	This	implies,	according	to	Joly,	that	the	cultural	‘compatibility’	with	the	host	
society	 is	 often	 lower.	 Consequently,	 refugees	 ‘have	 experienced	 the	 most	 complete	
dislocation	of	their	social	world.	They	are	deprived	of	power	as	social	actors	both	in	the	
country	of	 origin	 and	 the	 country	of	 reception’	 (1996:	 149-150).	Nominalist	 scholars,	
instead,	 criticise	 the	 dichotomy	 between	 political	 and	 economic	 circumstances	 as	
precursor	 factors	 of	 refugee	 movements,	 as	 they	 are	 inextricably	 linked	 (Richmond	
1995).	 These	 scholars	 also	 claim	 that,	 as	 there	 is	 often	 a	 degree	 of	 constraint	 in	 the	




various	 degrees	 of	 freedom	 in	 decision	 making,	 the	 other	 denoting	 different	
combinations	of	economic,	social	and	political	factors	that	lead	to	the	flight	(Richmond	
1995,	1988;	Zolberg,	Suhrke	and	Aguayo	1989).	Richmond	(1995),	for	instance,	points	




could	 lead	 to	 different	 kinds	 of	 migration	 movements.	 Schmeidl	 (1996)	 states	 that,	




which	 represent	 as	 well	 triggers	 and	 precursors	 of	 flights.	 Furthermore,	 other	
researchers	 have	 revealed	 evidence	 of	 the	 existence	 of	 such	 factors	 (for	 example:	
Colson,	2003;	and	Guy	2003).	
A	second	current	in	refugee	studies	has	focused	on	the	decision-making	process	
of	 asylum	 seekers,	with	particular	 attention	 to	 patterns	 of	 destination.	 This	 issue	has	
been	 explored	 through	 very	 interesting	 case	 studies.	 Making	 a	 distinction	 between	
anticipatory	 refugee	 movements	 and	 acute	 refugee	 movements	 (Johansson,	 1990)	
different	factors	have	been	identified	that	explain	patterns	of	origin	and	destination	for	









the	 modern	 sovereign	 state	 (Bartleson,	 1995)	 and	 addresses	 issues	 related	 to	 how	
immigration	 policies	 are	 influenced	 by	 the	 perception	 of	 the	 ‘refugee	 problem’	 at	 the	
international	 level.	This	research,	 for	 instance,	addresses	the	 impact	of	EU	regulations	








As	 Vicki	 Squire	 (2017)	 points	 out,	 in	 recent	 years	 ‘an	 emphasis	 on	 migrant	
agency	has	become	 increasingly	prominent	 in	 literatures	 in	 the	 field	of	migration	and	
border	studies,	precisely	in	order	to	challenge	oversimplified	conceptions	of	people	on	
the	 move	 either	 as	 victims	 of	 violence	 and	 exploitation	 or	 as	 villains	 who	 commit	
crimes’	 (255).	 As	 a	 matter	 of	 fact,	 one	 should	 be	 aware	 that,	 when	 it	 comes	 to	





Indeed,	 the	 discussion	 about	 structure	 and	 agency	 raises	 questions	 about	 the	
intentionality	 or	 constraint	 of	migrants,	 thus	 risking	 to	 easily	 legitimise	 assumptions	
that	portray	asylum	seekers	either	as	victims	or	as	culpable	of	their	own	situation,	if	not	
as	‘bogus’.		
This	 debate	 has	 been	 very	 thoroughly	 analysed	 by	 Colin	 Hay	 (2002),	 who	
categorises	 the	positions	of	 social	 scientists	on	 the	 issue	of	 structure	and	agency	 into	
‘structuralists’	 or	 ‘functionalist’	 on	 the	 one	 side	 and	 ‘intentionalists’,	 social	
phenomenologists,	interactionists,	and	ethnometodologists	on	the	other	side.		The	first	
category	 believes	 that	 the	 primary	 and	most	 significant	 element	 in	 human	 behaviour	
should	be	recognized	in	social	structures	and	institutions,	as	they	constrain,	and	more	
generally	 shape	 individuals’	 dispositions	 towards,	 and	 capacities	 for,	 action.	 As	 a	
consequence,	structures	cannot	be	understood	as	simply	the	sum	of	the	individuals	by	
which	they	are	made	up,	but	possess	peculiar	characteristics	and	properties	that	shape	
the	 social	 world.	 Methodologically,	 these	 scholars	 relie	 mostly	 on	 structural	 or	
contextual	 factors	 in	 addressing	 the	 issue	 on	what	 determines	migration	 (Hay,	 2002:	
93-95)1.	 In	 the	structuralist	approach,	 the	 focus	 is	 this	on	 the	conditions	under	which	
migration	occur	and	the	structures	that	shape	it;	individual	agency,	when	considered,	is	
regarded	 as	 constrained.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 the	 intentionalist	 approach	 stresses	 the	
centrality	 of	 the	 agent	 as	 the	 most	 important	 theoretical	 and	 ontological	 element	 in	
social	 systems;	 social	 structure	 is	 therefore	 seen	 as	 an	 epiphenomenon:	 a	 result	 and	
consequence	 of	 the	 actions	 and	 activities	 of	 interacting	 individuals.	Methodologically,	
institutionalists	 tend	to	 look	more	at	 the	ability	of	 the	migrant	 to	act	 in	ways	that	are	
not	constrained	by	the	context	(Squire,	2017:	257).	To	its	extreme,	this	argument	falls	
																																																								
1	 An	 example	 is	 the	 work	 of	 Castles	 and	 Miller	 (2008),	 who	 focus	 on	 ‘push’	 and	 ‘pull’	 factors	 as	




thus,	 overlooking	 the	 role	 of	 structures	 in	 shaping	 the	 choices	 available	 to	 the	
individual.		
The	 limits	 of	 such	 both	 approaches	 are	 evident:	 none	 of	 them	 can	 allow	 for	 a	
complete	account	of	human	behaviour,	able	to	take	into	consideration	both	the	micro-
level	of	the	agent	behaviour	and	the	macro-level	of	structure.	Thus,	many	theorists	have	
attempted	 to	 find	 a	 balance	 between	 the	 two	 approaches	 and	 to	 combine	 them	 in	 a	
consistent	and	solid	design2.	
In	 this	 respect,	 structuration	 theory	 of	 Anthony	 Giddens	 has	 been	 strongly	
influential	 in	 challenging	 this	 dualism	 (Squire,	 2017).	 It	 represents	 ‘one	 of	 the	 best-
known	 and	 more	 articulated	 efforts	 to	 integrate	 agency	 and	 structure’	 (Ritzer	 and	
Goodman,	2004:	379)3.	In	order	to	integrate	both	agency	and	structure,	Giddens	surveys	
modern	theories	trying	to	overcome	their	deficiencies.	Thus,	if	on	one	side	he	draws	on	
the	 concepts	 of	 methodical	 and	 practical	 consciousness	 in	 order	 to	 overcome	 the	








2	Among	 the	exponents	of	 this	approach	we	can	 find	G.	Simmel	 (The	Metropolis	and	Mental	Life,	1903;	
and	The	Philosophy	of	Money,	1907),	P.	Bourdieu	(An	Outline	of	Theory	of	Practice,	1972),	P.	Berger	and	
T.	Luckmann	(Social	Construction	of	reality,	1996),	J.	Coleman	(Foundation	of	Social	Theories,	1990).	In	
the	 field	 of	 IR,	 for	 instance,	 scholars	 have	 recently	 focused	 on	 ‘political	 action’,	 that	 is	 the	 political	





form	of	 societal	 totality,	but	social	practices	ordered	across	space	and	 time’	 (Giddens,	
1984:	2).	
At	 the	 heart	 of	 structuration	 theory	 Giddens	 places	 the	 concepts	 of	 ‘structure’,	
‘system’	and,	even	more	important,	‘duality	of	structure’	(Giddens,	1984:	2).	The	latter	is	
indeed	the	concept	that	allows	him	to	build	a	bridge	between	agency	and	structure:	 it	
represents	 ‘the	essential	 recursiveness	of	 social	 life,	 as	 constituted	 in	 social	practices:	
structure	 is	 both	 medium	 and	 outcome	 of	 the	 reproduction	 of	 practices.	 Structure	
enters	 simultaneously	 into	 the	 consititution	 of	 the	 agent	 and	 social	 practices,	 and	
‘exists’	 in	 the	 generating	 moments	 of	 its	 constitution’	 (Giddens,	 1979:	 5).	 	 In	 other	
words,	 structure	 and	 agency	 are	 dependent	 upon	 each	 other,	 but	 also	 constrain	 each	
other.	Therefore,	neither	social	structures	nor	social	actions	can	exist	independently	of	
one	another4.	In	Giddens’	view,	structure	is	represented	by	‘the	structuring	properties5	
which	make	 it	 possible	 for	 discernibly	 similar	 social	 practices	 to	 exist	 across	 varying	
spans	of	 time	and	space	and	which	 lend	 them	systemic	 form’	 (Giddens,	1984:	17).	 	 In	
this	 sense,	 structures	 are	 intended	 as	 resources	 both	 materially	 and	
phenomenologically	(Stones,	2005):	on	one	hand,	they	represent	the	material/physical	
setting	that	give	the	agent	the	capability	and	the	conditions	to	perform	the	action6;	on	
the	 other	 hand,	 they	 can	 be	 intended	 as	 agents’	 knowledgeability	 interiorised	 in	
memory	 traces7	 (Giddens,	 1984:	 377).	 Structure	 has	 another	 particular	 feature:	 it	 is	





5The	 structuring	 properties	 are	 the	 rules	 and	 resources	 that	 are	 drawn	 upon	 by	 agents	 during	 the	





said,	 structures	 are	 not	 only	 constraining,	 but	 also	 enabling:	 in	 fact,	 they	 sometimes	
allow	the	agent	to	conduct	an	action	that	otherwise	he	or	she	would	not	be	able	to	do.		
On	 the	 contrary,	 the	 system	 has	 an	 actual	 existence:	 it	 ‘comprises	 the	 situated	
activities	of	human	agents,	reproduced	across	time	and	space’	(Giddens,	1984:	25)	and,	
therefore,	 ‘analysing	 the	 structuration	of	 social	 systems	means	 studying	 the	modes	 in	
which	such	systems,	grounded	 in	 the	knowledgeable	activities	of	 situated	agents	who	
draw	 upon	 rules	 and	 resources	 in	 the	 diversity	 of	 action	 contexts,	 are	 produced	 and	
reproduced	in	interaction’	(25)8.		
Moreover,	 Giddens	 identifies	 three	 dimensions	 of	 structure	 (signification,	
domination,	and	 legitimation)	 to	which	correspond	different	 typologies	of	 interaction,	
communication,	 power,	 and	 sanction	 respectively.	 The	 three	 dimension	 are	 always	
involved	 in	 any	action	 (Giddens,	1984:	31;	 Stones,	2005:	17).	Between	 them,	Giddens	
introduces	‘modalities’	(interpretive	scheme,	facility,	and	norm)	in	order	to	‘clarify	the	
main	dimensions	of	 the	duality	of	structure	 in	 interaction,	relating	 the	knowledgeable	
capacities	of	agents	to	structural	features’	(Giddens,	1984:	28).	That	is,	a	social	system	
can	 be	 explained	 and	 understood	 by	 its	 structure,	modality	 and	 interaction.	 The	 first	
one	 refers	 to	 rules	 and	 resources	 governing	 and	 available	 to	 agents9.	 The	 second,	
instead,	 represents	 the	means	by	which	structures	are	drawn	upon	during	 the	action.	
Here,	 as	 critics	 have	 pointed	 out,	 the	 distinction	 between	 structures	 internal	 and	
																																																								
8	Of	 course,	 as	 structures	are	virtual,	 they	do	not	have	 structures	but	 structural	properties	 (Ritzer	 and	
Goodman,	 2004:	 382).	 Let’s	 clarify	 this	 with	 the	 example	 on	 language.	 It	 is	 clear	 to	 everyone	 that	 it	











external	 to	 the	 individual	 is	 not	 so	 clear.	 Finally,	 the	 third	 denotes	 the	 activity	
instantiated	by	the	agent	acting	within	the	social	system.		
From	the	analysis	carried	on	until	here,	we	can	deduce	that	in	Giddens’s	model	a	
very	 important	 role	 is	 given	 to	 the	 agent	 and	 praxis.	 Agents	 are	 knowledgeable	 and	
competent,	 and	 reproduce,	 through	 their	 engagement	 in	 the	 process	 of	 interaction,	
entire	 social	 systems.	 We	 can	 understand	 this	 better	 by	 considering	 shortly	 the	
‘Stratification	 Model	 of	 the	 Agent’	 (Giddens,	 1984:	 5-14).	 	 First	 of	 all,	 the	 agent	 is	
situated	 in	a	structural	context	and	 is	propelled	 to	act	or,	more	 formally,	 to	engage	 in	
praxis,	by	his	or	her	desires,	projects,	wants,	that	are	involved	in	the	motivational	aspect	
(Cf.	Stones,	2005:	24-29)	of	agency	and	can	be	more	or	less	purposeful,	or	routinized,	or	
conscious10.	 Then,	 in	 order	 to	 reach	 his	 or	 her	 aim,	 the	 agent	 draws	 upon	 his	 or	 her	
knowledge	 about	 the	 structure	 in	 order	 to	 employ	 them	 as	 a	 medium	 of	 the	 action	
(rationalisation	of	action).	The	better	the	quality	of	the	knowledge	about	the	context	the	
less	 probable	 for	 the	 agent	 to	 have	 unexpected	 consequences.	 The	 rationalisation	 of	
action,	then,	implies	on	one	side	degrees	of	knowledgeability	and,	on	the	other	side,	the	
engagement	of	the	agent	in	establishing	a	hierarchy	between	his	or	her	projects,	wants,	
desires.	 It	 is	 through	 the	 reflexive	 monitoring	 therefore	 that	 the	 agent	 is	 able	 to	
organise	his	or	her	practises	according	to	the	hierarchy	established	by	him	or	her	and	
taking	 into	account	 the	 context	 and	 the	 structure	of	 action.	Of	 course,	 as	we	 said,	 the	




10‘Motivation	 refers	 to	 the	 potential	 for	 action	 rather	 than	 to	 the	mode	 in	 which	 action	 is	 chronically	




of	 choice:	 they	 can	 always	 choose	 to	 do	 otherwise.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 however,	 they	
experiment	 ‘constraints’11;	 these	 can	 involve	 for	 instance	 physical	 limitations,	 but	
considerations	about	time	and	space	are	relevant	here.	In	fact,	time	and	space	have	an	
impact	 on	 both	 the	 external	 structure	 and	 on	 the	 outcomes	 of	 action.	 As	 to	 the	 first,	
agents	are	historically	(time)	and	geographically	(space)	positioned	and	this	can	make	
more	actions	more	realizable	 than	others	(Cf.	Stones,	2005:	28).	As	 to	 the	second,	 the	
bigger	 the	 temporal	 (and	perhaps	also	geographical)	distance	between	 the	action	and	
the	outcome,	the	less	predictable	the	outcomes	(Giddens,	1984:	110-116).		
Moreover,	 agents’	 knowledge	 is	 sometimes	 ‘tacit’	 but,	 in	 Giddens	 view,	 they	
‘routinely…maintain	 a	 continuing	 «theoretical	 understanding»	 of	 the	 grounds	 of	 their	
activity’	 (Giddens,	1984:	5).	Therefore,	 for	Giddens,	 the	most	 important	and	prevalent	
kind	 of	 knowledge	 in	 social	 relations	 is	 the	 one	 that	 is	 often	 taken	 for	 granted,	 not	




bridging	 agency	 and	 structure	 has	 failed,	 as	what	 the	 author	 considers	 and	names	 as	
‘structure’	 (rules	and	 resources	of	 the	virtual	order)	 is	 something	very	different	 from	
the	 classical	 idea;	 therefore,	 the	 ‘duality	of	 structure’	works	only	because	 structure	 is	
																																																								
11	 ‘The	 nature	 of	 constraint	 is	 historically	 variable,	 as	 are	 the	 enabling	 qualities	 generated	 by	 the	
contextualities	of	human	action.	It	is	variable	in	relation	to	the	material	and	institutional	circumstances	of	
activity,	 but	 also	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 forms	 of	 knowledgeability	 that	 agents	 possess	 about	 those	
circumstances’	(Giddens,	1984:	179).	
12	Discoursive	 consciousness	 refers	 to	 the	 competency	 of	 actors	 in	 reporting	discoursively	 ‘about	 their	
intentions	in,	and	reasons	for,	acting	as	they	do’	(Giddens,	1984:	6).	This	distinction	is	permeable,	and	can	
be	shifted	through	socialization	and	learning	experiences	(Giddens,	1984:	7).	Thus,	when	an	agent	gives	






concepts	 of	 virtuality	 of	 structure	 and	 voluntarism,	 and	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 constraints	
cause	 an	 underestimation	 of	 the	 importance	 of	 the	 cultural	 system	 (Archer,	 1988):	
‘Since	what	 is	 instantiated	depends	on	 the	power	of	agency	and	not	 the	nature	of	 the	
property	[of	the	rule	or	constituent	of	the	cultural	system],	then	properties	themselves	




tries	 to	 apply	 it	 to	 empirical	 analysis.	 These	 limitations,	 and	 many	 more,	 have	 been	
recognised	 by	 Stones	 (1991,	 1996,	 2005)	 who	 attempts	 to	 overcome	 the	 theoretical	




concept	 of	 ontology	 in	 situ	 as	 different	 from	Giddens’s	 ontology	 in	 general;	 secondly,	
introduces	 an	 meso-level	 of	 ontological	 abstraction	 and	 a	 meso-level	 of	 ontological	
scale;	 thirdly,	 elaborates	 a	 quadripartite	 cycle	 of	 structuration	 from	 the	 duality	 of	
structure;	 lastly,	 conceptualises	 what	 he	 calls	 the	 independent	 causal	 forces	 and	 the	
irresistible	 causal	 forces.	 On	 the	 epistemological	 and	 methodological	 front,	 instead,	
Stones	distinguishes	appropriate	forms	of	methodological	bracketing	elaborating,	at	the	
same,	time	specific	methodological	steps	to	be	undertaken	by	the	researcher.	
According	 to	 Stone,	 Giddens’s	main	 concern	 is	 not	 to	 engage	 in	 conjuncturally	






at	 the	abstract	 level,	 also	 focus	his	attention	on	 the	substantive	 level;	 the	author	calls	
this	the	ontic-level13.		
As	 stated	 above,	 Stones	 also	 introduces	 a	 meso-level	 of	 ontological	 scale.	 The	
duality	 of	 structure	 requires	 that	 attention	 be	 paid	 both	 at	 the	 structures	 and	 at	 the	
categories	of	hermeneutics;	thus,	any	empirical	study	aiming	at	studying	a	structuration	
process	must	 provide	 itself	 of	 tools	 of	 hermeneutical	 and	 structural	 analysis	 (Stones,	
2005:	81).	Inevitably,	this	has	the	consequence	of	narrowing	the	scale	and	scope	of	the	
studies	that	can	be	undertaken	within	structuration	theory.	Therefore,	following	Parker	
(2000),	Stones	argues	 that	 the	scale	of	 temporality	within	which	 the	researcher	could	
study	both	structure	and	agency	is	the	‘intermediate	temporality	of	historical	processes’	
(Stones,	2005:	81):	it	allows	for	the	identification	of	both	‘the	relations	between	specific	
events	 and	 agency,	 and	 relations	 between	 events	 themselves’	 (Stones,	 2005:	 82).	
Drawing	 upon	 Cohen’s	 elaboration	 of	 position-practices	 relations14	 (1989),	 Stones	









passing	 through	 the	 meso-level,	 and	 the	 influence	 of	 empirical	 research	 on	 the	 modification	 and	
elaboration	 of	 ontological	 concepts.	 This	 means,	 in	 other	 words,	 that	 through	 empirical	 findings	 the	
theory	allows	for	creation	or	modification	of	concepts	adapting	the	theory	to	the	in-situ	situation.		
	




In	 his	 attempt	 of	 refinement	 of	 Giddens’s	 structuration	 theory,	 Stones	 draws	
upon	some	elements	emerged	through	debates	and	critiques	on	some	of	the	aspects	of	
the	 duality	 of	 structure15.	 Thus,	 the	 author	 develops	 a	 quadripartite	 model	 of	
structuration.	 It	encompasses	 four	elements:	 in	 first	place,	 the	external	 structure:	 this	
exists	outside	and	autonomously	from	the	agent-in-focus	and	represents	the	context	of	
action	 (here	 Stones	 consider	 the	 agent	 in	 his	 ‘action-horizon’);	 in	 second	 place,	 the	
internal	 (virtual)	 structures	 within	 the	 agent:	 these	 are	 in	 fact	 the	 means	 of	 agent’s	
conduct	(Stones,	2005:	86)	and	can	be	divided	into	two	categories,	the	conjuncturally-





by	 Giddens’s	 structuration	 theory	 about	 its	 ‘overly-voluntaristic’	 character	 (Archer,	
																																																								
15	In	particular,	he	attempts	to	clarify	the	distinction	between	internal	and	external	structures	(concerns	
in	 this	 sense	 were	 raised	 for	 example	 by	 Thompson,	 1997)	 and,	 more	 in	 general,	 tries	 to	 give	 more	
solidity	to	the	theory	in	view	of	its	application	in	the	substantive	level.	
16	The	term	‘dispositional’	has	been	elaborated	by	Mouzelis	with	reference	to	Mead’s	theory	on	adaptable	
dispositions	 and	 Bourdieu	 notion	 of	 habitus	 (Mouzelis,	 1991;	 Stones,	 2005).	 The	 latter	 refers	 to	 those	
memory	traces	or	habitual	schemas	that	are	taken	for	granted	by	the	agents.	Generally,	they	draw	upon	it	
without	noticing.	But,	suddenly,	the	individual	can	become	aware	of	it	as	the	external	conditions	subvert	
the	 routinized	 and	 taken-for-granted	part	 of	 the	 general	 dispositional.	 Thus	 the	 latter	 can	become	 ‘the	




the	 perceive	 their	 context	 (Stones,	 2005),	 	 and	 can	 be	 subdivided	 in	 the	 three	 elements	 of	 structures	
formalised	by	Giddens:	the	interpretive	schemes	(that	is,	how	other	individuals	will	interpret	the	action),	









Tompson)18.	 Thus,	 Stones	 introduces	 two	 concepts	 related	 to	 the	 external	 structure:	
independent	 causal	 influences	 and	 irresistible	 causal	 forces.	 The	 first	 refers	 to	 the	




to	 resist	an	external	 influence…[the	agents]	 feel	 they	do	not	have	 the	ability	 to	 resist’	
(Stones,	2005:	111).	Therefore,	these	are	not	independent	from	the	agent’s	feelings	on	
being	 (or	 not)	 powerless.	 Thus	 the	 agents	 would	 have	 to	 meet	 three	 ‘counterfactual	
conditions’	 in	 order	 to	 resist	 these	 pressures:	 to	 possess	 ‘adequate	 power	 to	 resist	
without	 endangering	 the	 conditions	 of	 possibility	 for	 the	 realisation	 of	 core	







As	 we	 said,	 one	 of	 the	 main	 concerns	 of	 Stones	 is	 Giddens’s	 neglect	 of	
epistemology	and	methodology.	 In	particular	Stones	criticises	the	conceptual	practical	




understood	 as	 the	 conduct	 of	 people	 on	 the	move,	 who	 reproduce	 or	 transform	 (although	 with	 great	




and	conduct	analysis19.	Stones	argues	 that	 institutional	analysis	 should	be	substituted	
with	 context	 analysis,	 as	 the	 latter	 is	 better	 complementary	 to	 conduct	 analysis20.	
Finally,	 Stones	 provides	 a	 very	 interesting	 description	 of	 the	 recurrent	 steps	 to	 be	
undertaken	 by	 the	 researcher	 willing	 to	 conduct	 a	 study	 informed	 by	 the	 strong	
structuration	ontology21.		
Stones	 brings	 some	 new	 elements	 to	 structuration	 theory.	 In	 particular,	 his	
emphasis	is	on	the	aspects	of	the	theory	that	have	mainly	given	rise	to	ruthless	critiques	
in	 the	Academia.	 Indeed,	 the	 clarifications	 and	 further	 distinctions	 brought	 by	 Stones	
give	new	light	to	some	parts	of	the	theory	that	would	have	been	otherwise	left	on	the	
philosophical	 level	with	no	 serious	 and	 concrete	 application.	 In	doing	 so,	 he	modifies	
the	 theory	 through	 a	 dialectical	 engagement	 with	 the	 critics	 giving	 birth	 to	 a	 new	
‘stronger’	 version	 of	 new	 structuration	 theory.	 	 Nonetheless,	 this	 theory	 still	 carries	
some	of	the	limitations	that	where	criticised	in	Gidden’s	theory.	For	instance,	according	
to	Spaargaren	(2006),	Stones	reintroduces	back	 into	structuration	 theory	some	of	 the	
dichotomies	 Giddens	 tried	 to	 overcome	 with	 the	 very	 formulation	 of	 it,	 such	 as	 the	
dichotomy	between	individual	(instead	of	‘agency’)	and	society	(instead	of	‘structure’),	
																																																								
19	 The	 first	 one	 is	 the	 ‘social	 analysis	 which	 places	 in	 suspension	 the	 skills	 and	 awareness	 of	 actors,	
treating	 institutions	 as	 chronically	 reproduced	 rules	 and	 resources’	 (Giddens,	 1984:	 375).	 The	 second	
one,	 instead,	 is	 the	 ‘social	 analysis	 which	 places	 in	 suspension	 institutions	 as	 chronically	 reproduced,	




knowledge	which	 is	drawn	upon	 in	 the	 conjuncturally-specific	 internal	 structures	 and,	 therefore,	 takes	
into	account	the	other	relevant	part	of	the	quadripartite	cycle	of	structuration.		
21	 Firstly,	 the	 researcher	 should	 consider	 the	 ‘general-dispositional	 frames’	 through	 conduct	 analysis;	
secondly,	the	researcher	should	shift	his	or	her	attention	to	the	conjuncturally-specific	structures	of	the	
agent	 (that	 is,	 how	he	or	 she	perceive	 the	 external	 structure	 from	 the	angle	of	his	or	her	own	aims	or	
projects);	always	as	 the	second	stage,	 the	researcher	should	now	focus	on	how	the	agent	hierarchically	
organises	his	or	her	own	aims	or	project;	thirdly,	the	researcher	should	identify,	through	context	analysis,	
the	 existence	 of	 external	 structures	 and	 how	 the	 agents	 are	 positioned	 in	 them;	 lastly,	 the	 researcher	
should	 take	 into	 account	 the	 space	 left	 for	 a	 modification	 of	 the	 external	 agencies,	 and	 diversity	 of	













are	 recognised	 as	 particular	 relevant	 in	 this	 thesis.	 First	 of	 all,	 the	 underlying	
assumption	 of	 rationality	 of	 the	 actor.	 Agents	 choose	 rationally	 (almost	 strategically)	
the	 means	 upon	 which	 the	 draw	 to	 reach	 their	 project;	 in	 other	 occasions,	 they	 act	
almost	 unconsciously	 through	 habitus.	 However,	 a	 specific	 account	 on	 how	 an	 actor	
takes	 a	 decision	 is	 somehow	 absent	 and	 the	 important	 role	 of	 emotions	 in	 decision-
making	and	the	way	migrants	strategise	their	moves	is	neglected.	Secondly,	how	agents’	
perceptions	 about	 the	 structure	 are	 produced,	 shared	 and	 re-inforced	 through	
interactions	 thus	 creating	 ‘information’	 that	 migrants	 can	 draw	 upon	 is	 particularly	
relevant	 as	 it	 will	 be	 discussed	 across	 the	 thesis.	 The	 gap	 in	 theory	 here	 would	 be	
whether	 general-dispositions	 and	 conjuncturally-specific	 knowledge	 about	 external	
structures	are	drawn	upon	in	the	same	way.	
Colin	 Hay’s	 (2002)	 concept	 of	 ‘strategic	 actor’,	 made	 from	 a	 critical	 realist	
perspective,	seems	here	more	fit	to	address	the	above	mentioned	issues	–	that	are	the	
focus	 of	 these	 thesis.	 According	 to	 the	 author,	 actors	 are	 ‘capable	 of	 devising	 and	
revising	means	to	realise	their	intentions.	This	immediately	implies	a	relationship,	and	a	
dynamic	 relationship	 at	 that,	 between	 the	 actor	 (individual	 or	 collective)	 and	 the	
	 26	
context	 in	 which	 she	 finds	 herself.	 For,	 to	 act	 strategically,	 is	 to	 project	 the	 likely	




structures	 conditions	 for	 courses	 of	 actions.	Hay’s	 strategic	 actor	 does	 not	 act	 on	 the	
basis	 of	 full	 knowledge,	 instead,	 s/he	 however,	 is	 not	 always	 fully	 cognisant	 of	 the	
structuring	conditions	that	frame	his/her	capacity	to	act.	As	Mainwaring	(2016)	points	
out,	Hay’s	work	is	relevant	in	that	 it	applies	to	the	decision-making	capacity	of	people	
on	 the	 move,	 who	 are	 complex	 strategic	 actors	 who	 make	 decisions	 and	 negotiate	
conditions	that	are	far	from	easy	(see	also	Squire,	2017).	
As	Squire	(2017)	points	out,	this	theory	presents	some	limitations,	that	is	the	fact	















decision-making	 applied	 to	 migration	 models.	 As	 pointed	 out	 by	 Klabunde	 and	
Willekens	(2016),	the	literature	on	migration	in	the	field	of	demography	tried	to	explain	
observed	migration	 flows	 in	 order	 to	 predict	 future	 migration	 and	 relied,	 for	 a	 long	
time,	on	 the	 “gravity	model”,	which	postulates	 that	 ‘the	volume	of	migration	between	
two	 locations	 increases	 with	 population	 size	 in	 each	 location	 and	 decreases	 with	
geographical	distance	between	the	locations’	(Klabunde	and	Willekens,	2016:	73).	This	
model	underwent	different	modifications	culminating	in	the	‘spatial	interaction	models’	
that	 considered	 other	 determinants	 of	migration	 and	 historical	migration	 patterns	 in	
addition	 to	 population	 size	 and	 geographical	 distance.	 These	models,	 however,	while	
accounting	for	macro-level	migration	flows,	 failed	to	capture	the	 individual	dimension	
which	 originated	 those	 flows.	 This	 gap	 was	 partially	 filled	 since	 the	 2000s	 by	
‘microsimulation	 models’,	 which	 put	 the	 individual	 at	 the	 centre	 of	 the	 model	 and	
started	considering	individual	actions	a	results	of	decision	processes	(as	an	example	see	
Billari	 and	Prskawetz,	 2003).	 In	 these	models,	 individuals	 are	 treated	 as	 autonomous	
entities	 and	 the	 interaction	 between	 them	 is	 considered	 varying	 depending	 on	
randomized	 parameters	 that	 represent	 individual	 preferences	 and	 tendencies.	
However,	 many	 scholars,	 such	 as	 Klevmarken	 (2008)	 for	 instance,	 highlighted	 the	
shortcomings	of	these	models	and,	in	particular,	the	lack	of	details	and	clarity	about	‘the	
path	[economic]	subjects	follow	to	reach	a	decision’	(33).		






move	 elsewhere	 and	 destinations	 are	 evaluated	 according	 to	 the	 same	 parameters.	
While	 focusing	 on	 the	 individual,	most	 of	 these	models	 also	 address	 how	 institutions	
and	the	 interaction	with	other	 individuals	affect	migration.	Some	of	 these	models	also	
recognise	 the	 impact	of	 life	events	on	 the	utility	or	value	attributed	 to	migration,	and	
therefore	try	to	incorporate	them	as	variables.		
Further	 progress	 in	 the	 direction	 of	 incorporating	 individual	 decision-making	
into	migration	model	has	been	achieved	since	the	2000s	by	‘agent-based	models’,	which	
consider	 individual	 agents,	 their	 decision-making	 processes,	 and	 the	 outcome	 of	





These	models	 differ	 considerably	 among	 each	 other	 but,	 nevertheless,	 provide	
important	 reference	 points	 when	 discussing	 individual	 decision-making.	 They	 are	
relevant,	for	the	purpose	of	this	thesis,	in	that	they	help	identifying	important	issues	in	
the	 decision-making	 process	 to	 build	 upon.	 Firstly,	 they	 give	 a	 precise	 definition	 of	
agent.	 According	 to	Macal	 and	North	 (2010),	 agents	 are	 distinct	 autonomous	 entities	
that	take	decision	following	rules.	Individuals,	however,	are	not	considered	as	isolated	
beings;	 in	 fact,	 they	 interact	 with	 each	 other	 and	 they	 can	 be	 influenced	 by	 other	
individuals	 or	 by	 the	 outcome	 of	 their	 interaction.	 It	 follows	 that	 interaction	 among	
individuals	 according	 to	 behavioural	 rules	 create	 complex	 patterns	 at	 the	 population	
level	(Klabunde	and	Willekens,	2016:	77).	It	can	be	argued,	then,	that	these	models	also	
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developed	 from	 economic	 theory	 and	 focus	 on	 utility	 maximisation	 as	 a	 driver	 for	
decision-making	–	 is	 that	 they	 recognise	 the	 importance	of	 information	acquisition	as	
part	of	the	decision-making	process.	For	instance,	some	of	these	models	(e.g.	Silveira	et	
al.	 2006)	 posit	 that	 individuals	 move	 to	 maximise	 their	 income.	 In	 order	 to	 identify	
which	 location	 guarantees	 the	 highest	 income	 the	 individual	 collects	 information	
through	 a	 comparison	 of	 their	 neighbours’	 earnings:	 if	 his/her	 income	 is	 lower	 than	
his/her	neighbours’,	s/he	will	decide	to	move.	Despite	the	deterministic	approach	and	
oversimplification	 of	 reality	 of	 such	 theories,	 they	 highlight	 that	 information	 is	 a	 key	
asset	 in	 decision-making	 and	 that	 individuals	 can	 elaborate	 different	 strategies	 to	
obtain	relevant	information.		
A	 third	 relevant	 aspect,	 linked	 to	 information	 availability,	 is	 that	 some	models	
(e.g.	Jansenn,	2010;	Hafizoglu	and	Sen,	2012)	take	into	account	 ‘shortcuts’	 in	decision-
making:	individuals	often	rely	on	strategies	that	ignore	part	of	the	information	in	order	
to	 ‘take	 decisions	 more	 quickly	 and	 /or	 accurately	 than	 more	 complex	 methods’	
(Klabunde	and	Willekens,	2016:	81).	These	strategies	are	what	Tversky	and	Khaneman	
(1974)	defined	as	‘heuristics’24,	that	is	cognitive	processes	that	are	not	based	on	perfect	









themselves	 in	 a	 situation	 of	 scarcity	 of	 relevant	 information	 and	 need	 to	 recur	 to	
different	strategies	to	overcome	the	obstacles	they	face.		
Finally,	agent-based	models	of	migration	also	cover	a	wide	range	of	approaches	
that	derive	form	social	psychology.	The	 ‘planned	behaviour	model’	 first	 formulated	by	
Ajzen	(1991)	and	 its	 following	developments	by	Kniveton	et	al.	 (2011)	 is	 relevant	 for	
the	purpose	of	this	study	as	it	also	highlights	the	role	of	subjectivity	in	decision-making	
processes	 and	 emphasises	 the	 distinction	 between	 desired	 and	 actual	 behaviour.	
According	to	Fishbein	and	Ajzen	theory	(1980;	2010),	an	individual	evaluates	different	
outcomes	 of	 the	 action	 he/she	 is	 considering	 to	 take	 and	 ponders	 the	 probability	
(subjective)	they	have	to	occur.	This	processes	generates	an	attitude	towards	the	action	
(in	our	case,	migration).	This	attitude	does	not	necessarily	translate	into	the	intention	to	
migrate.	 The	 latter	 is	 in	 fact	 the	 result	 of	 a	 decision-making	 process	 that	 takes	 into	
account	 other	 factors,	 such	 as	 influence	 by	 others,	 and	 the	 perceived	 behavioural	
control	the	individual	perceives	to	have	over	the	action.	For	instance,	as	it	will	also	be	




them	addressing	diverse	 issues	often	under	 the	 lenses	of	different	 theories,	 they	help	
indeed	 identifying	some	of	 the	relevant	variables	or	key	questions	 to	be	considered	 if	
one	 is	 to	 address	 the	 problem	 of	 agency	 at	 the	 individual	 level.	 For	 instance,	 a	 very	
important	 question	 is	 the	 role	 of	 expectations	 in	 individual	 agency.	 It	 is	 evident	 that,	
usually,	 individuals	 take	 into	 consideration	 future	 outcomes	 when	 pondering	 their	
decisions,	thus	forming	expectations	of	what	may	(or	not)	happen	if	a	certain	action	is	
taken.	 In	 this	 respect,	 the	 consideration	 of	 the	 available	 information	 is	 of	 paramount	
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importance,	 as	 agent	 use	 information	 to	 predict	 future	 outcomes.	 In	 general,	 agent-
based	models	of	migration	consider	different	 levels	of	 information	available	to	agents,	
from	 perfect	 information	 to	 no	 information	 at	 all.	 On	 the	 one	 hand	 of	 the	 spectrum,	
models	 by	 Heiland	 (2003)	 and	 García-Díaz	 and	 Moreno-Monroy	 (2012)	 take	 into	
account	 individuals	with	perfect	 information	about	 the	present.	They	posit	 that	 if	 the	
environment	is	simple	and	different	individuals	behave	the	same	way,	agents	can	easily	
predict	 the	 future	 and	 form	 expectations	 that	 inform	 their	 agency	 (Klabunde	 and	
Willekens,	 2016:	 84).	 On	 the	 other	 end	 of	 the	 spectrum,	 individuals	 have	 almost	 no	
information	and,	therefore,	as	they	are	not	able	to	predict	the	future	and	form	reliable	
expectation	can	only	take	very	limited	decision	based	on	a	limited	time	framework	(e.g.	
Schweitzer,1998).	 The	 most	 common	 argument	 in	 agent-based	 models	 of	 migration,	
however,	is	that	individuals	act	neither	on	the	basis	of	full	information	nor	in	complete	
absence	 of	 it.	 These	 are	 actually	 the	most	 interesting	models	 as	 they	 need	 to	 give	 an	
account	of	how	individuals	use	the	available	 information.	As	pointed	out	by	Reichlová	
(2005),	 if	 actors	 have	 relevant	 information	 about	 one	 variable	 they	 take	 the	 decision	
assuming	that	the	other	variables	will	remain	constant.	Other	models,	instead,	posit	that	
if	 an	 individual	does	not	have	perfect	 information	on	any	variable,	 they	will	 resort	 to	
other	 strategies:	 for	 instance,	 they	 might	 compare	 him/herself	 to	 others	 that	 took	 a	
decision	 under	 the	 same	 circumstances	 and	 look	 at	 the	 outcomes	 of	 those	 decisions,	




the	 agents	 have	 little	 or	 complete	 information	 they	 will	 use	 very	 simple	 decision-
making	 rules	 that	 maximise	 utility.	 The	 highest	 level	 of	 sophistication	 is	 postulated,	
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instead,	 in	cases	where	agents	have	some	but	 imperfect	 information.	 In	 this	situation,	
they	will	need	 to	assess	different	variables	according	 to	 the	 information	 they	have	on	
each	of	them	and	often	consider	the	interplay	between	them.	
Finally,	 a	 very	 relevant	 feature	 of	 some	 of	 these	 models	 is	 that	 they	 try	 to	
incorporate	the	role	of	networks.	As	a	matter	of	fact,	there	is	a	common	understanding	
in	 migration	 theory	 that	 networks	 are	 an	 important	 factor	 in	 determining	 not	 only	
migration	 but	 also	 integration	 in	 the	 host	 country	 (among	 others	 see:	 Boyd,	 1989;	
Portes,	 1995	 and	 1998;	 Massey	 et	 al.,	 1998;	 Calavita,	 2005;	 Biao,	 2006).	 Migration	
researchers	have	typically	defined	migrant	networks25	as	interpersonal	ties	linking	kin,	
friends,	 and	 community	 members	 in	 their	 places	 of	 origin	 and	 destination	 (Poros,	
2011a)26.	Necessary	resources,	such	as	 information,	money,	persuasion,	 influence,	and	
aid	must	 be	 exchanged	within	 these	 ties	 to	make	migration	 possible	 (Poros,	 2011a).	
Some	 agent-based	 models,	 therefore,	 include	 some	 form	 of	 network	 influence	 over	
agency.	 In	 particular,	 networks	 are	 considered	 in	 these	 models	 as	 a	 form	 of	 social	
capital,	 and	 the	 mechanisms	 by	 which	 relevant	 resources	 are	 distributed	 among	









called	 “nodes,”	which	are	 tied	 together	by	different	 sorts	of	 relationships,	 such	as	 friendship,	economic	
exchange,	influence,	and	common	interests.		




this	 thesis,	 show	 that	 individuals	 often	 take	 into	 account	 considerations	 other	 than	
simply	 maximisation,	 many	 of	 which	 are	 ascribable	 to	 their	 emotional	 sphere	 (see	
among	other,	Svašek,	2010).	As	it	will	be	described	in	this	thesis,	emotions	play	a	very	
important	 role	 in	 the	 formation	 of	 perceptions	 which,	 in	 turn,	 inform	 agency	 (see	
chapter	 four).	 Secondly,	 agent-based	 models	 of	 migration	 tend	 to	 oversimplify	 the	
environment	in	which	the	decision-making	process	takes	place.	This	is	also	true	for	the	
ways	 expectations	 are	 formed	 in	 these	 models:	 most	 agents	 assume	 that	 today’s	
conditions	will	 be	 valid	 in	 the	 future	 as	well	 (Klabunde	 and	Willekens,	 2016:	 89).	 In	
reality,	 however,	 events	 occur	 that	modify	 today’s	 conditions	 and	 this	 is	 particularly	
true	for	migrants,	who	are	often	forced	to	make	decisions	on	the	basis	of	highly	variable	
contingent	 situations.	 Furthermore,	 many	 of	 these	 models	 do	 not	 account	 for	
subjectivity	 in	 a	 convincing	 way.	 As	 it	 will	 be	 discussed	 in	 chapter	 four,	 individual	
perceptions	play	a	fundamental	role	in	leading	to	specific	sets	of	expectations	and,	thus,	
in	 shaping	 agency.	 Finally,	 agent-based	 migration	 models	 often	 overlook	 human	 life	
course,	 by	 including	 a	 very	 limited	 set	 of	 events	 in	 the	 model	 (under	 the	 form	 of	
randomization).	 Nevertheless,	 it	 can	 be	 argued	 that	 an	 analysis	 of	 the	 way	 in	 which	











Indeed,	 as	 Boccagni	 and	 Baldassar	 (2015)	 among	 others	 point	 out,	 ‘the	 nexus	
between	 emotion	 and	migration	makes	 for	 an	 important	 research	 field’	 (74).	 Firstly,	
through	 the	 migration	 experience,	 the	 migrant	 is	 confronted	 with	 changing	
environments	 and	 different	 cultures	 that	 influence	 his/her	 emotions.	 A	 study	 of	
emotions	 ‘on	 the	move’	 can	be	effectively	 carried	out	especially	 through	 the	 lenses	of	
the	migration	process.	Secondly,	an	emphasis	on	emotions	could	help	overcoming	 the	
paradigm	of	the	migrant	as	a	‘rational	agent’	in	economic	terms,	that	was	predominant	
in	past	 approaches	 on	migration.	The	 study	of	 emotions	 could,	 in	 fact,	 provide	useful	
correctives	 (Boccagni	 and	 Baldassar,	 2015:	 74)	 to	 reinforce	 explanations	 of	 very	
debated	 instances,	 such	 as,	 for	 instance,	 transnational	 engagements	 and	 integration	
trajectories	to	the	host	societies.	Thirdly,	from	a	theoretical	point	of	view,	as	emotions	
are	 internal	 to	 the	 individual	sphere	and,	at	 the	same	time,	 interpersonal	 (as	 they	are	
intersubjectively	shared	and	expressed	in	the	public	domain),	they	can	‘link	micro	and	
macro	 level	 of	 analysis’	 (Turner	 and	 Stets,	 2005:	 1;	 also	 quoted	 in	 Boccagni	 and	
Baldassar,	2015:	74)	and	act	as	a	bridge	between	agency	and	structure	(as	posited	by	




‘dynamic	 process	 through	 which	 individuals	 experience	 and	 interpret	 the	 changing	
world,	position	themselves	vis-à-vis	others,	and	shape	their	subjectivities’	(868;	Svašek,	
2005,	2008).	This	 echoes	Hochschild	 (1983)	argument	 that	 ‘based	on	our	 feelings	we	
develop	our	own	view	of	the	world’	(41).	Therefore,	emotions	are	always	relevant,	and	
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and	 how	migrants’	 emotions	 are	 influenced	 by	 the	 host	 society	 (Svašek,	 2010).	 	 The	
focus	 has	 been	 on	 mainly	 two	 concepts:	 emotion	 work	 carried	 out	 by	 migrants	 and	
emotional	 transnationalism.	However,	 emotions	have	been	mostly	approached	 from	a	
pathological	perspective,	 that	 is,	negative	emotions	or	effects	of	being	emotional	have	









(Hochschild,	 1983;	 2002;	 2013):	 ‘feeling	 rules	 are	 what	 guide	 emotion	 work	 by	
establishing	 the	 sense	of	 entitlement	 or	 obligation	 that	 governs	 emotional	 exchanges’	
(56).		
The	concept	of	emotion	work	has	been	applied	to	migration	by	different	scholars	
interested	 in	 how	 migrants	 perform	 or	 negotiate	 their	 feelings.	 Among	 them,	 Mona	
																																																								
27	The	former	concept	refers	to	the	kind	of	emotional	management	that	occurs	in	a	private	setting,	where	






migrants	 to	 Sweden	 to	 facilitate	 their	 integration.	 In	 her	 view,	 emotion	 work	 is	 an	
intrinsic	 cognitive	 process	 of	 integration	 (Mona	 Lindqvist,	 2013:	 231).	 Following	
Bourdieu	 concept	 of	 ‘habitus’,	 she	 states	 that	 migrant	 women	 develop	 a	 ‘foreign	
habitus’,	which	enables	them	to	develop	and	perform	a	‘migrant-self’	(229).	The	marker	
of	this	habitus	is	the	feeling	of	being	a	stranger	(Lindqvist,	2013;	Albrecht,	2015).	This	
emotion	 arises	 from	 the	 acknowledgment	 that	 feeling	 rules	 are	 different	 in	 the	 new	
society	 and	 that,	 therefore,	 one’s	 own	 emotional	 behaviour	must	 be	 controlled	 in	 the	
public	 sphere	 to	 comply	 with	 normative	 expectations.	 Migrant	 woment	 then	 choose	
what	emotion	to	display	according	 to	social	rules	 in	 the	new	setting	(Lindqvist,	2013:	
233-242;	 Albrecht,	 2015:	 27).	 However,	 several	 criticisms	 have	 been	 raised	 against	
Lindqvist	work.	In	particular,	Albrecht	argues	that	the	author	does	not	fully	develop	the	
concept	 of	 foreign	 habitus,	 which	 remains	 quite	 undetermined	 in	 relation	 to	 the	
empirical	 material	 gathered	 in	 the	 study	 (Albrecht,	 2015:	 27)28.	 It	 would	 have	 been	
interesting	if	the	author	inductively	showed	what	specific	feeling	rules	were	adopted	by	
migrants	 in	 which	 specific	 situation	 and	 how	 migrants	 themselves	 described	 them.	
Furthermore,	Lindqvist	sample	 is	quite	small29	and	all	her	respondents	were	refugees	
with	 traumatic	 experiences	 in	 their	 home	 countries.	 This	 leads	 Albrecht	 (2015)	 to	










she	 highlights	 the	 feeling	 rules	 that	 the	 former	 deem	 to	 be	 relevant	 for	 the	 latter	 to	
comply	 with.	 Any	 deviation	 from	 performing	 those	 felling	 rules	 is	 ascribed	 by	
frontliners	to	migrants’	 lack	of	knowledge	on	the	society	of	arrival.	Very	 interestingly,	
she	also	highlights	a	sort	of	‘micropolitics	of	emotions’,	where	migrants	(who	have	less	
power	 in	 the	 relationship)	 need	 to	 show	 emotional	 restrain	 whereas	 local	 workers	
(who	have	more	power	in	the	relationship)	can	show	a	greater	emotional	register.	
The	concept	of	‘emotional	transnationalism’	–	where	transnationalism	is	defined	
as	 ‘the	 degree	 of	 connectivity	 of	 individuals	 and	 groups	 across	 borders’	 (Faist	 et	 al.,	
2014:	 12)	 has	 been	 evoked	 by	 Albrecht	 (2015)	 as	 a	 space	 for	 further	 expansion	 of	
sociological	research	on	emotions	in	the	context	of	migration	(31).	This	topic	has	been	
addressed	 by	 a	 limited	 number	 of	 scholars.	 Amongst	 them,	 Gu	 (2010)	 analyses	 how	
Taiwanese	women	migrated	 to	 Chicago	 develop	 strategies	 to	 deal	with	 suffering	 and	
distress.	 The	 pathological	 focus	 is	 here	 once	 again	 clear.	 The	 author	 posits	 that	 her	
informants	 try	 to	 control	 themselves	 by	 shifting	 from	 continuously	 from	 the	 social	
norms	 in	 the	 host	 society	 and	 those	 in	 the	 society	 of	 origin	 and	 vice-versa	 (687).	
However,	an	analysis	of	why	(and	which)	migrants	decide	to	recur	 to	one	 feeling	rule	
rather	 than	 to	 the	 other	 is	 lacking.	 A	 step	 forward	 in	 the	 topic	 of	 emotional	
transnationalism	has	been	taken	by	Albrecht	(2015),	who	argues	that:	
‘feeling	rules	and	patterns	serve	the	individual	for	interpreting	their	own	actions	
and	 interactions	 with	 other,	 which	 does	 not	 mean	 that	 individuals	 can	 only	 act	 in	
conformity	with	these	rules.	On	the	contrary,	a	decision	could	be	to	position	themselves	
against	these	rules	and	in	doing	so	being	capable	of	enacting	themselves’	(31).	
Migrants	 are	 engaged	 transnationally,	 and	 this	 creates	 transnational	 emotional	
spaces	that	influence	people	no	matter	the	place	where	they	are.	Transnational	spaces	
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are	 then	 ‘multidimensional	 and	 could	 convey	 an	 interesting	 frame	 for	 analysing	
emotions’	(31).	
If	 the	 connections	 between	 the	 ‘multiple	 emotional	 attachments	 of	migrants	 to	
their	homelands	and	new	places	of	residence,	and	the	emotional	 interactions	between	





to	act:	 feelings	are	often	consciously	managed	by	 individuals	 to	control	or	change	 the	
situation	 (876).	 Furthermore,	 the	 author	 sees	 emotions	 as	 embodied	 experiences.	
Emotions	could	be	based	not	only	on	actual	interaction	but	also	on	ideas:	memories	and	
imaginations	 could	 provoke	 as	 strong	 emotions	 as	 a	 bodily	 encounter.	 As	 it	 will	 be	
shown	in	the	course	of	this	thesis,	even	the	physical	manifestations	of	colonial	relations	




This	 partial	 review	 suggests	 that	 attention	 has	 been	 paid	 to	 the	 interplay	
between	 structure	 and	 agency,	 in	 order	 to	 identify	 particular	 structural	 contexts	 that	
force	migration	or	 to	develop	models	of	migration	 ranging	 from	reactive	 to	proactive	





work	 on	 Eritrean	 migrants,	 consider	 issues	 like	 the	 circulation	 of	 knowledge	 on	 the	
journey	 from	 Eritrea,	 the	 way	 refugee	 laws	 can	 trigger	 asylum	 seekers’	 actions,	
contributing	 to	 the	 growth	 of	 Eritrean	 human	 rights	movements,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 way	
national	measures	 can	 develop	 a	 specific	 representation	 of	 the	 state	 among	 Eritrean	
refugees.		
Following	this	trend,	this	research	attempts	to	develop	a	dynamic	understanding	





agency	 appears	 to	 be	 particularly	 fit.	 I	 will	 intend	 human	 agency	 as	 a	 ‘temporally	
embedded	process	of	social	engagement,	 informed	by	the	past	(in	 its	habitual	aspect),	
but	also	oriented	toward	the	 future	(as	a	capacity	 to	 imagine	alternative	possibilities)	
and	 toward	 the	present	 (as	 a	 capacity	 to	 contextualize	 past	 habits	 and	 future	project	
within	the	contingencies	of	the	moment’	(963).	This	conceptualization,	in	a	way,	allows	
for	 the	 considerations	 of	 all	 the	 relevant	 aspects	 of	 decision-making	 that	 have	 been	
previously	discussed.	
I	 will	 also	 focus	 on	 the	 concept	 of	 ‘perceptions’	 as	 a	 fundamental	 element	 in	
asylum-seekers	 agency.	 Here,	 perceptions	 are	 understood	 as	 a	 dynamic	 process	 of	
receiving,	selecting	and	interpreting	 information,	e.g.	a	particularly	structured	process	
of	 acquiring,	 collecting	 and	 assessing	 information	 on	 Italy	 and	 its	 asylum	 system.	
Perceptions	 could	 be	 considered	 as	 an	 element	 linking	 structure	 and	 agency.	 Some	
scholars	have	elaborated	a	passive	model	of	perceptions	(Gibson	1966,	1987;	Gregory	
1974)	 that	 was	widely	 used	 until	 the	 1960s	 and	 argued	 that	 perceptions	 depend	 on	
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various	 factors,	 i.e.,	 outside	 stimuli,	 guiding	 maps	 or	 models	 of	 the	 perceiving	 actor.	
Thus,	 this	 model	 underlines	 the	 reactivity	 of	 perceptions	 and	 on	 the	 importance	 of	
outside	stimuli.	Although	this	model	is	losing	momentum	nowadays,	we	still	can	assume	
that	events	 in	 Italy	and	the	activities	of	 Italian	actors	do	provide	occasions	and	assets	
for	 the	 formation	 and	 reproduction	 of	 perceptions	 by	 Eritrean	 actors.	 However,	 an	
active	model	 of	 perceptions	 is	 adopted	 in	 this	 study:	 a	 single	 activity	 can	 give	 rise	 to	
very	different	perceptions	so	they	are	systematically	biased	and	it	is	thus	important	to	
analyse	 ‘mental	 maps’	 of	 perceiving	 actors	 in	 order	 to	 empirically	 validate	 and	
theoretically	 understand	 individual	 or	 collective	 responses	 to	 outside	 stimuli.	
Perceptions	are	not	formulated	and	articulated	according	to	fixed	mental	maps,	but	are	
rather	 to	 be	 considered	more	 as	 the	 result	 of	 an	 interactive	 process	 of	 negotiations,	
struggles,	trial-and-error	games,	and	that	time	is	an	important	factor	in	their	creation.	
The	analysis	will	concern	two	levels:	at	the	individual	level,	the	individual	is	confronted	
with	 other	 (similar,	 antagonistic,	 or	 simply	 different)	 perceptions	 that	 are	 important	
reference	points	 for	 the	 same	 individual	 perception	 formation.	At	 the	 collective	 level,	
intersubjectively	 shared	 perceptions	 become	 a	 product	 of	 collective	 interaction	
processes:	 for	 instance,	specific	reference	groups	might	recur	routinely	to	a	particular	
perception	in	order	to	make	a	specific	event	or	activity	meaningful	or	might	expect	their	
members	 to	 use	 specific	 ones	 rather	 than	 others.	 As	 social	 relations	 create	 and	
reproduce	 a	 structure	 of	meanings	 (Mead,	 1934),	 they	 contribute	 to	 the	 definition	 of	
individual	perceptions	of	the	country	of	destination	and	its	asylum	policies	(see	Passy	
and	 Giugni,	 2001;	 Chong	 1991;	 Hardin	 1982).	When	 asylum	 seekers	 flee	 in	 different	
waves	 in	 time,	perceptions	of	people	back	home	can	be	 shaped,	 for	example,	by	 their	
transnational	 engagements	 (Morawska,	 2001).	 Due	 to	 their	 flexibility	 to	 change,	
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perceptions	 are	 therefore	 a	 valuable	 tool	 to	 understanding	 agency	 in	 volatile	
circumstances.	
The	novelty	of	this	study	also	resides	in	that	it	addresses	the	interaction	between	
perceptions,	 emotions	 and	agency.	 In	 sociology,	 theories	of	 emotions	 fall	 into	 a	 set	 of	
theoretical	 approaches	 that	 includes	 evolutionary	 theories,	 symbolic	 interactionist	
theories,	 dramaturgical	 theories,	 ritual	 theories,	 power	 and	 status	 theories,	
stratification	 theories,	 and	 exchange	 theories	 (for	 a	 comprehensive	 review	 of	 these	
theories	see	Turner,	2009).	However,	there	has	been	so	far	no	wide	application	of	such	
theories	 to	 the	 field	of	migration	and,	 in	particular,	 to	explanations	 to	asylum	seekers	
strategy.	 If	 asylum	 seekers	 strategies	 cope	 with	 changing	 circumstances,	 it	 can	 be	
argued	that	the	emotional	aspect	is	very	important,	as	it	provides	further	resources	for	
agency.	 This	 point	 is	made	 by	 studies	 in	 the	 field	 of	 the	 sociology	 of	 revolutions	 (for	
example	 Reed,	 2004	 as	 it	 will	 be	 discussed	 on	 Chapter	 Four),	 where	 emotions	 are	 a	
crucial	 factor	 in	 determining	 forms	of	 participation.	Here,	 I	 argue	 that	 is	 concept	 is	 a	
useful	tool	for	understanding	asylum	seekers’	agency	as	well.			
The	 case	 study	or	Eritrean	asylum	seekers	 to	 Italy	provides	 the	opportunity	 to	
address	 these	 issues	 from	a	privileged	point	of	observation.	Chapter	One	will	address	
the	 colonial	 relation	 between	 Eritrea	 and	 Italy	 and	 provide	 an	 account	 of	 how	
perceptions	 about	 Italy	 are	 produced	 and	 re-produced	 in	 Eritrea.	 Chapter	 Two	 will	
focus	 on	 the	 Eritrean	 internal	 situation,	 and	 describe	 liberation	 movement	 and	 its	
modern	 declination.	 This	 is	 key	 to	 understanding	 the	 paradoxes	 that	 characterise	
contemporary	Eritrea,	including	the	dynamics	within	the	Eritrean	Diaspora	in	Italy,	and	
the	milieu	 in	which	young	Eritreans	who	 flee	 the	country	are	now	socialized.	Chapter	
Three	will	address	Eritrean	refugee	movements	from	Eritrea	and	give	an	account	of	the	







































When	 it	 comes	 to	 exploring	 asylum-seekers’/refugees’	 perceptions	 of	 Italy,	 its	
asylum	 policies	 and	 the	 impact	 of	 these	 policies	 on	 their	 strategies,	 the	 underlying	
ontological	and	epistemological	 issues	necessitate	adopting	a	research	strategy	 that	 is	








most	 appropriate	 approach	 for	 an	 account	 of	 how	 asylum-seekers/refugees	 perceive	
and	experience	 the	world.	From	an	epistemological	perspective,	 this	 study	 shares	 the	
‘constructionist’	 conviction	 that	 everyday	knowledge	 is	 fundamentally	 interactive,	 the	
result	of	individuals’	efforts	to	‘make	sense	of	their	encounters	with	the	physical	world	
and	 other	 people’	 (Blaikie	 2009:	 95).	 Consequently,	 a	 qualitative	 methodology	
combined	 with	 an	 abductive	 research	 strategy	 represents	 the	 best	 way	 to	 give	 an	
account	of	asylum-seekers’/refugees’	 ‘inner’	point	of	view	and	of	the	manner	in	which	
their	 understanding	 of	 the	 world	 influences	 their	 behaviour.	 This	 study,	 therefore,	
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adopts	a	‘bottom	up’	approach	that	first	entails	gathering	data	in	an	exploratory	fashion,	




The	aim	of	 the	research	project	 is	 to	study	how	asylum	seekers	strategize	their	
moves,	 and	 how	 their	 perceptions	 of	 the	 receiving	 country	 and	 its	 immigration	 and	
asylum	policies	influence	their	decisions.	 	 In	order	to	answer	this	research	question,	a	
relevant	case	study	has	been	selected,	namely,	Eritrean	asylum	seekers	having	migrated	
to	 Italy.	Case	studies	are	 ‘the	method	of	 choice	when	 the	phenomenon	under	study	 is	
not	 readily	distinguishable	 from	 its	 context’	 (Yin	2003a:	4).	They	are	useful	when	 the	




2014,	 Italy	 ranked	 5th	 	 among	 the	 10	major	 refugee-receiving	 countries	 according	 to	
UNHCR	data,	whereas	Eritrea	was	the	2nd	major	sending	country.	Moreover,	according	
to	data	collected	by	the	Italian	Ministry	of	the	Interior,	in	2014,	the	number	of	Eritrean	
mgrants	 to	 Italy	 sharply	 increased,	 reaching	 unprecedented	 numbers,	 representing	
25%	of	the	total	inflow	of	migrants.		
The	 tables	 below	 provide	 descriptive	 data	 about	 Eritrean	 asylum	 seekers	 and	
about	 Italy’s	 performance	 in	 granting	 forms	 of	 protection	 in	 comparison	 to	 other	 EU	
countries30.		As	it	can	be	observed,	there	is	a	striking	difference	in	the	numbers	of	those	
																																																								
30	 Data	 on	 asylum	 seekers	 and,	more	 generally	 on	migrants,	 are	 highly	 politicised,	 as	 countries	 (and	 I	








































Syria Eritrea Somalia Nigeria
Arrivals	to	Italy	according	to	declared	nationality	at	the	moment	of	
disembarcation	2012-2015	(%)
2012 2013 2014 2015
2012	 2013	 2014	 2015	
Somalia	 2,180	 Syria		 11,307	 Syria	 43,323	 Eritrea	 39,162	
Eritrea	 1,431	 Eritrea	 9,834	 Eritrea	 34,329	 Nigeria	 22,237	
Egypt	 1,221	 Somalia	 3,263	 Mali	 9,908	 Somalia	 12,433	
Syria	 582	 Egypt	 2,728	 Nigeria	 9,000	 Sudan	 8,932	
Nigeria	 361	 Nigeria	 2,680	 Gambia	 8,691	 Gambia	 8,454	
Gambia	 348	 Gambia	 2,619	 Somalia	 5,756	 Syria	 7,448	
Mali	 224	 Mali	 1,674	 Egypt	 4,095	 Mali	 5,826	
Other	 6,920	 Other	 8,820	 Other	 54,998	 Other	 49,350	





















Austria	 17,520	 68.5	 31.5	 Not	provided	for	in	
national	legislation	
France	 66,265	 83	 17	 Not	provided	for	in	
national	legislation	
Germany	 126,995	 53.2	 30.5	 16.3	
Greece	 8,225	 41.3	 29.9	 30,7	
Italy	 26,620	 21.3	 38.9	 39.9	
Spain		 4,495	 39.6	 58.6	 1.8	
Sweden	 54,365	 28.2	 64.9	 6.9	











Belgium	 22,850	 81.1	 18.9	 Not	provided	for	in	
national	legislation	
France	 64,310	 78.6	 21.4	 Not	provided	for	in	
national	legislation	
Germany	 202,815	 79.2	 12.8	 8	
Italy	 64,625	 17.7	 37.1	 45.2	
Sweden	 81,325	 33.3	 60.2	 6.5	
Hungary	 42,775	 	 	 	
United	
Kingdom	
31,945	 82.7	 1.4	 15.9	
Other	 116,070	 	 	 	





	 2012	 2013	 2014	 2015	














Denied	protection	 3	 39	 33	 16	
Unreachable	 17	 79	 121	 52	
Other	outcome	 52	 -	 1	 6	
TOTAL	 296	 1522	 1499	 659	
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Eritrea	 and	 Italy	 have	 a	 long-standing	 relation,	which	 dates	 back	 to	 the	 Italian	
colonial	venture	in	Eritrea,	which	lasted	from	the	end	of	the	nineteenth	century	until	the	
beginning	of	 the	 twentieth.	 In	 Italy	(and	 in	Rome	 in	particular)	 there	 is	a	big	Eritrean	
community	that	is	also	very	active	transnationally.	As	of	January	2014,	according	to	the	
National	 Institute	 for	 Statistics	 (ISTAT)	 there	 were	 about	 10,600	 Eritrean	 registered	
residents	in	Italy,	of	which	more	that	4,000	were	residing	in	the	municipality	of	Rome.			
	Thus,	for	the	purposes	of	this	research,	it	becomes	crucial	to	understand	Eritrean	
asylum	 seekers’	 perceptions	 of	 Italy	 and	 of	 the	 Italian	 asylum	 system.	 Accordingly,	 I	
investigate	 how	 Eritrean	 asylum	 seekers’	 perceptions	 are	 shaped	 in	 their	 country	 of	
origin	and	after	 their	arrival	 in	 Italy	 (given	 the	many	 links	between	 the	meso-level	of	
community	and	the	macro-level	of	policy).	 I	also	try	to	determine	what	perceptions	of	
the	Italian	asylum	system	Eritreans	had	before	leaving	their	country	of	origin;	whether	
those	 had	 an	 influence	 in	 the	 choice	 of	 their	 destination;	 and	 whether	 (and	 in	 what	
manner)	 these	perceptions	were	modified	en	route,	once	 they	came	 into	contact	with	
the	 Italian	 asylum	 system	 and	 came	 to	 stay	 in	 Italy.	 	 Finally,	 I	 look	 into	 how	 these	
perceptions,	 along	 with	 other	 factors,	 influence	 the	 strategies	 of	 Eritreans’	 in	 the	




For	the	purposes	of	 this	study	an	extensive	 fieldwork	was	carried	out	 in	Rome,	
mainly	between	2012	and	2014.	Some	additional	research	visits	were	made	in	2015,	in	
order	to	gather	updates	on	the	respondents	and	to	fill	the	gaps	in	the	data	that	emerged	
after	 the	 first	 analysis.	 Moreover,	 fieldwork	 was	 completed	 by	 10	 days	 of	 travel	 in	
Eritrea	 in	 2014,	 of	 which	 7	 were	 spent	 in	 Asmara	 and	 3	 in	 Massawa.	 This	 research	
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therefore	 relies	 heavily	 on	 participant	 observation	 and	 on	 interviews	 with	 Eritrean	
asylum	seekers	and	refugees,	as	well	as	with	organisation	members,	practitioners	in	the	
field	of	asylum,	members	of	the	Eritrean	community	in	Rome,	and	Eritreans	residing	in	








the	essence.	The	project	was	designed	 to	operate	at	 three	 levels.	At	 the	micro-level,	 it	
consisted	in	semi-structured	interviews	with	asylum-seekers	and	refugees;	at	the	meso-
level,	 it	 relied	 on	 open-ended	 interviews	 with	 organisation	 representatives,	 lawyers,	






from	 the	 diaspora	 community.	 Since	 one	 of	 the	 presuppositions	 underpinning	 the	
research	was	that	perceptions	are	not	fixed	but	intersubjectively	shared,	and	therefore	
reactive	to	outside	stimuli,	I	decided	to	interview	asylum	seekers	at	different	stages	of	
the	 asylum	 process.	 The	 rationale	 was	 that	 interviewing	 asylum	 seekers	 at	 different	
stages	would	yield	a	more	complex	account	of	how	Italy	and	the	Italian	asylum	policies	
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and	 processes	 are	 perceived.	 	 Therefore,	 I	 needed	 to	 gain	 an	 ‘observation’	 point	 that	




organisations	 that	assist	asylum-seekers	 throughout	 the	asylum	process.	However	my	
identity	as	a	researcher	turned	out	to	be	an	insurmountable	obstacle:	explaining	what	I	
wanted	 to	 do	 minimized	 my	 chances	 of	 being	 accepted	 as	 a	 volunteer.	 Due	 to	 the	
sensitivity	of	the	asylum	issue	and	of	the	way	it	 is	handled,	volunteers	(and	especially	
researchers)	are	not	always	welcomed,	especially	 in	 state-run	centers,	 such	as	CARAs	
(Centro	di	Accoglienza	per	Richiedenti	Asilo	 –	 reception	 centre	 for	 asylum	seekers).	 In	
addition,	organizations	that	are	run	by	(or	have	strong	links	with)	the	Catholic	Church	
are	 very	 cautious	when	 it	 comes	 to	 accepting	 ‘external’	 help.	 I	 therefore	 targeted	my	
efforts	at	gaining	access	to	centres	belonging	to	the	SPRAR	network	(which	are	usually	
smaller	 and	more	 flexible),	 and	 in	 particular	 to	 the	Baobab	Centre	 in	Rome,	which	 is	
close	 to	 the	 Tiburtina	 Station	 and	 to	 the	 Verano	 Cemetery.	 This	 small	 facility	
represented	a	privileged	 standpoint	 for	observation.	 Located	 inside	 the	premises	of	 a	
former	glassworks,	the	centre	was	set	up	in	2005	following	the	evacuation	of	what	was	
then	called	the	‘Hotel	Africa’,	a	building	close	to	the	Tiburtina	Station,	mainly	occupied	
by	 Eritreans	 but	 also	 by	 Ethiopians.	 The	 evacuation	 led	 to	 the	 creation	 of	 different	
centres;	one	of	them,	Anagnina,	is	now	occupied	by	Eritreans	and	has	become	an	illegal	
squat.	The	Baobab	centre,	on	the	other	hand,	represents	an	interesting	experiment,	as	
the	people	 in	 the	organisational	 committee	of	 ‘Hotel	Africa’	 became	social	workers	 in	
the	centre.	The	nationality	of	the	guests	has	changed	over	time:	at	the	beginning,	it	only	
hosted	people	 from	the	Horn	of	Africa	but	now	it	 is	open	to	all	 refugees,	even	though	
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Eritreans,	Somalis	and	Ethiopians	still	represent	a	majority.	When	I	was	carrying	out	my	









where	 they	usually	 sit	with	guests	or	play	draughts.	On	 the	other	side	of	 the	building	
there	 is	 an	 Eritrean	 restaurant,	 where	 refugees	 and	 asylum	 seekers	 eat	 for	 free	 and	
where	parties	and	events	are	organised;	there	is	also	a	recording	room.	The	latter	is	at	
















positive	 experience.	 Moreover,	 they	 found	 the	 degree	 of	 interest	 I	 was	 showing	
suspicious,	 and,	 as	 it	 later	 surfaced,	 they	 feared	 that	 I	 would	 report	 what	 I	 found	 to	
either	 Italian	or	Eritrean	authorities	(they	were	well	aware	of	 the	extent	to	which	the	
Eritrean	government	controls	the	diaspora)	and	that	this	would	be	detrimental	to	them.	
In	 the	 end,	 it	 was	 through	 the	 help	 of	 the	 Eritrean	 social	 workers	 in	 the	 centre,	 in	
particular	that	of	a	man	named	G.,	that	I	managed	to	slowly	gain	the	confidence	of	the	
other	men	 in	 the	centre.	My	relationship	with	G.	was	then	 fundamental	 for	 this	study.	
Due	 to	 his	 past	 as	 a	 fighter	 in	 the	 Eritrean-Ethiopian	 border	 war	 in	 1998	 and	 his	
experience	in	Rome	as	one	of	the	leading	occupiers	of	the	‘Hotel	Africa’,	he	was	highly	
regarded	among	his	fellow	nationals	at	the	Baobab	centre	and	in	Rome.	At	the	time	of	















period,	 and	 who	 were	 usually	 reference	 points	 for	 newcomers.	 I	 usually	 spent	 the	
afternoons33	playing	draughts	with	them	–	and	irremediably	loosing	–	which	gained	me	
their	sympathy.	It	became	quite	a	fun	game	among	us	to	make	turnaments	at	draughts	
and	 to	 celebrate	 (with	me	bringing	 cookies)	 in	 the	 rare	 occasions	when	 I	would	win.	
During	 the	afternoons,	 I	would	also	help	 them	with	 learning	 Italian	and	answer	some	





ask	 for	help,	 including	asking	me	 to	mediate	with	 the	head	of	 the	association	running	
the	facility.	
Although	 they	were	 aware	 that	 I	was	 a	 researcher	 looking	 at	 Eritreans	 asylum	
seekers	 in	Rome,	 I	decided	to	start	with	the	 interviews	at	 the	centre	at	a	 later	stage	–	
that	 is,	 after	 almost	 three	months	 of	 participant	 observation	 -,	 when	 I	 felt	 that	 their	
suspitions	 against	 my	 presence	 were	 starting	 to	 fade.	 Having	 begun	 to	 conduct	
interviews,	 I	 then	 asked	my	 informants	 to	 refer	me	 to	 other	 Eritrean	 asylum	 seekers	
and	 refugees,	 including	 those	 outside	 the	 centre,	 which	 allowed	 me	 to	 collect	 data	
through	 a	 non-probability	 snowball	 sampling	method.	 This	method	 is	 conventionally	
used	‘when	a	population	is	widely	distributed	or	elusive’	(May	2001:	95),	and	involves	
																																																																																																																																																																												
depended	on	G.,	 as	he	knew	how	 to	 relate	 to	 the	other	 residents,	 and	 therefore	 I	was	 in	a	 subordinate	
position.	 Instead,	 ‘outdoors	activities’	were	performed	 in	a	 setting	 (the	city	of	Rome)	with	which	 I	was	
more	 familiar	 than	 him.	 As	 he	 realised	 that	 I	 was	 able	 to	 elicit	 better	 responses	 from	 Italians	 to	 our	
requests,	he	started	to	see	me	as	a	‘valuable	asset’.	Moreover,	he	started	to	‘like	me’	and	to	trust	me	as	I	




‘using	a	small	group	of	 informants	who	are	asked	 to	put	 the	researcher	 in	 touch	with	
their	 friends	who	are	 subsequently	 interviewed,	 then	asking	 them	about	 their	 friends	
and	 interviewing	 them	until	 a	 chain	 of	 informants	 has	 been	 selected’	 (Burgess	 1984:	
55).	Snowballing	is	very	appropriate	in	the	case	of	refugees,	as	members	of	this	group	
are	 typically	 ‘hard	 to	 locate	 and	 are	 therefore	 hard	 to	 identify	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	
sampling’	(Bloch,	1999:	371)	and	it	has	been	extensively	used	by	other	researchers	 in	
the	 field	 (among	 others:	 Griffiths	 2002;	 Wahlbeck	 1999;	 Gammel	 et	 al.	 1993).	 An	
important	feature	of	this	technique	is	that	it	makes	it	easier	to	establish	a	relationship	of	
trust	 between	 participants	 and	 the	 researcher	 as	 ‘the	 intermediaries	 are	 known	 to	
potential	 respondents	 and	 trusted	 by	 them	 and	 thus	 are	 able	 to	 vouch	 for	 the	
researcher’s	bona	fide’	(Lee	1992:	130).		
Another	relevant	gatekeeper	 in	 the	centre	was	Daniel,	 the	other	director	of	 the	
centre,	who	is	an	Eritrean	naturalised	Italian.	Due	to	his	position,	his	role	was	different	
from	that	of	G.:	Daniel	had	strong	relations	with	specific	members	of	the	centres	and	of	




the	 Eritrean	 residents,	 and	 even	 by	 G..	 Nevertheless,	 Daniel’s	 connections	 with	 the	







more	 involved	 in	the	daily	activities	of	 the	men	and	women	who	were	working	 in	the	





on	 the	 gatekeepers,	 whom	 they	 trusted.	 Another	 issue	 was	 tape-recording	 the	
interviews:	 asylum	seekers	and	 refugees	were	very	wary;	 therefore,	 as	 I	 realised	 that	
recording	 the	 interview	 was	 making	 the	 informants	 uncomfortable	 and	 conditioned	
their	answers,	I	decided	to	give	up	the	recorder	and	to	just	take	notes.		
I	 also	 noticed	 that	 the	 answers	 they	 gave	me	 during	 the	 interviews	were	 very	
similar,	 representing	 a	 sort	 of	 façade	 version	 of	what	 they	were	 really	 thinking.	 This	
‘standard	version’	seemed	to	clash	with	the	material	I	had	gathered	in	Eritrea	and	with	
my	 interviews	with	practitioners.	A	 change	of	 strategy	was	 therefore	necessary	 and	 I	
began	 to	approach	 refugees	more	 informally	by	 chatting	 to	 them	while	playing	board	




their	 interactions	with	each	other,	 and	 the	 interactions	 they	had	with	 the	 Italian	 staff	
and	the	head	of	the	association	(with	whom	I	developed	a	very	good	relationship).	
This	 part	 of	 the	 fieldwork	 was	 concluded	 in	 mid-2014	 and	 was	 carried	 out	




centres.	 I	 still	managed	to	hang	out	 there	 in	 the	weekends	and	during	 late	afternoons	








and	 professionals	 did	 not	 prove	 to	 be	 easy.	 In	 my	 research	 project,	 I	 had	 initially	
planned	to	interview	organisations	that	dealt,	on	the	one	hand,	with	refugee	issues	and	
with	 assistance	 and,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 with	 those	 involved	 in	 the	 Italian	 asylum	
process.	I	therefore	deemed	that	the	most	appropriate	sampling	technique	to	select	the	
organisations	 to	 interview	 was	 the	 so-called	 purposive	 sample	 technique,	 where	 ‘a	
selection	 of	 those	 to	 be	 surveyed	 is	made	 according	 to	 a	 known	 characteristic’	 (May	
2001:	95).	In	practice,	the	selection	is	‘a	matter	of	judgement	as	to	which	organisations	
would	 be	most	 appropriate’	 (Blaikie	 2009:	 178).	 Thus,	 my	 selection	 was	 based	 on	 a	
territorial	criterion	(being	based	in	Rome,	although	I	also	visited	Crotone	CARA),	and	on	
the	 services	 they	 provided	 to	 asylum	 seekers	 and	 refugees	 at	 different	 stages	 of	 the	
asylum	process	(for	example	legal	aid,	legal	representation,	housing	and	benefits).	I	also	
contacted	 refugee	 community	 organisations	 (RCOs),	 that	 is,	 ‘organisations	 rooted	
within,	 and	 supported	 by,	 the	 ethnic	 or	 national	 refugee/asylum-seeker	 community	
they	 serve’	 (Zetter	 and	 Pearl	 2000).	 In	 the	 case	 of	 the	 first	 type	 of	 organisations,	
contacts	were	 initially	made	via	 e-mail:	 I	 sent	 a	 cover	 letter	with	a	description	of	 the	
study	 and	 with	 all	 the	 relevant	 information	 in	 an	 attachment	 to	 the	 various	
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organisations.	 Later	 on,	 further	 contacts	 were	 made	 via	 telephone,	 in	 order	 to	 elicit	
faster	 responses.	A	 key	 element	 in	 gaining	 access	 proved	 to	 be	 the	 ‘mediation’	 of	 the	
head	 of	 the	 Baobab	 centre,	 who	 had	 personal	 links	 with	 the	 other	 associations.	
Moreover,	 and	 in	 particular	 in	 my	 relations	 with	 the	 CIR	 (Comitato	 Italiano	 per	 i	
Rifugiati	 –	 the	 Italian	 Refugee	 Council),	 I	 used	 my	 willingness	 to	 contribute	 to	 their	
research	and	to	their	reports	as	a	means	of	leverage	to	obtain	access	(Thomas	1993:	84;	











Access	 to	 these	organisations	also	entailed	access	 to	 lawyers,	practitioners	and	
advocates	 working	 in	 the	 refugee	 sector.	 Moreover,	 through	 personal	 networks	
developed	 during	 my	 fieldwork,	 I	 managed	 to	 interview	 the	 head	 of	 the	 USI	 (Ufficio	
Speciale	 Immigrazione	 –	 Special	 Immigration	 Office),	 and	 to	 attend	 and	 observe	 7	
asylum	 claim	 interviews	 with	 Italian	 authorities.	 The	 material	 gathered	 was	 very	
valuable	 not	 only	 because	 it	 provided	 a	 comprehensive	 overview	 of	 the	 role	 of	
organisations	 as	 meso-level	 actors,	 but	 also	 because	 it	 helped	 to	 establish	 the	 legal	
context	 confronting	 asylum	 seekers,	 and	 to	 elaborate	 a	 more	 coherent	 view	 of	 the	
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asylum	process	and	of	the	reception	system.	The	latter	required	considerable	effort,	and	
I	 did	 it	 by	 examining	 the	 relevant	 legislation	and	 the	 recommendations	 issued	by	 the	
organisations.			
Snowball	sampling	was	also	used	in	accessing	the	members	of	Eritrean	diaspora	
in	Rome.	To	avoid	obtaining	a	 sample	 that	was	 too	homogeneous,	 I	differentiated	my	
‘points	 of	 entry’.	 My	 two	 gatekeepers	 were	 a	 man	 with	 links	 to	 the	 Erythros	
organisation,	 and	 a	 female	Eritrean	 activist	with	 links	 to	 the	 Sant’	 Egidio	 community.	





Since	 the	beginning	of	 the	research	project,	 it	was	clear	 that	managing	 to	carry	
out	 fieldwork	in	Eritrea	would	 improve	the	overall	strength	of	 the	study,	especially	 in	
terms	of	analysing	Eritrean	perceptions	of	 Italy.	However,	 in	spite	of	several	attempts	
during	 2012	 to	 organise	 a	 trip	 to	 the	 small	 African	 country,	 it	 seemed	 unfeasible.	
Eritrean	authorities	do	not	allow	researchers	to	carry	out	 fieldwork	or	other	research	
activities	 without	 being	 informed	 about	 them	 beforehand,	 and	 without	 the	
authorization	of	the	Ministry	of	Information	or	of	the	Ministry	of	Education.	This	means	
that	 in	 order	 to	 receive	 this	 official	 sanction,	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 first	 submit	 a	 formal	
request	to	the	Eritrean	authorities	through	an	Eritrean	embassy	abroad.	The	researcher	
needs	 to	motivate	 his/her	 request,	 and	 to	 submit	 documents	 along	with	 a	 ‘mandate’	
from	his/her	institution/university.	Usually,	he/she	is	not	allowed	to	travel	alone,	but	is	





or	 generally	 subversive,	 and	 if	 the	 subsequent	 research	 could	 reflect	 badly	 on	 the	
government.	Being	stopped	outside	the	capital	city	without	a	permit	can	lead	to	arrest	
and	 detention	 and,	 in	 the	 best-case	 scenario,	 to	 expulsion	 from	 the	 country.	
Alternatively,	one	can	be	arrested	on	the	charges	of	carrying	out	activities	detrimental	
to	 the	 Eritrean	 State.	 It	 is	 therefore	 evident	 that	 conducting	 empirical	 independent	
research	in	Eritrea	is	exceedingly	difficult.	
However,	 in	2014,	a	 series	of	 circumstances	related	 to	my	 job	made	 it	possible	
for	me	 to	 visit	 Eritrea	 for	 a	 period	of	 10	days	 (7	days	 in	Asmara	 and	3	 in	Massawa).	
During	that	period,	I	could	gather	a	lot	of	interesting	material	even	if	I	was	not	officially	
travelling	for	research	purposes.	In	particular,	I	was	able	to	speak	(with	great	caution)	
to	 representatives	 of	 the	 establishment,	 as	 well	 as	 to	 other	 Eritreans,	 to	 Italian	
residents,	to	former	Ascari,	and	to	missionaries	in	Eritrea.			
In	this	respect,	my	activity	at	the	Baobab	centre	and	the	contacts	I	had	developed	
with	Eritrean	asylum	seekers	at	 the	squat	buildings	were	crucial	 to	make	 the	most	of	
this	small	travel.	 In	fact,	many	of	my	informant,	with	whom	I	grew	closer	 in	time,	had	
informed	 their	 families	 living	 in	 Asmara	 or	Massawa	 abou	my	 trip,	 and	 asked	me	 to	
meet	 them.	This	 allowed	me	 to	meet	 around	30	Eritreans	during	my	 short	 stay.	 Two	
considerations	 are	 relevant	 here:	 first,	 as	 I	 was	 introduced	 by	 my	 respondents	 as	 a	
‘friend’,	I	found	their	relatives	and	friends	very	keen	to	meeting	me	and	very	welcoming,	
despite	 the	 dangers	 that	 they	 might	 have	 incurred	 if	 they	 were	 caught	 talking	 to	 a	
foreigner	 holding	 a	 diplomatic	 passport.	 Many	 respondents	 asked	 me	 to	 bring	 small	




in	 those	 moments	 I	 embodied	 their	 transnational	 missing	 kin34.	 Second,	 in	 order	 to	
minimise	 the	 risk	 of	 endangering	 my	 respondents,	 meetings	 were	 carried	 out	 very	
informally	 in	 public	 spaces	 such	 as	 very	 busy	 bars	 or	 the	 Pavonian	 library.	 In	 those	
occasions,	 people	 they	 knew	 at	 the	 bar	 would	 also	 join	 the	 conversation,	 adding	
important	elements	to	my	research.		










conducting	 interviews	 and	 participant	 observation	 in	 Rome	 not	 knowing	 really	 how	
long	 it	 would	 be	 necessary	 to	 remain	 engaged	 in	 the	 fieldwork	 in	 order	 to	 gather	
sufficient	data.	However,	circumstances	along	the	fieldwork	(being	hired	by	the	Italian	
institutions,	 developing	 very	 close	 ties	with	 some	 informants)	 undeniably	 shaped	 the	
collection	methods,	which	ended	up	being	different	from	what	I	had	originally	planned.	
First	of	all,	the	fieldwork	proved	to	be	very	long	providing	for	stronger	relationships	to	
be	developed	with	key	 informants.	This,	 in	 turn,	opened	new	unpredicted	settings	 for	
research,	 such	 as	 for	 instance	 the	 possibility	 to	 visit	 squat	 buildings	 and	 traveling	 to	
																																																								





The	 study	has	 then	 slowly	 shifted	 into	 a	multi-sited	 ethnography,	 as	 the	 study	 of	 the	
subject	 was	 not	 focused	 on	 different	 sites	 (Falzon,	 2016).	 Indeed,	 a	 multi-sited	
ethnography	 of	 a	 topic	 such	 as	 perceptions	 of	 asylum-seekers,	 which	 is	 per	 se	
transnational,	 enhances	 the	 researcher’s	 lenses	 giving	 him/her	 a	 very	 powerful	
opportunity	 to	 study	 across	 space	 the	 fundamental	 relations	 at	 the	 core	 of	 the	
phenomenon.		Second,	an	important	point	to	acknowledge	here	was	the	role	of	the	state	
(both	in	Itlay	and	Eritrea)	in	shaping	data	collection.	In	Eritrea,	pervasive	state	control	
of	 researchers	 and	 individuals	 constrained	 the	 possibility	 to	 carry	 out	 fieldwork	 in	
Eritrea.	 The	 risk	 of	 endangering	 the	 participants	 and	 myself	 by	 investigating	 a	 very	
sensitive	 political	 issue	 for	 Afewerki’s	 government	was	 very	 high	 and	 this	 led	me	 to	
resort	 to	alternative	strategies	 to	engage	 locals	 in	Eritrea.	Even	 in	 Italy,	Eritrean	state	
control	 over	 its	 migrant	 citizens	 influenced	 the	 research,	 as	 fear	 of	 repercussions	
against	 their	 families	 in	 Eritrea	 was	 tangible	 among	 Eritrean	 asylum-seekers.	 These	
problems	were	 partially	 balanced	 by	my	 job	 for	 the	 Italian	 government,	 that	 allowed	
me,	on	the	one	hand,	to	travel	to	Eritrea	and,	on	the	other,	to	have	access	to	privileged	
data	and	institutional	representatives.		
As	 to	 the	 tools,	 I	 needed	 flexible	data	 collection	 instruments	 in	order	 to	obtain	
detailed	 and	 exhaustive	 information	 from	 the	 participants.	 As	 I	 stated	 earlier,	 I	
therefore	relied	on	semi-structured	tape-recorded	qualitative	interviews.	My	approach	
consisted	 in	 drawing	 up	 a	 topic-guide	 or	 a	 list	 of	 questions	 to	 be	 covered	 (interview	
guide),	but	one	 in	which	“the	 interviewee	had	a	great	deal	of	 leeway	on	how	to	reply.	
Questions	did	not	follow	on	exactly	in	the	way	outlined	on	the	schedule.	Questions	that	




understand	how	 the	 interviewee	 sees	 and	 understands	 complex	 issues,	 “that	 is,	what	
the	 interviewee	views	as	 important	 in	explaining	and	understanding	events,	patterns,	
and	 forms	 of	 behaviour”	 (Bryman,	 2004:	 321).	 	 Furthermore,	 in	 relation	 to	 this	
investigation,	 the	 methodology	 presents	 some	 significant	 advantages	 compared	 to	
unstructured	 interviews:	 as	 my	 investigation	 already	 had	 a	 fairly	 clear	 focus,	 it	 was	
more	 useful	 to	 adopt	 a	 semi-structured	 interview	 that	 allowed	 me	 to	 direct	 the	
interviewee	towards	the	kind	of	information	I	needed,	without	therefore	cutting	off	the	
possibilities	 to	 expand	 and	 redirect	 the	 focus	 of	 the	 interview,	 and	 to	 integrate	 ,new	
issues	raised	by	the	interviewee	(Beardsworth	and	Keil,	1992).	
Different	 interview	guides	were	designed	depending	on	 the	 type	of	participant.	
When	 it	 came	 to	 asylum	 seekers	 and	 refugees,	my	 guideline	was	 structured	 in	 three	
parts	and	the	interviews	lasted	between	30	and	60	minutes.	The	first	part	was	designed	
to	 establish	 a	 relationship	 with	 the	 interviewee	 by	 asking	 him/her	 about	 his/her	
personal	experiences	and	life	before	he/she	was	forced	to	leave.	This	was	a	crucial	part	
of	 the	 interview	 as	 it	made	 clear	 to	 the	 interviewees	 that	my	 aim	was	 not	 to	 assess	
whether	 they	 were	 genuine	 or	 ‘bogus’	 refugees	 (by	 using	 the	 expression	 ‘forced	 to	
leave’,	 it	 was	 clear	 that	 I	 already	 believed	 them	 and	 that	 their	 claims	 would	 not	 be	
scrutinized).	 	 Moreover,	 in	 the	 first	 part	 of	 the	 interview	 I	 also	 attempted	 to	 gather	
background	information	and	to	explore	why	they	had	chosen	to	come	to	Italy;	what	they	
had	know	 then	about	 Italy	and	how	 they	had	obtained	 this	 information	 (newspapers,	
school,	photographs,	etc.);	what	they	had	imagined	that	their	life	in	Italy	would	be	like;	
what	 they	 had	 known	 about	 the	 asylum	 process	 and	 what	 they	 had	 expected.	 The	
second	 part	 of	 the	 interview	 was	 designed	 to	 gather	 information	 about	 how	 their	
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perceptions	of	 the	asylum	system,	of	 Italian	authorities	 (border	police,	police,	etc.),	of	
Italy	and	its	policies	changed	in	the	course	of	the	asylum	process	and	what	this	entailed	
in	 terms	 of	 their	 own	 agency.	 Finally,	 in	 the	 last	 part,	 I	 focused	 on	 their	 experiences	
after	 having	 been	 granted	 refugee	 status,	 and	 on	 their	 relations	with	 their	 new	 host	
society.		However,	the	interviews	did	not	necessarily	unfold	in	the	same	way	nor	strictly	
follow	 the	 order	 of	 the	 questions.	 As	 ‘accounts	 are	 not	 simply	 representations	 of	 the	
world	 [but]	part	of	 the	world	 they	describe’	 (Hammersley	and	Atkinson	1983:	107),	 I	




sensitive	 issues	can	be	very	difficult	and,	 therefore,	 letting	the	refugees	decide	how	to	
tell	me	their	story	was	necessary	to	minimise	distress.	 It	 is	 important	to	bear	 in	mind	







more	 comfortable	 in	 talking	 to	 me	 about	 their	 emotions	 and	 allowed	 themselves	 to	
show	more	 emotion.	 In	 the	 same	 way,	 my	 personal	 experience	 of	 living	 in	 different	
countries	during	my	childhood	and	my	more	cosmopolitan	identity	represented	a	sort	




they	 were	 asked	 to	 give	 a	 retrospective	 account	 of	 their	 experiences	 in	 Italy	 and	 to	
specify	 how	 it	 differed	 from	 or	 conformed	 to	 what	 they	 had	 hoped/believed	 before	
leaving	 Eritrea,	 and	 I	 paid	 more	 substantial	 attention	 to	 their	 transnational	
engagements	and	to	their	relations	with	other	community	members.	
As	for	organisations,	the	interviews	with	them	lasted	between	30	and	45	minutes	
and	 a	 different	 interview	 guide	 was	 designed	 each	 time,	 taking	 into	 account	 their	
particular	organisational	objectives	and	the	services	they	provided,	in	order	to	develop	
a	 better	 insight	 into	 asylum-seeker/refugee	 issues	 and	 vulnerabilities,	 and	 into	 the	
problems	of	the	asylum	process.	However,	these	interview	guides	were	less	structured	
than	the	ones	designed	for	refugees,	in	that	they	identified	specific	areas	of	discussion	
rather	 than	 precise	 issues.	 This	 choice	 was	 guided	 by	 the	 consideration	 that	 my	
interviewees	possessed	great	expertise,	and	that	it	was	best	to	draw	on	their	knowledge	
and	to	ask	 further	questions	on	emerging	 interesting	 topics	during	 the	 interview.	The	
same	rationale	was	applied	to	the	interviews	with	professionals.	
The	 interviews	 I	 gathered	 were	 transcribed	 and	 analysed	 according	 to	 the	
‘manual	thematic	coding	procedure’.	This	method	of	data	analysis	makes	it	possible	to	
organise	 and	 manage	 the	 large	 amount	 of	 information	 gathered	 through	 semi-
structured	 interviews,	 by	 categorising	 the	 information	 into	 themes	 and	 sub-themes	
using	 a	 thematic	 framework	 (Mason	 2002;	 Silverman	 2001).	 I	 created	 two	 different	
frameworks	 (one	 for	 asylum	 seekers	 and	 refugees	 and	 another	 for	 organisations	 and	








Research	with	 vulnerable	 groups	 and	 on	 sensitive	 issues	 always	 raises	 several	
ethical	 concerns,	 in	 particular	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 possibility	 of	 involuntarily	 harming	
those	participating	in	the	study.	Respondents	can	be	harmed	by	the	careless	disclosure	
of	 confidential	 information,	 or	 by	 the	 distress	 caused	 by	 thinking	 about	 traumatic	
experiences.		In	addition,	in	several	contexts,	their	participation	in	the	study	could	cause	
suspicion	among	their	fellow-nationals	or	community	members	(understood	in	a	broad	
sense).	 For	 these	 reasons,	 interviewing	 refugees	 can	 be	 very	 problematic.	 First	 of	 all,	
they	have	already	been	questioned	several	times	by	border	officers,	lawyers	and	other	








pushed	 into	 accepting	 by	 his/her	 friendship	 with	 my	 gatekeepers,	 I	 decided	 not	 to	
interview	 him/her.	 Moreover,	 full	 and	 detailed	 information	 was	 given	 to	 the	
participants	 at	 the	 time	 of	 the	 first	 contact,	 and	 their	 verbal	 consent	 was	 requested	
before	 each	 interview	 (when	 access	 to	 research	 participants	 is	 difficult	 and	 rests	 on	
their	 feelings	 of	 trust	 for	 the	 individual	 researcher,	 formal	 requirements	 to	 obtain	
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written	 consent	 could	 have	 a	 detrimental	 effect	 on	 the	 relationship	 (Miller	 and	 Bell,	
2002)).	Refugees	and	asylum	seekers	were	also	offered	the	possibility	of	withdrawing	
from	 the	 interview	 at	 any	 time,	 in	 order	 to	 minimize	 the	 distress	 caused	 by	 talking	
about	 very	 traumatic	 experiences.	 	 I	 also	 decided	 to	 anonymise	 all	 the	 interviews	 by	
default.	Therefore,	 I	 asked	my	participants	 to	choose	a	name	by	which	 they	would	be	
referred	 to	and	quoted	 in	 the	study.	 I	always	 tried	 to	make	sure	 that	each	participant	
had	 fully	 understood	 the	 implications	 of	 participating	 in	 the	 study,	 his/her	 right	 to	
withdraw	from	it	at	any	time,	and	what	it	meant	for	the	interview	to	be	confidential	and	
anonymous.	 Interviews	 with	 the	 asylum	 seekers	 and	 refugees	 staying	 at	 the	 Baobab	
centre	 were	 carried	 out	 on	 the	 premises,	 in	 a	 separate	 office.	 As	 for	 the	 other	
interviews,	the	interviewees		themselves	chose	the	setting,	since	I	considered	that	being	




As	 for	 the	 interviews	 with	 organisations	 and	 professionals,	 my	 approach	







natural	 process,	 and	 since	 I	 had	 established	a	 relation	of	 trust	with	 the	people	 in	 the	
centre,	 it	 was	 not	 always	 easy	 to	 determine	 whether	 the	 information	 they	 provided	
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could	 also	 be	 used	 for	 research	 purposes,	 especially	 when	 they	 touched	 on	 very	


















The	 first	 thing	 you	notice	while	 flying	 over	Eritrea	 is	 its	 elongated	 triangular	
shape;	it	is	a	very	small	territory	compared	to	its	neighbours	Sudan	to	the	West	and	
Ethiopia	to	the	South.	 	It	 is	still	a	wild	territory,	arid	to	the	west,	and	dominated	by	





More	 that	 440,000	 refugees	 and	 asylum	 seekers	 originated	 from	 Eritrea	 in	 2015	
(UNHCR,	2015).	 	War,	dictatorship,	and	the	country’s	 increasing	militarization	have	




deep	 influence	 on	 the	 way	 Eritreans	 perceive	 themselves	 and	 their	
country's	relationship	to	Italy.	
																																																								
35	 The	 expression	 ‘un	 posto	 al	 sole’	 (‘a	 spot	 in	 the	 sun’)	 	 (most	 English	 academic	writings	 uses	 simple	
quotation	marks	rather	than	double	quotation	marks,	I	am	therefore	tempted	to	change	them.	Do	let	me	
know	however	 if	 there	are	different	conventions	 in	your	specific	 field)	was	used	by	the	Fascist	dictator	
Benito	Mussolini	with	reference	to	the	‘Italian	colonial	empire’	in	East	Africa.	
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Eritrean-Italian	 colonial	 relations	 have	 been	 the	 object	 of	 several	 studies.	
Among	 them,	 Jacqueline	 Andall’s	 (2005)	 work	 stands	 out,	 as	 it	 addresses	 the	






Years	 of	 conflict	 have	 kept	 most	 of	 Eritrea	 frozen	 in	 time.	 While	 rich	
businessmen	and	contractors	were	already	exploiting	the	resources	of	other	colonial	
African	 countries,	 the	 economic	 stagnation	 that	 followed	 the	 Armed	 Struggle	 (the	




Italian	 town,	 or	 of	 leafing	 through	 the	 pictures	 of	 a	 family	 album.	 Evidence	 of	 the	
passage	of	 Italian	 colonists	 can	 easily	be	 seen	 in	 the	 city’s	 architecture,	 but	 also	 in	
																																																								
36	As	Andall	 claims,	 it	 is	probably	as	 a	 result	 of	 the	growing	 salience	of	 immigration	 in	 Italy	 that	 some	
scholars	of	Italian	colonialism	have	recently	sought	to	make	a	connection	between	Italian	colonialism	and	
contemporary	 immigration,	 emphasising	 in	 particular	 the	 racist	 dimension	 of	 Italy’s	 colonial	 past	
(Sorgoni,	 1998;	 Labanca,	 1999;	 Barrera,	 2003b).	 Sorgoni	 (2002)	 has	 acknowledged	 the	 difficulties	 of	
elaborating	on	 ‘similarities	or	continuities	between	colonial	racism	and	that	experienced	in	present	day	
Italy’	(56).	Labanca	attributes	the	latent	colonial	attitudes	in	Italy	to	the	absence	of	a	political	debate	on	
colonialism	 in	 the	 post-war	 period	 and	 maintains	 that	 such	 attitudes	 have	 been	 re-activated	 against	
migrants.	
37	 According	 to	 Andall,	 (2005),	 Italy’s	 situation	 in	 terms	 of	 numbers	 of	 ex-colonial	 subjects	 on	 her	
territory	 differs	 from	 other	 several	 European	 countries	 where	 post-war	 colonial	 labour	 migration	
occurred	at	an	earlier	stage	and,	frequently,	prior	to	de-colonization.	Italy	experienced	an	unusual	form	of	
external	 decolonization	 in	 the	 immediate	 post-war	 period	 as	 it	 was	 dispossessed	 of	 its	 colonies.	
Moreover,	while	 other	 colonial	 countries	 (France,	 UK)	where	 receiving	 labour	migration	 in	 the	 1950s,	
Italy	was	a	sending	migration	country.	Italy’s	transformed	immigration	status	(from	sending	to	receiving)	






‘today	 there	 are	 only	 a	 few	 Italian	 families	 living	 here…mostly	 elderly	
people…people	who	came	back	after	 Independence	 in	1993	to	the	places	
where	 they	had	 lived	and	 that	 they	 feel	 is	 their	home’.These	people,	and	
the	 very	 few	 old	 Italians	 who	 never	 left	 Eritrea,	 are	 called	 in	 Italian	 gli	
insabbiati	(literally	‘those	who	have	buried	by	sand’),	an	expression	which	
corresponds	to	the	English	idea	of	‘going	native’.		
	‘The	 colonial	 experience	 has	 left	marks	 on	 both	 the	 Italian	 and	 the	 Eritrean	
sides’,	 says	 Br.	 Ezio	 Tonini,	 an	 Italian	 Pavonian	 missionary	 (the	 Sons	 of	 Mary	
Immaculate	 also	 known	 as	 Pavonians,	 are	 an	 order	 founded	 by	 Saint	 Ludovico	
Pavoni).	He	is	not	like	other	missionaries	I	have	met	before.	He	is	not	fighting	on	the	
frontline,	trying	to	defeat	the	many	plagues	that	affect	this	war-torn	country.	As	we	
speak,	 he	 tells	me	 he	moved	 to	 Eritrea	 over	 forty	 years	 ago,	 during	 the	 war	 with	
Ethiopia,	 and	 I	 realise	 that	 he	 has	 played	 an	 essential	 part	 in	 Eritrean	 society	 by	
helping	 to	 preserve	 certain	 memories.	 In	 the	 Pavoni	 Social	 Center	 in	 Asmara,	 he	
founded	a	library	devoted	to	ancient	books	and	rare	publications	about	Eritrea	and	
the	Horn	of	Africa;	 it	 is	probably	one	of	 the	most	comprehensive	collections	on	the	
subject,	ranging	as	it	does	from	history	and	anthropology	to	geography,	agriculture,	
botanic,	 linguistics,	 etc.	 The	 library	 is	 open	 to	 the	 public,	 and	 is	 used	 by	 students,	








‘You	 know,	 that	 bond	 is	 strong.	 Historians	 and	 scholars	 in	 general	 have	
written	about	it	[colonialism].	The	problem	is	not	the	lack	of	material.	The	
issue	is	the	way	it	happened	and	what	it	meant	for	those	involved…I	mean,	
for	 Italy	 as	 well,	 because	 of	 the	 role	 of	 the	 liberals	 and	 especially	 of	
Mussolini.	 It	 is	difficult	 to	 separate	 the	 judgment	about	 colonialism	 from	
the	judgement	about	what	happened	during	those	years	in	Italy’.		
	The	 relation	 between	 Italy	 and	 Eritrea	 was	 always	 fraught	 and	 fluctuating,	
alternating	between	love	and	hate.	The	meaning	of	colonialism	itself	was	repeatedly	
put	into	question	by	the	Italian	governments	of	the	time.	Indeed,	the	Italian	colonial	
adventure	 in	 the	 Horn	 of	 Africa	 happened	 at	 a	 time	 when	 the	 young	 and	 small	
European	 country	 was	 searching	 for	 a	 common	 national	 identity.	 Inner	
discrepancies,	mostly	related	to	the	lack	of	a	widespread	national	sentiment,	marked	
the	 Italian	unification,	which	was	 the	work	of	a	 small	elite.	The	weakness	of	 Italy’s	
national	 identity	 stemmed	 from	the	 fact	 that	 its	underlying	values	were	essentially	
secular	(whereas	the	majority	of	the	population	was	traditionally	Catholic)	and	that	
the	 newly	 established	 state	 lacked	 a	 strong	 and	 well-established	 state	 tradition	
capable	of	reconciling	different	historical,	political,	 linguistic	and	cultural	 traditions	
(Castronovo	 et	 al.,	 2004).	 At	 the	 end	 of	 the	 nineteenth	 and	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	
twentieth	centuries,	the	Italian	nationalist	movement	slowly	began	to	consolidate	its	
ideology	and	to	appeal	to	the	masses.	At	that	time,	Italy	had	one	of	the	highest	birth	
rates	 in	 Europe	 and	 emigration	 was	 increasing	 dramatically,	 with	 more	 than	 9	
million	emigrants	leaving	Italy	between	1870	and	1930,	mainly	for	the	Americas	and	
Australia.	 Moreover,	 on	 the	 political	 side,	 the	 new	 government	 found	 itself	
internationally	 isolated	 and	 suffocated	 by	 growing	 tensions	 with	 France	 and	
territorial	 disputes	 with	 Austria.	 As	 a	 consequence,	 Italian	 nationalists	 started	
pushing	 for	 an	 imperialist	 foreign	 policy,	 in	 order	 to	 transform	 the	 crowds	 of	






Italy	established	 its	 first	 foothold	 in	Eritrea	 in	1869,	when	the	 fifty-nine-year-
old	 Giuseppe	 Sepeto,	 an	 explorer	 and	 a	 missionary	 belonging	 to	 the	 Order	 of	 S.	
Vincenzo	 de’	 Paoli,	 bought	 the	 port	 of	 Assab	 from	 a	 local	 sultan,	 on	 behalf	 of	 the	
Rubattino	shipping	company.	Assab	was	a	strategic	location,	especially	following	the	






which	 was	 worried	 that	 France,	 its	 competitor	 in	 Africa,	 would	 take	 advantage	 of	
Cairo’s	weakness	in	order	to	gain	a	foothold	in	the	Red	Sea	(Wrong,	2005).	Soon,	Italy	
controlled	 the	 coastline	 and	Massawa	was	 chosen	 as	 the	 capital	 city	 of	 the	 colony,	
named	Eritrea	after	the	Latin	name	for	the	Red	Sea,	Erythraeum	Mare.	Massawa	was	
then	turned	by	the	then	Governor,	General	Baldissera,	into	a	recruitment	hub:	due	to	
the	 need	 for	 new	 military	 recruits	 in	 order	 to	 further	 expand	 Italian	 territorial	
control,	local	young	men	were	recruited	under	the	name	of	ascari.		
At	that	point,	politicians	in	the	Italian	Parliament	disagreed	about	what	path	the	
Italian	 expansion	 should	 take.	 The	 then	 Minister	 of	 Foreign	 Affairs,	 Pasquale	




decided	 to	 launch	 a	 campaign	 in	 the	 direction	 of	 the	 Eritrean	 central	 plateau,	 into	
Abyssinian	territory.	The	Abyssinian	Empire	was	ruled	by	several	local	sultans	(ras),	
who	 were	 formally	 under	 the	 control	 of	 the	 emperor	 (Negus	 Neghesti,	 that	 is	 the	
‘King	of	Kings’),	but	in	fact	they	had	a	high	level	of	autonomy.	The	relations	between	
colonists	and	the	Negus	were	fast	deteriorating,	as	the	Italians	were	cementing	their	
control	 of	 the	 coastline,	 occupying	 territories	 that	 fomally	 fell	 under	 Egyptian	 rule	
but	 which	 were	 	 de	 facto	 run	 by	 the	 Empire.	 According	 to	 the	 reports	 of	 the	







most	 of	 them	 mutilated	 or	 severely	 injured.	 Following	 that	 defeat,	 the	 Italians	
abandoned	 Saati.	 This	 event	 also	 highlighted	 the	 lack	 of	 preparation	 of	 the	 Italian	
contingent:	 for	 instance,	 the	 soldiers	 were	 wearing	 winter	 uniforms,	 which	 were	
utterly	unsuited	to	the	climate.	Some	of	them	were	also	suffering	from	malaria.	The	
defeat	 was	 a	 major	 blow	 for	 Italian	 nationalists	 and	 politicians;	 it	 led	 to	 street	
protests	 in	 Rome	 and	 brought	 about	 the	 resignation	 of	 Robilant	 and	 an	 ensuing	
government	reshuffle	(Sabbatucci	and	Vidotto,	2009;	see	also	Montanelli,	2011).	 	At	
that	 point,	 the	 divide	 between	 the	 political	 elite	 and	 the	 masses	 was	 growing	
stronger,	and	many	critics	of	the	political	class	were	also	opposed	to	Italy’s	colonial	
																																																								
38	Translated	 from	 the	 Italian:	 “e	non	conviene	certamente	attaccare	 importanza	a	quattro	predoni	 che	
possiamo	avere	tra	i	piedi	in	Africa”.	
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with	 the	 Italian	 colonial	 project,	 and	 it	 is	 not	 a	 coincidence	 if	 it	 was	 engraved	







		Following	 the	 setback	 in	 Dogali,	 General	 Baldissera	 reorganised	 the	 colony	
militarily:	 in	 particular,	 he	 boosted	 the	 recruitment	 of	ascari	who	were	 regrouped	













Baldissera’s	 administration	 of	 the	 colony	 was	 brutal	 (Romandini,	 1996).	 He	
established	a	military	regime	and	repressed	dissent,	filling	Massawa’s	jails	and	killing	
suspected	 traitors	 (Martini,	 1891).	 Some	 rumours	 of	 what	 was	 happening	 in	 the	
Eritrean	 port	 reached	 the	 Parliament	 in	 Rome,	 and	 public	 discomfort	 with	 the	
colonial	adventure	–	which	had	already	caused	the	loss	of	many	Italian	lives	–	grew	
stronger.	 Newspapers	were	 also	 feeding	 this	 disapproval,	 and	 loudly	 called	 for	 an	
investigation.	 Therefore,	 in	 1891,	 the	 then	 Prime	 Minister	 Antonio	 Starabba	
Marquess	Di	Rudinì	 launched	an	 inquiry	 into	 the	atrocities	perpetrated	by	 the	 two	
Italian	 commanders	 Dario	 Livraghi	 and	 Eteocle	 Cagnassi,	 and	 sent	 a	 delegation	 to	
Eritrea	to	assess	the	situation.	This	could	have	been	a	turning	point	(Wrong,	2005),	
as	 many	 members	 of	 Parliament	 were	 militating	 for	 a	 retreat	 from	 Eritrea	 for	 a	
number	 of	 different	 reasons.	 Echoing	 popular	 resentment,	 some	 politicians	 were	
questioning	the	government’s	spending	on	infrastructure	in	Eritrea;	they	argued	that	
Italy	 itself	 needed	 investments	 for	 development,	 especially	 in	 the	 south.	 Others	
claimed	 that	 the	 colony	was	 too	militarised	 and	argued	 for	 the	need	 to	 establish	 a	
civil	 administration	 (Montanelli,	 2011).	 This	 position	 eventually	 triumphed:	 Di	
Rudinì	decided	 to	 remove	 the	 colony	 from	 the	 control	of	 the	military,	 to	 secure	 its	
borders,	and	to	reduce	colonial	expenditure.		
Under	 the	 newly	 appointed	 governor,	 Ferdinando	 Martini,	 the	 colony	
experienced	a	strong	infrastructural	development	and	the	foundations	were	laid	for	a	
new	 colonial	 society.	 Eritrea’s	 capital	 was	 moved	 to	 Asmara,	 and	 the	 colony	 was	






was	 still	 difficult	 to	 travel	 from	 Massawa	 to	 Asmara,	 especially	 if	 carrying	
construction	materials	 or	 supplies.	 So	 a	 quicker	 and	 safer	 connection	was	 deemed	
necessary,	and	Martini	started	planning	a	railway.	In	his	7,000	pages	long	memoirs,	Il	
Diario	 Eritreo,	 he	 expresses	 his	 enthusiasm	 for	 the	 project,	 but	 also	 his	
disappointment	with	Rome.	The	fact	was	that,	having	cut	the	colonial	budget,	Rome	
was	not	supportive	of	constant	requests	for	money.	Moreover,	after	the	tremendous	
Italian	 defeat	 against	 the	 Abyssinians	 at	 Adua	 in	 1896,	 in	 which	more	 than	 6,000	
Italian	soldiers	and	ascari	lost	their	lives	(Montanelli,	2011),	the	colonial	venture	was	





Eritrean	workers	 and	 Italian	 superintendents,	 and	 started	 the	 groundwork	 for	 the	
railway,	which	was	very	complicated,	due	to	the	very	steep	grade	of	the	slope	which	




The	 works	 continued	 during	 the	 1930s,	 but	 the	 Italian-Ethiopian	 war,	 sparked	 in	
1935,	interrupted	the	construction	of	the	final	section	to	Sudan.		
																																																								
39 Translated from the Italian: ‘La ferrovia sarebbe l’unico rimedio effettivo a molti – se non a tutti – i mali della 
colonia. Ma a Roma non ne vogliono sapere’. 
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Eritrea’s	 governor	was	 also	worried	 about	 the	 relations	between	 settlers	 and	
locals.	 During	 that	 period,	 the	 Italian	 community	 was	 small,	 mostly	 composed	 of	
soldiers.	 Being	 far	 from	 their	 home,	 many	 of	 them	 took	 Eritrean	 women	 as	
concubines	(madamismo)	setting	up	house	together	(Cassata,	2006;	see	also	Wrong,	




Italian	 education.	 Italian	 local	 authorities	 in	 Eritrea	 deplored	 this	 phenomenon	 as	
they	considered	it	to	be	a	threat	to	the	‘purity	of	the	race’	and	to	the	‘dominance	of	
the	 white	 man’.	 However,	 Italian	 officials	 in	 Eritrea	 saw	 things	 differently	 and	
completely	disregarded	their	superiors’	directions.		
The	education	system	established	under	Italian	domination	was	also	marked	by	
this	 racist	 view.	 Italian	 and	 Eritrean	 pupils	 were	 kept	 separate,	 to	 avoid	 them	
forming	 any	 close	 relationships:	 the	 ‘dominance	 of	 the	 white	 race’	 was	 to	 be	
preserved	at	any	cost.	Martini	was	certain	that	Eritreans	understood	Italian	rule	as	a	
form	of	necessary	evil,	 given	 the	benefits	 it	 gave	 them	 in	 terms	of	development,	 in	
comparison	to	their	Abyssinian	neighbours;	he	believed	they	considered	the	Italians	
to	 be	 kind	 but	 stupid	 (Martini,	 1946).	 The	 Italian	 governor	 noticed	 that	 Eritreans	
were	very	clever,	especially	when	it	came	to	learning	languages	(Italian	was	taught	to	
them	 in	 school).	 So	 he	 believed	 that	 they	 could	 undermine	 the	 ‘superiority	 of	 the	
white	 race’,	were	 they	 to	 attend	 the	 same	 classes	 as	 Italians,	 or,	 even	worse,	 instil	
revolutionary	 ideas	 into	 their	 Italian	 peers	 (Martini,	 1946).	 Segregation	 was	 also	










Ironically,	 one	of	 the	most	 zealous	 champions	of	 the	 superiority	of	 the	 ‘white	
race’	was	 a	 former	 socialist,	 Benito	Mussolini,	who	 in	 his	 early	 years	 had	 opposed	
Italy’s	 ‘imperialist	war’	 and	denounced	 the	 invasion	of	Libya	 (1911),	which	earned	
him	 a	 five-month	 jail	 term	 (De	 Felice,	 2005,	 Montanelli	 2011b).	 Mussolini	 was	
expelled	from	the	Partito	Socialista	Italiano	(PSI	–	the	Italian	Socialist	Party)	because	
of	his	criticism	of	the	party	and	of	socialism	itself,	which	had	(in	his	view)	failed	to	
recognize	 the	 national	 problems	 that	 brought	 about	 the	 First	World	War	 (WW1);	
another	 part	 of	 the	 reason	was	 his	 support	 for	 the	 Italian	 intervention	 in	 the	war.	
Gradually	 however	 Mussolini	 changed	 his	 views	 and	 adopted	 the	 ideology	 of	
revolutionary	 nationalism,	 transcending	 class	 lines	 (Gregor,	 1979:	 191).	 When	 he	









of	 1929.	 Migration	 to	 the	 African	 colonies	 could,	 in	 his	 view,	 deter	 Italians	 from	








justify	 the	 invasion	 of	 Abyssinia	 in	 1935,	 in	 which	 both	 ascari	 and	 Italian	 troops	
participated.	In	1936,	the	Italian	expansion	was	finally	complete,	and	the	Empire	was	
named	Africa	Orientale	Italiana	(AOI	–	Italian	Eastern	Africa).	To	Mussolini,	Adua	was	
a	 lesson	 learnt,	 so	 he	 sent	 an	 oversupply	 of	 men	 and	 materiel.	 The	 cost	 of	 the	
endeavour,	 however,	 was	 very	 high:	 roughly	 12,000	 Italians	 and	 another	 4,000	 to	
5,000	Libyans,	Eritreans	and	Somalis	died	in	the	battle	(Weinberg,	2005:	276).	Also,	
the	 economic	 cost	 of	 the	 conquest	 excessively	 strained	 the	 Italian	 budget;	 as	 a	
consequence,	dissent	about	the	colonialist	expansion	was	growing	in	Rome.	
The	 invasion	 of	 Abyssinia	 represented	 a	 boost	 for	 Eritrea’s	 economy,	 as	 the	
country	became	the	staging	post	for	further	expansion,	and	the	settlement	Mussolini	
so	 desperately	wanted	 to	 create	 in	 order	 to	 lure	 Italian	migrants.	 The	 railway	had	
been	expanded	and	towns	such	as	Keren	were	greatly	benefiting	from	their	location	




50,000-strong	 work	 force	 (Wrong,	 2005)	 made	 up	 of	 workers,	 engineers	 and	
surveyors	 to	 develop	 the	 colony.	 They	 built	 hospitals,	 airports,	 bridges,	 and	 paved	
















of	 malaria.	 Avant-garde	 architects	 designed	 modernist	 buildings…for	
instance,	the	Fiat	Tagliero	building…did	you	see	it?’.		
The	 architect	 Giuseppe	 Pettazzi	 designed	 the	 Fiat	 Tagliero	 petrol	 station	 in	
1937-1938;	 it	 is	 one	 of	 the	 world’s	 best	 examples	 of	 Futurism.	 It	 is	 shaped	 as	 an	
aeroplane,	with	a	central	building	and	two	long	‘wings’.		
‘Legend	 has	 it	 that	 when	 the	 petrol	 station	 was	 finally	 finished,	 the	
workers	 refused	 to	 withdraw	 the	 scaffolding	 as	 they	 feared	 that	 the	
project	was	too	ambitious	and	that	the	wings	would	collapse.	At	that	point,	
Pettazzi	 went	 mad	 and	 pointed	 a	 gun	 to	 the	 head	 of	 the	 building	
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supervisor	 threatening	 to	 kill	 him’,	 says	 Pippo	 Cinnirella.	 Much	 to	






The	 migration	 of	 Italians	 to	 the	 colony	 naturally	 created	 concerns	 in	 Rome	
regarding	 the	 relations	 they	 would	 establish	 with	 the	 local	 populations.	 These	
worries	were	not	new:	as	mentioned	earlier,	during	the	pre-fascist	period,	Eritrea’s	
governors	 had	 tried	 to	 tackle	 the	 phenomenon	 of	madamismo	 and	 ‘interbreeding’,	
with	 almost	 no	 success.	 The	 fascist	 government	was	worried	 that	 the	 presence	 of	




new	 births,	 rather	 than	 to	 immigration	 (Barrera,	 2003).	 By	 1931,	 in	 fact,	 40%	 of	
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Italians	 in	 Eritrea	were	 born	 in	 the	 colony	 (Castellano,	 1948).	Many	 of	 them	were	
sons	 and	 daughters	 of	 Italian	 men	 and	 Eritrean	 women.	 Very	 few	 Italian	 women	
immigrated,	and	most	of	them	were	already	married.		
As	the	frequent	call	to	the	protection	of	the	‘white	race’	did	not	have	the	desired	
effect	 on	 the	 Italians’	 behaviour	 in	 the	 colony,	 Mussolini	 promoted	 a	 stricter	
legislation	 against	 ‘interbreeding’.	 The	 tacit	 racism	 of	 the	 liberal	 administration	
became	institutionalised	during	the	fascist	years.	 In	the	summer	of	1935,	Mussolini	
urged	 the	 then	 Ministry	 of	 the	 Colonies,	 Alessandro	 Lessona,	 to	 prepare	 a	
‘contingency	plan’	 to	 tackle	 the	phenomenon.	As	 a	 result,	 the	 ‘New	Regulations	 for	




were	 forbidden,	 and	many	 of	 those	which	 had	 taken	 place	were	 declared	 null	 and	
void.		
Furthermore,	in	order	to	force	Italian	residents	in	the	colony	to	comply	with	the	
law	 provisions,	 a	 sanctions	 regime	 was	 also	 introduced42.	 For	 instance,	 an	 Italian	
citizen	convicted	of	having	had	sexual	relations	with	natives	would	be	imprisoned	for	
five	 years.	 Overnight	 stays	 in‘indigenous’	 neighbourhoods,	 as	 well	 as	 frequenting		
places	where	Eritrean	hanged	out	were	prohibited.	 In	 addition,	 Eritreans	 of	mixed	
descent	 were	 equated	 to	 locals	 and,	 therefore,	 excluded	 from	 the	 education	
																																																								
41	 Already	 in	 1933,	 the	 fascist	 government	 had	 restricted	 the	 possibility	 for	 the	 offspring	 of	 unknown	
white	fathers	to	claim	Italian	citizenship:		it	specified	that	when	they	came	of	age	(at	18	years	old),	they	
needed	to	demonstrate	that	they	had	met	specific	cultural	and	moral	requirements.	Moreover,	they	also	
needed	to	undergo	an	 ‘anthropological’	diagnostical	procedure,	 to	establish	 that	 they	were	 ‘dark	white’	
rather	than	‘light	black’	(see	Cucinotta,	1934).	





historically	 provided	 by	 missionaries.	 Being	 Eritrean,	 they	 were	 only	 allowed	 to	
attend	school	until	the	fourth	grade,	in	all-black	classes.		
Thinking	 that	 interbreeding	was	 the	result	of	single	men	migration,	Mussolini	
regulated	the	duration	of	their	stay:	single	men	could	not	stay	in	the	colony	for	more	
than	six	months;	married	men	could	stay	 longer	 if	 their	 families	were	 to	come	and	
join	 them.	To	 finally	 solve	 the	 problem,	Mussolini	 decided	 in	 1938	 to	 promote	 the	
migration	of	Italian	women	to	the	African	colonies	(Di	Lalla,	2014)43.		
According	to	Pippo	Cinnirella,		
‘Il	 Duce	 [Mussolini]	 introduced	 these	 laws...but	 they	 were	 not	 really	
followed!	Many	of	the	Italian	soldiers	already	had	a	girlfriend;	many	were	
already	married	 to	 an	 Eritrean	 woman.	 As	 a	 result	 of	 this	 policy,	 many	
decided	 not	 to	 go	 back	 to	 Italy	 and	 to	 remain	 here	 forever	 with	 their	
Eritrean	families’.	He	adds	that	 ‘some	men	or	couples	decided	to	settle	in	






have	 to	 step	 aside	when	 they	 passed.	 Also,	 in	 the	 cinema,	 Eritreans	 had	
their	 seats	 in	 the	gallery,	 they	had	 their	own	queue	at	 the	public	offices,	




but	 also	 young	 unmarried	 teachers,	 nurses,	 office	 workers,	 as	 well	 as	 prostitutes	 that	 considered	
migration	as	a	chance	to	better	their	lives	(see	Di	Lalla,	2014).	
44	A	subregion	in	the	northwestern	Anseba	region	of	Eritrea.	The	Casciani	are	considered	by	the	Italian	
community	 in	Eritrea	as	a	 form	of	 ‘founding	 fathers’.	At	 the	end	of	 the	1890s,	Pietro	Casciani	(a	 lawyer	
and	notary)	and	his	wife,	Maria	Verolini,	were	allocated	an	estate	 in	 the	Anseba	valley,	10-12	km	away	
from	 the	 Asmara-Keren	 railway.	 At	 the	 beginning	 they	 lived	 in	 a	 modest	 tucul,	 a	 form	 of	 local	 shed.	




school.	 In	 1975,	 when	 Afewerki	 forced	 Italians	 to	 return	 to	 their	 country	 of	 origin,	 the	 estate	 was	
nationalised.	
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still	 call	 that	 area	 the	 commishtato45,	 their	 pronunciation	 of	 the	 Italian	
campo	cintato	(enclosed	field)	(see	also	Wrong,	2005:	74).		
Then	he	adds,		










of	 human	 activities	 aimed	 at	 preserving	 their	 state:	 a	 refreshed	white	 shop	 sign,	 a	
clean	shop	window.		
I	walk	 alongside	Pippo	Cinnirella,	 I	 am	accompanying	him	 to	 the	barbershop.	
The	sign	says	‘Giovanni’s’;	the	interiors	are	vintage	and	the	walls	are	decorated	with	




to	his	assistant	and	 friend.	Together	with	 the	shop,	 the	 latter	decided	to	 informally	
take	on	his	predecessor’s	name	as	a	sign	of	continuity	with	the	past.		
																																																								




‘Everyone	 calls	 him	 Giovanni’	 says	 Pippo,	 ‘this	 is	 normal	 here…many	
Eritreans	who	have	worked	with	Italians	take	their	name	when	they	die	or	
go	away.	It	means	that	they	are	proud	of	this	relationship’.	




















sweetened	 and	 smoothened	 with	 the	 passing	 of	 time.	 In	 a	 sense,	 his	 positive	
perceptions	of	Italy	are	constantly	recreated	through	his	interaction	with	his	clients,	
but	they	are	mostly	 linked	to	a	distant	past	and,	 therefore,	 they	are	not	 in	any	way	











Small	 in	numbers	but	very	active,	 the	 Italian	community	organises	events,	many	of	








gives	 me	 a	 friendly	 smile	 as	 he	 slowly	 walks	 towards	 us.	 Pippo	 has	 told	 me	 that	
Solomon	is	always	happy	to	talk	about	his	story,	and	that	he	is	held	in	high	esteem	by	
the	Eritrean	regime,	the	local	population	and	the	Italians.		
‘I	was	 born	 in	Tessenei	 and	my	 father	was	 a	 peasant.	 I	 am	93	 years	 old	
now…I	am	very	old’,	he	tells	me	in	good	Italian.	‘At	that	time,	the	situation	
was	not	very	safe,	because	we	were	right	at	 the	border	with	Sudan.	And	
there	was	not	much	 to	do	either	apart	 from	 farming.	 I	 knew	 the	 Italians	
were	looking	for	Eritrean	manpower	to	build	bridges,	defences…they	were	




an	 Eritrean	 Muntaz	 [ascari	 corporal	 of	 the	 Corpo	 Speciale	 d’Africa]	 by	
chance	and	 I	 enrolled.	The	 salary	was	higher	 than	 that	of	workers.	Then	
my	wife	also	 came.	 […]	 It	was	difficult	 at	 the	beginning	because	 I	had	 to	
learn	 Italian,	and	how	to	use	weapons.	We	 followed	 the	orders	of	 Italian	
officials.	I	remember	a	capitano	[captain],	Betti,	he	was	inflexible	[smiles],	
I	guess	he	was	like	that	because	he	wanted	us	to	learn	discipline	and	to	be	
prepared.	 We	 were	 respected,	 anyway.	 You	 know,	 I	 had	 many	 Italians	






British	domination	 in	 the	1940s	and,	 later	on,	 against	 the	Ethiopian	 regime.	Awate	
also	 gave	 momentum	 to	 the	 growing	 Eritrean	 independence	 movement,	 which	
Solomon	joined	and	with	which	he	later	fought	the	war	for	independence.	Solomon’s	
account	is	very	representative	of	the	experience	of	the	ascari:	his	story	is	similar	to	
that	 of	many	 others	who	 also	 joined	 the	 independence	 struggle.	 These	 very	 proud	
Eritreans	 are	 those	 who	 mostly	 contributed	 to	 the	 country’s	 military	 and	
infrastructural	development	and,	most	importantly,	to	the	construction	of	a	national	
identity.	In	this	respect,	serving	as	an	Ascaro	also	contributed	to	that.	






a	 social	 filter	 between	 the	 colonial	 administration	 and	 its	 colonial	 subjects	
(2004:546).	The	colonial	government’s	aim	was,	in	fact,	to	progressively	incorporate	
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these	 Eritrean	 soldiers	 into	 the	 colonial	 structure	 (Negash,	 1987).	 This	 approach	
entailed,	first	of	all,	the	development	of	a	level	of	mutual	trust:	on	the	one	hand,	the	
Italians	needed	to	be	confident	 that	 the	ascari	would	not	 turn	against	 them;	on	the	
other	 hand,	 the	 latter	 needed	 to	 feel	 included	 and	 respected	 by	 the	 colonists.	 In	
Solomon’s	case,	the	statement	 ‘we	were	respected’	is	key:	despite	the	difficulties	he	
encountered,	 this	 sense	of	 respect	 led	 to	 a	positive	 self-	 evaluation,	which,	 in	 turn,	
caused	 him	 to	 develop	 a	 sense	 of	 pride	 and	 a	 good	 relationship	with	 the	 Italians.	
Consequently,	 Solomon	 has	 a	 positive	 perception	 of	 the	 colonial	 times,	 especially	
compared	to	his	memories	of	the	English	rule,	that	did	not	maintain	or	replicate	this	
system.		
The	 first	 step	 of	 the	 process	 was	 recruitment.	 Italians	 preferred	 to	 enlist	
married	 Eritreans	 because	 they	 were	 thought	 to	 be	 more	 trustworthy	 and	 more	
likely	 to	 stay	 for	 longer	 periods	 because	 of	 their	 family	 responsibilities,	 thus	
providing	 the	 colonial	 army	 with	 very	 experienced	 fighters	 (Dirar,	 2004).	
Furthermore,	 families	became	an	 important	element	of	 the	construction	of	 colonial	
society.	The	Italian	authorities	of	that	time	paid	a	lot	of	attention	to	the	family	as	the	
original	 nucleus	 of	 society.	 This	 can	 be	 seen	 from	 the	 amount	 of	 laws,	 bills	 and	
decrees	 on	 the	 family	 that	 were	 passed	 and	 approved	 both	 by	 Rome	 and	 by	 the	
Eritrean	 government.	 In	 Eritrea,	 the	 1908	 disciplinary	 regulations	 for	 indigenous	
soldiers	 serving	 in	 the	 Royal	 Corps	 of	 Colonial	 troops	 of	 Eritrea	 (Regolamento	 di	
disciplina	per	i	militari	indigeni	del	Regio	Corpo	di	Truppe	Coloniali	d’Eritrea)46,	gave	
ascari	 the	right	 to	bring	 their	 families	with	 them	during	military	campaigns.	 It	also	
specified	 that	 new	 residential	 areas	 for	 ascari	 and	 their	 families	 were	 to	 be	





these	 new	 districts,	 the	 regulation	 explicitly	 emphasised	 that	 only	 families	 who	
resided	 in	the	camps	would	benefit	 from	housing	allowances.	However	the	 families	
unable	 to	 find	 accommodation	 in	 such	 camps	 for	 exceptional	 reasons	 would	
nonetheless	be	entitled	to	a	monthly	15	lira	stipend	(Dirar,	2004:543).	In	the	campi-
famiglia,	 ascari	 were	 supposed	 to	 build	 their	 own	 house	 using	 locally	 available	
materials	 (Vitale,	 1960).	 In	 general,	 the	 works	 were	 were	 supervised	 by	 Italians	
officials.	Moreover,	 the	campi-famiglia	were	developed	in	accordance	with	the	 local	
town	 plan,	which	 indicated	 that	ascari	houses	 needed	 to	 be	 similar	 to	 each	 other,	
giving	the	camps	a	sense	of	order	and	uniformity.		
Education	also	played	a	very	significant	role	in	the	shaping	of	the	ascari	as	an	
important	component	of	 colonial	 society.	Education	was	provided	 free	of	 charge	 to	
all	ascari	children.	Growing	up	in	the	campi	 in	constant	contact	with	Italian	officials	
and	administrators,	they	were	expected	to	realise	that	they	were	part	of	a	society	in	
which	 they	 were	 called	 to	 become	 prominent	 participants.	 In	 addition	 to	 the	
education	 of	 children,	 ever	 since	 the	 ‘liberal’	 administration,	 colonial	 authorities	
sought	to	secure	the	loyalty	of	Eritrean	soldiers	by	teaching	them	Italian47.	Colonial	
troops	underwent	a	process	of	 ‘Italianisation’,	which	proved	to	be	very	effective.	 In	










the	 salary	which	 ascari	 received	during	during	military	 campaigns	was	undeniably	
far	superior	to	the	average	wages	of	Eritrean	workers	(Vitale,	1960:101).	Moreover,	
the	 social	 status	 of	 Eritrean	 soldiers	was	 reinforced	 through	 promotions,	 given	 on	
the	 basis	 of	 military	 merit	 and	 seniority.	 They	 received	 decorations	 consisting	 of	




was	 older	 than	 me,	 became	 a	
Saleqqa	 	 [a	 commander	 of	 a	
battalion48],	 after	 serving	 for	
more	 or	 less	 10	 years.	 He	was	 a	
very	 important	 man	 among	 the	
ascari,	 he	 was	 also	 held	 in	 very	
high	 esteem	 by	 the	 Italians.	 […]	
There	 was	 a	 ceremony,	 it	 was	




were	 given	 a	 medal	 for	 their	
bravery.	 […]	 I	 thought	 that	 I	




Unfortunately,	 Solomon	 never	 received	 any	 promotion,	 as	 the	 Italians	 were	
defeated	before	he	had	spent	the	requisite	amount	of	years	as	a	soldier.	Nevertheless,	
it	 can	be	argued	 that	 the	hope	 to	 attain	a	high	 social	 status	 -	 in	 comparison	 to	 the	









their	 rulers	 and	 other	 Eritreans.	 Through	 their	 involvement	 in	 the	 colonial	
administration,	 the	ascari	 and	especially	 their	 children	were	 intended	 to	develop	a	
new	 identity	 and	 thereby	 to	 help	 preserve	 the	 colonial	 social	 organisation.	 As	 in	
Solomon’s	 case,	 the	 local	 fighters	 openly	 embraced	 this	 new	 identity,	 which	





At	 the	same	 time,	however,	 it	 also	helped	 to	 foster	a	new	 form	of	Eritrean	 identity	
and	 thereby	 to	 bolster	 nationalism	 (Le	 Huerou,	 1999;	 Taddia,	 1986:	 263).	 The	
massive	recruitment	of	Eritreans	in	the	colonial	administration	and	especially	in	the	
army	 changed	 their	 own	 perception	 of	 their	 ethnic	 and	 religious	 identity.	 Colonial	
soldiers	were	first	of	all	 taught	to	serve	under	the	Italian	banner	and	to	be	 loyal	 to	
their	 armed	 section.	 Even	 though	 differences	 in	 ethnicity	 and	 religion	 were	 to	 a	
certain	 extent	 taken	 into	 account	 in	 the	 formation	 of	 battalions,	 platoons	 and	
divisions,	these	were	often	socially	and	culturally	mixed.	As	Dirar	points	out,	fighting	











colonial	 development	 project,	 created	 the	 perception	 of	 a	 new	 and	 more	
homogeneous	 political	 community.	 This	 new	 identity	 is	 deeply	 rooted	 in	 the	
experience	 of	 the	 ascari	 and	 their	 offspring,	 who	 tend	 to	maintain	 and	 reproduce	
positive	memories	of	the	Italian	rule.		
‘I	 was	 a	 soldier.	 An	 Italian	 soldier’	 says	 Solomon.	 ‘When	 the	 British	
attacked	 us	 I	 stayed	 to	 fight	 with	 my	 companions.	 Many	 of	 us	 were	
massacred,	 but	 I	 survived.	 I	 was	 imprisoned	 for	 a	 while	 but	 then	 I	
managed	 to	escape	and	 I	walked	 to	Sudan.	 I	 think	 it	 took	me	17	days	 to	









The	 valuable	 contribution	 of	 the	 ascari	 sometimes	 came	 at	 a	 great	 personal	
cost.	Having	this	‘sacrifice’	recognised	also	by	the	Italian	authorities	–	even	after	the	
collapse	 of	 the	 Italian	 Empire	 –	 gave	 the	 ascari	 and	 their	 families	 a	 sense	 of	
entitlement.	 And	 it	 is	 not	 rare	 to	 to	 hear	 them	 express	 feelings	 of	 disappointment	
about	the	meagre	compensation	which	the	colonial	troops	obtained.	This	is	the	case	
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of	 Emsegheb,	 who	 attended	 the	 latest	 exhibition	 on	 the	 ascari	 at	 the	 Casa	 degli	
Italiani,	and	who	commented	in	the	‘Remarks	Book’:	
	‘This	 [exhibition]	 reminds	 new	 generations	 of	 our	 grandfathers,	 our	
fathers	who	paid	a	great	price	on	several	fronts	in	the	interest	of	Italy.	To	
thank	 them	 for	 their	 bravery,	what	 does	 the	 Italian	 government	 give	 us	
today?	 What	 sort	 of	 moral	 or	 economic	 help?	 Young	 Eritreans	 ask	 the	
Eritrean	 government,	 and	 the	white	 and	 the	black	 if	 there	 is	 a	 sufficient	
price	for	the	construction	of	the	country	that	does	not	hinder	our	progress.	







‘among	 Eritreans,	 especially	 nationalist	 Eritreans,	 the	 assessment	 of	 the	
colonial	 times	 is	 ambivalent.	 First	 of	 all,	 they	 establish	 a	 distinction	
between	 the	 first	 Italians	 who	 came	 to	 Eritrea…what	 is	 known	 as	 the	
‘liberal’	period…and	the	ones	that	came	during	the	fascist	era.	Despite	the	
fact	that	they	all	came	from	a	humble	background,	the	first	wave	seemed	
keener	 on	 putting	 down	 roots	 in	 the	 country.	 Therefore,	 their	 attitude	
towards	 the	 local	 population	 was	 different.	 The	 fascists	 were	 harsher;	
some	of	them	would	kick	the	locals	if	they	didn’t	get	out	of	their	way	when	
they	were	 passing.	 They	were	 racist,	 arrogant	 bullies!	 But	 it	 is	 true	 that	
many	of	 them	did	not	comply	with	the	 fascist	regulations	and	that	was	a	
problem	for	the	regime…Mussolini	really	didn’t	know	what	else	he	could	
do	 to	make	 them	behave	 accordingly…In	 the	 end,	many	 of	 them	did	 not	
even	 return	 to	 Italy,	 they	 stayed	with	 their	 local	 families!	 Then,	 there	 is	
also	another	facet	to	consider.	Almost	everybody	knows	that	the	Italians’	
legacy	 has	 been	 enormous:	 by	 the	 1930s	 we	 were	 the	 most	 developed	
African	country…we	had	a	rising	economy,	lots	of	factories,	there	was	a	lot	
of	 expenditure	 on	 infrastructure,	 new	 neighbourhoods	 were	 built.	











it	 unbearable	 for	 Eritreans	 to	 regress	 under	 Ethiopia,	 a	 less	 developed	
country.	 However,	 the	 perception	 still	 remains	 –	 and	 it	 is	 not	 just	 a	
perception	 –	 that	 Eritreans	were	 considered	 to	 be	 second-class	 citizens.	
They	 were	 not	 allowed	 to	 be	 educated	 for	 more	 than	 four	 years.	 Italy	
feared	 that	 if	 Eritreans	 were	 too	 educated	 they	 would	 overthrow	 their	
rulers.	So	better	to	keep	them	in	chains!’.		
Brahim	underlines	an	important	aspect	of	the	Eritrean	perception	of	Italy,	that	
is,	 the	 fact	 that	 positive	 perceptions	 of	 Italy	 are	 mostly	 linked	 to	 infrastructural	
progress	 and	 to	 the	 Italians’	 participation	 in	 the	 development	 of	 the	 country.	 It	 is	
possible	 to	argue,	 then,	 that	 those	years	 left	 their	mark,	both	socially	and	spacially.	
Traces	 of	 the	 passage	 of	 Italians	 and	 of	 the	 ‘golden’	 economic	 years	 can	 be	 found	
everywhere,	there	are	visible	reminders	both	in	the	city	and	in	the	countryside.	Daro	
Ghunat,	Cheren,	Dogali,	Massawa,	and	Asmara,	all	bear	 the	 footprint	of	 the	colonial	
adventure	 and	 of	 its	 cost	 in	 terms	 of	 human	 lives,	 both	 Eritrean	 and	 Italian.	
Memorials	 and	 cemeteries	 have	 been	 left	 to	 commemorate	 that	 part	 of	 Eritrea’s	
history,	and	to	honour	those	who	fell	in	battle.		
																																																								
50	The	University	of	Asmara	was	the	 first	university	 in	Eritrea.	 It	was	 funded	by	the	Comboni	Sisters	 in	
1958,	 and	 was	 at	 first	 attended	 mostly	 by	 local	 Italians.	 In	 2002	 the	 government	 shut	 down	 all	







of	 1,586	 Italian	 soldiers	 who	 died	 between	 1885	 and	 1946.	 They	 were	 buried	 in	
several	national	cemeteries	across	the	country,	which	were	 lately	abandoned.	 In	 its	
two	 lateral	crypts,	 this	 impressive	mausoleum	also	holds	 the	remains	of	more	than	
1,120	Italian	civilians.	Over	time,	just	like	Asmara’s	Italian	cemetery,	it	has	become	a	





high	social	 status.	What	 is	very	 interesting	about	 these	monuments	 is	 that	 some	of	
them,	such	as	Daro	Ghunat	and	the	Cheren	war	memorials,	built	respectively	in	1939	
and	 1941,	 hold	 the	 remains	 of	 both	 Italian	 soldiers	 and	 ascari	 in	 the	 same	 crypt,	
thereby	 erasing	 any	 differences	 between	 them.	 This	 choice	 conveys	 a	 powerful	
	 96	



















dubbed	piglo	Roma	 (‘piccola	Roma’	 that	 is	 ‘small	 Rome’)	 by	many	Eritreans,	was	 a	
paradise	 of	 modernist	 architecture.	 Modernist	 landmarks	 include	 the	 Catholic	
cathedral,	the	schools,	and	there	are	still	shops,	such	as	Bini’s	optical	shop,	that	are	
now	run	by	Eritreans	but	have	kept	their	old	signs	and	appearance.		
It	 is	 possible	 to	 come	 across	 cafés	with	 Italian	 names,	 such	 as	 the	Bar	 Lia	 in	
Gherar	 (Massawa),	 which	 still	 resists	modernisation	with	 its	 bright	 green	 and	 red	
colours	 and	 old	 Gaggia	 coffee	 machine.	 Other	 examples	 ae	 the	 Savoia	 Hotel	 in	







In	Asmara,	 there	are	still	many	places	whose	name	comes	 from	Italian.	 In	 the	
city,	 you	 can	 hear	 people	 talking	 about	 the	Forto,	 an	 Eritrean	 corruption	 of	 ‘forte’,	
which	 means	 fortification.	 Usually,	 ‘most	 of	 the	 villages	 grown	 up	 during	 colonial	
times	have	their	own	Forto,	which,	actually	was	the	pivotal	structure	around	which	
those	centres	expanded’	(Dirar,	2004:	544).	As	Asmara	became	the	capital	city,	many	





Invalidi	 (the	 Italian	 for	 ‘warehouse’	 and	 ‘warehouse	 of	 the	 disabled’).	 At	 the	
beginning	many	 army	warehouses	were	 located	 in	 this	 area,	 but	 it	 later	 became	 a	
residential	 neighbourhood	 for	 disabled	 veterans.	 In	 Asmara	 there	 are	 two	
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neighbourhoods	 that	 were	 originally	 inhabited	 by	 colonial	 irregular	 troops	 which	
were	employed	by	the	colonial	government	for	police	activities	(Tracchia	1940:	188;	
Dirar,	2004:	544).	These	 irregular	 troops	were	called	 ‘Bande’	(bands)	and	gave	 the	
name	 to	Gheza	Banda	Habasha	 (gheza	means	house	 in	Tigray,	 so	 the	 name	 can	be	
translated	as	‘House	of	the	Abyssinian	Banda’),	and	to	Gheza	Banda	Tillian	(‘House	of	




veterans,	 who	 were	 then	 allowed	 to	 live	 there;	 Villaggio	 Genio	 (Village	 of	 the	
Engineers)	was	 the	area	were	 the	 Italian	army	engineers	used	 to	 live;	Haddish	Adi	
(New	Village),	was	 a	 district	 allocated	 to	migrants	 from	neighbouring	 regions	who	
were	 looking	 for	employment	 in	the	colonial	army.	Some	street	names,	such	as	 ‘via	
Comboni’	or	‘via	Bologna’	also	reflect	this	connection	to	Italy.	
If	 the	physical	traces	of	the	Italian	colonial	era	are	very	difficult	to	 ignore,	the	
same	 goes	 for	 the	 influence	 that	 they	 had	 on	 the	 Eritrean	 language.	 Besides	
toponymy,	 many	 other	 Italian	 words	 also	 entered	 the	 Eritrean	 vocabulary.	 Even	
though	Italian	is	now	only	taught	at	the	Italian	school	(which	is	mostly	attended	by	
Eritreans)	and	has	widely	been	replaced	by	English,	it	is	not	rare	to	hear	one	person	
ask	 another	 ‘Come	 stai?’	 (how	 are	 you?),	 or	 to	 hear	 someone	 urge	 a	 crowd	 on	 by	
saying	‘Andiamo,	andiamo’	(come	on,	come	on).	Many	Eritreans	speak	at	least	a	few	
words	 of	 Italian,	 so	 when	 they	 realise	 someone	 comes	 from	 there,	 they	 try	 out	
various	 Italian	 expressions	 such	 as	 ‘Va	 bene,	 dopo’	 (ok,	 later)	 or	 ‘bishkoto?’,	 the	








Interestingly,	 above	 and	 beyond	 these	 everyday	 words,	 many	 others	 are	 the	
result	of	Eritrean	participation	in	the	colonial	administration.	As	 it	was	pointed	out	
earlier	 in	 this	 chapter,	 both	 under	 the	 so-called	 ‘liberal’	 administration	 (from	 the	
1890s	 to	 the	early	1920s)	and	under	 the	 fascist	administration	 (from	the	1920s	 to	
1941),	 the	 colony	 underwent	 a	 process	 of	 expansion	 and	 of	 infrastructural	
modernization.	 This	 process	 mostly	 relied	 on	 a	 workforce	 made	 up	 of	 Italian	
migrants	 –	 some	 of	 them	 temporary	 –	 but	 also,	 very	 importantly,	 of	 Eritrean	
labourers.		
The	 Italian	 colonial	 adventure	 in	 Eritrea	 nourished	 hopes	 of	 finding	




296).	However,	 the	 influx	of	 Italians	 into	 the	 colony	was	never	 regular.	During	 the	
liberal	 period,	 the	 colonial	 government	 delegated	 the	 recruitment	 of	 workers	 to	
various	 contracting	 firms	 (and	 their	 intermediaries).	 In	 general,	 these	 companies	
preferred	to	hire	Eritreans,	as	they	were	considerably	cheaper	to	employ	than	Italian	
workers.	 However,	when	 it	 came	 to	 the	mechanical	 sector	 or	 to	 agricultural	work	
that	 required	 higher	 specialization,	 contracting	 firms	 preferred	 to	 hire	 skilled	
Italians51.	This	indirectly	influenced	the	migratory	flow	from	Italy	to	Eritrea,	as	low-
skilled	 Italians	who	 came	 to	 the	 colonies	 had	 to	 compete	with	Eritreans	 and	 often	








process	 of	 infrastructural	 modernisation	 gained	 momentum,	 as	 thousands	 of	
Eritrean	 workers	 found	 employment	 in	 the	 construction	 sector	 under	 the	
supervision	of	Italian	engineers	and	surveyors.	Of	course,	Italians	did	not	understand	
construction	in	the	same	way	as	Eritreans.	For	instance,	the	typical	Eritrean	dwelling	













surprising,	 therefore,	 that	 the	 Eritrean	 Tigray	 language	 slowly	 absorbed	 Italian	
terminology	linked	to	the	construction	industry	and,	in	general,	to	the	technical	and	
administrative	 fields	which	were	 first	developed	by	Italians	overseeing	the	work	of	
locals53.	 Even	 today,	 it	 is	 very	 easy	 to	hear	 local	workers	 in	Asmara	 call	 a	window	
‘feshtra’	(corruption	of	‘finestra’),	or	a	toilet	‘bagno’,	a	pickaxe	‘bicone’	(corruption	of	
‘piccone’),	etc.		
Clearly,	 Italian	 colonialism	 left	 a	 lasting	 mark	 on	 space	 and	 culture	 in	
Eritrea,	which	is	still	very	visible.	This	is	mostly	due	to	the	intrinsic	characteristics	of	




Since	 the	end	of	 the	 Italian	domination,	Eritrea	has	experienced	different	
trials,	 from	 English	 rule	 to	 its	 annexation	 by	 Ethiopia,	 from	 the	 resistance	 fight	
against	 the	Derg	 to	 its	declaration	of	 independence	 in	1993,	 followed	by	 territorial	
conflicts	 that	 led	 to	 yet	 another	 war	 against	 Ethiopia	 in	 1998.	 Decades	 of	 armed	
conflict,	followed	by	a	dictatorial	regime	–	also	based	on	militarisation	of	the	masses	
–	 refashioned	 Eritrean	 identity	 and	 consolidated	 the	 foundational	 role	 played	 the	
																																																								





war	 for	 independence	 was	 a	 war	 against	 colonialism	 –	 not	 Italian	 or	 British	
colonialism,	 but	 Ethiopian	 colonialism.	 As	 one	 of	 the	 regime’s	 representatives	 (a	
businessman	I	met	in	Rome)	pointed	out	during	our	interview,		
‘the	 issue	 is	 that	 in	 1962,	 when	 Ethiopia	 occupied	 Eritrea,	 we	 were	
economically	 advanced	while	 they	were	 very	 backwards.	 Have	 you	 ever	
seen	a	colony	that	is	more	developed	that	the	colonising	country?	We	had	
foreign	investment,	 infrastructure…yes,	 the	English	dismantled	most	of	 it	





underwent	 a	 process	 of	 infrastructural	 modernisation	 and	 economic	 growth,	 as	 I	





















difficult	 years	 in	 general:	 various	 Eritrean	 liberation	 movements	 –	 the	
Eritrean	Liberation	Front	(ELF)	and	the	Liberation	Front	for	the	Eritrean	
People	(LFEP)	–	were	 fighting	against	 the	Ethiopians,	but	 they	were	also	
fighting	against	each	other	because	 they	had	different	political	agendas55	




delayed	 the	 airlift	 because	 it	 wanted	 it	 to	 land	 in	 Addis	 Ababa	 first,	 in	
order	 to	 use	 it	 to	 carry	 more	 soldiers	 to	 Eritrea.	 	 They	 [the	 Ethiopian	






the	 nationalisation	 of	 all	 economic	 assets,	 including	 all	 properties	
belonging	 to	 foreigners,	 that	 is,	 in	 Eritrea’s	 case,	 to	 Italians.	 In	 the	 end,	
there	was	nothing	left	to	go	back	to’.	
As	Cristoforo’s	testimony	points	out,	 in	1975	Italians	lost	their	properties	
and	 were	 forced	 to	 disengage	 from	 economic	 activity	 in	 Eritrea.	 The	 country’s	
instability	and	its	difficult	political	situation	never	made	it	possible	for	many	of	the	
Italians	 who	 had	 left	 to	 come	 back,	 nor	 for	 the	 Italian	 government	 to	 step	 up	 its	
investments.	 Even	 as	 I	 write,	 many	 Italians	 who	 wanted	 to	 return	 after	 Eritrea’s	
independence	 still	 have	 not	 had	 their	 property	 rights	 restored.	 According	 to	
members	 of	 the	 Italian	 Ministry	 of	 Foreign	 Affairs	 and	 International	 Cooperation,	
																																																								
55	The	ELF	and	the	LFEP	were	divided	due	to	ethnicity	and	political	agenda.	In	fact,	the	ELF	gathered	in	its	









the	 memory	 of	 the	 Villa	 Melotti,	 also	 known	 as	 La	 Cyprea.	 Eritrea’s	 most	 famous	
beachfront	villa,	it	was	commissioned	in	the	1960s	by	Emma	Melotti,	the	widow	of	an	
Italian	 businessman	who	 had	 started	 various	 companies	 in	 Eritrea	 in	 the	 1940s	 –	
including	the	local	beer	factory.	The	architect	was	the	famous	Luigi	Vietti.	In	Pippo’s	
words:		
‘Back	 then	 [the	 1950s	 and	 1960s],	 all	 of	 Italian-Eritrean	 polite	 society	
passed	through	Luigi	Vietti’s	study.	He	was	very	popular	among	the	Italian	
upper	 class,	 and	 also	 here;	 having	 him	 build	 your	 house	 demonstrated	
your	high	social	status.	The	Melotti	family	was	a	very	important	one	and,	
after	 WWII,	 they	 were	 in	 favour	 of	 Eritrea’s	 independence,	 which	 they	
thought	should	take	place	under	an	Italian	protectorate.	But	things	didn’t	
go	 that	way.	Mr.	 Lucio	 [Emma’s	 husband]	 died	 in	 1946	 and	Mrs.	 Emma	
took	 charge	 of	 the	 family	 business.	 She	 also	 helped	 rebel	 Eritrean	
independence	fighters.	When	the	Ehiopians	took	Massawa,	she	opened	her	
house	 to	 the	Eritreans	who	were	 fleeing	 from	Ethiopian	bombardments.	
Afterwards,	 the	 rebels	 saved	 her	 and	 brought	 her	 to	 Sudan,	 publicly	
acknowledging	 her	 support	 for	 their	 cause.	 It	 is	 undeniable	 that	 the	




have	 looked	 great	 considering	 the	 living	 conditions	 of	 the	 rest	 of	 the	
population.	Others	say	he	wanted	to	turn	it	into	a	resort.	I	don’t	know.	The	





56	The Italian	Cooperation	Services	had	been	operating	 in	 the	 country	until	2004-5,	 and	have	 resumed	
some	projects	in	the	past	few	years.	
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‘ridiculously	 low	 sum	 as	 compensation	 for	 the	 expropriation.	 There	was	
no	 agreement	 with	 the	 family,	 who	 sought	 help	 from	 us.	 When	 the	
Ambassador	 decided	 to	 send	 the	 First	 Secretary	 of	 the	 delegation	
[Ludovico	Serra]	to	check	on	the	state	of	the	villa,	he	was	arrested	without	






reason	 given	 for	 his	 expulsion	was	his	 interference	 in	Eritrean	 internal	 affairs,	 the	
Ambassador	having	intervened	on	behalf	of	the	European	Union	to	defend	the	case	of	
eleven	MPs	arrested	by	the	Eritrean	regime.	
Italian	 diplomats	 in	 Eritrea	 are	 not	 the	 only	 ones	 targeted	 by	Afewerki’s	
ambiguous	policies.	In	his	public	speeches	or	in	interviews	in	local	papers	–	such	as	
Haddas	 Eritrea,	 a	 daily	 newspaper	 in	 the	 Tigray	 language,	 or	 the	Eritrea	 Profile	 in	
English	 –	Afewerki	 argues	 that	 Italy	 should	 be	more	 engaged	 in	 Eritrea,	 yet	 at	 the	
same	 time	 the	 President	 seems	 clearly	 hostile	 to	 the	 staff	 of	 the	 Italian	 school	 in	
Asmara.	As	Giuliana,	an	Italian	teacher	in	the	school	points	out:		
‘our	school	consists	of	a	kindergarten	–	which	is	private	however	–	and	of	
an	elementary	 school,	 a	middle	 school	 and	a	high	 school.	 In	high	 school,	
students	 can	 choose	 among	 different	 curricula,	 like	 science,	 the	
humanities,	 and	 others	 which	 are	 more	 oriented	 towards	 building	
technical-professional	 profiles.	 I	 think	 that	 in	 total	we	 have	 about	 1,500	
students,	 but	 the	majority	 are	 Eritreans	 or	 Eritrean-Italian	 dual	 citizens.	
[…]	 The	 government	 barely	 tolerates	 us.	 Many	 times	 trivial	 issues	 have	
sparked	controversies,	 like	when	the	government	tried	to	prevent	Italian	
teachers	 from	 coming	 to	 teach	 here,	 by	 claiming	 that	 we	 Italians	 carry	
diseases’.			
It	is	clear	that	in	a	country	where	education	is	strictly	controlled	by	the	regime,	the	
presence	of	schools	 that	 the	government	cannot	completely	control	 is	considered	a	
problem.	 As	 it	 is,	 the	 Italian	 school	 is	 the	 only	 place	 where	 Italian	 is	 taught	 to	
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students,	and	where	curricula	include	subjects	such	as	Italian	history,	geography	and	




‘If	 I	were	 to	 leave	 the	country,	 I	would	go	 to	 Italy.	 In	 fact,	 I	often	 think	 I	
want	 to	 leave	Asmara	 and	 go	 abroad	 after	 finishing	 high	 school.	 I	 really	
don’t	want	to	serve	forever	in	the	army	and	to	be	stuck	in	this	country!’		












a	 special	 relationship.	Plus,	 if	Rome	 looks	 like	Asmara	 I	won’t	 feel	 like	 a	
stranger’.		
Demsas’s	 statement	 is	 very	 significant,	 as	 it	 highlights,	 very	 concisely,	 three	







his	 journey,	 such	 as	 the	 paths	 used	 by	 smuggling	 networks	 (this	 issue	 will	 be	
addressed	 in	 the	 following	 chapter).	 Almost	 all	 the	 Eritreans	 I	 interviewed	




Despite	 the	 fact	 that	 Italian	 is	not	widely	spoken	anymore	 in	Eritrea,	and	
that	 English	 has	 become	 the	 dominant	 language	 in	 education,	 large	 numbers	 of	
Eritreans	still	believe	there	exists	a	special	relationship	between	Italy	and	Eritrea.	As	
a	 matter	 of	 fact,	 signs	 of	 the	 presence	 of	 the	 Italians	 permeate	 the	 entire	
environment.	 As	 Gabriel,	 an	 Eritrean	 asylum	 seeker	 in	 Rome	 explained	 with	
disappointment,	
	‘I	 really	 believed	 that	 we	 [the	 Eritreans]	 would	 be	 welcomed	 here	 and	
treated	well	because	we	were	a	former	colony.	I	thought	there	was	a	sort	
of	privileged	path	 for	us	 to	stay,	 in	comparison	with	other	migrants.	You	
can	see	in	Eritrea	that	it	is	true	that	we	have	a	special	relationship	to	Italy,	
for	 instance	 if	 you	 look	 at	 the	 city	 or	 if	 you	 listen	 to	 many	 of	 our	
grandparents’.		
Gabriel’s	 account	 especially	 points	 out	 the	 importance	 of	 visual	 cues	 and	 of	 oral	
memories	 as	 evidence	 of	 the	 existence	 of	 such	 a	 special	 relationship.	 As	 I	 already	
explained,	 it	 is	 also	 reinforced	 by	 a	 public	 discourse	 that	 feeds	 their	 sense	 of	
abandonment.	





is	 also	 reflected	 in	 the	words	used	by	 the	Eritreans	 I	 interviewed	 to	describe	 their	
relation	to	Italy:	most	of	the	expressions	they	used	fell	within	the	visual	domain.	As	
one	 example	 among	 many,	 Selam,	 a	 twenty-four-year-old	 female	 Eritrean	 refugee	
living	in	Rome	told	me:		
‘you	 could	 see	 traces	 of	 the	 Italians	 everywhere	 in	 the	 city.	 You	 know,	
Asmara	looks	like	a	small	Rome.	Even	the	signs	are	in	Italian!’.	
Modernist	 architecture	 gives	many	 Eritreans	 a	misleading	 impression	 of	
grandeur,	of	economic	wellness,	which	does	not	correspond	to	the	current	economic	
situation	 in	 Italy	 and	 to	 its	 high	 level	 of	 unemployment.	 This	 misperception	 is	





cannot	 tell	 the	 truth.	 But	 then	 they	 are	 desperate	 because	 they	 cannot	
either	send	any	money	to	their	families’.	
In	 rural	 villages,	 perceptions	 are	 mostly	 reproduced	 by	 listening	 to	 older	
people’s	 oral	 accounts.	 Many	 of	 them	 are	 former	 ascari	 or	 were	 employed	 as	
construction	workers	 by	 the	 colonial	 administration.	 Others	were	 born	 during	 the	
fascist	 era	 and	 try	 to	 transmit	 the	 memories	 of	 those	 times	 to	 younger	 relatives.	
Their	accounts	are	thus	transmitted	from	one	generation	to	the	next.	Oral	memories,	
however,	are	more	than	a	mere	narration	of	events.	Language,	whether	in	speech	or	
in	 written	 form,	 has	 numerous	 communicative	 functions,	 including	 an	 emotive	
function	that	expresses	subjective	states	(Georgakopoulou	and	Goutsos,	1999).	They	
give	 information	 about	 the	 context	 and	 the	 setting	 where	 events	 or	 actions	 took	
	 110	
place,	 but	 they	 also	 have	 an	 intimate	 dimension;	 they	 convey	 an	 individual’s	
interpretation	of	 reality.	Certain	events	acquire	a	 subjective	meaning	 reflecting	 the	
way	a	person	understood	a	certain	event.	It	is	clear	that	the	cognitive	dimension	(the	
understanding	of	reality)	has	an	emotional	dimension	attached	to	it	(how	the	person	
felt	 about	 it).	 These	 dimensions	 are	 not	 separate	 but	 interact	with	 each	 other.	 For	
instance,	the	way	one	understands	reality	is	mediated	by	the	emotions	it	generates;	
at	 the	same	time,	a	certain	understanding	of	 reality	can	generate	 further	emotions.		
Oral	testimonies	are	laced	with	emotion57	which	is	transmitted	during	the	narration	
and	which	influences	the	listener’s	perception.	It	 is	possible	to	argue,	then,	that	the	
younger	 generations	 who	 do	 not	 have	 any	 direct	 memory	 or	 experience	 of	 the	
colonial	 period	 (or	 of	 Italians	 in	 general)	 are	 nevertheless	 influenced	 by	 the	
perceptions	 of	 their	 elders,	 which	 thereby	 shape	 the	 collective	 imagination	 about	
Italy.	 As	Woldu,	 a	 nineteen-year-old	 asylum	 seeker	 from	a	 village	 close	 to	Barentu	
told	me:		
‘my	grandfather	used	 to	 tell	me	and	my	 friends	 about	 the	 time	when	he	
served	 in	 the	 colonial	 troops,	 how	 he	 was	 well	 regarded,	 how	 and	 the	
Italians	 contributed	 to	 the	 fight	 against	 Ethiopia.	 He	 told	 me	 about	 the	
origin	of	 some	 traditions,	 such	as	pasta58,	 and	explained	 that	 the	 Italians	
are	good	people.	So	I	guess	I	was	happy	to	come	to	Italy,	even	though	I	first	
tried	 to	 go	 to	 Switzerland	 because	 a	 friend	 of	mine	was	 already	 there.	 I	




based	on	 the	 common	notion	 that	 there	exists	 a	 special	 relation	between	 Italy	 and	




58 Pasta has become part of Eritrean cooking habits as a replacement for injera, the Eritrean and Ethiopian flat 
bread, partly due to the difficulty of finding the necessary taf flour during the Eritrea-Ethiopia wars. 
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the	 relationship	 between	 Eritrea	 and	 Italy	 and	 the	 way	 that	 this	 relationship	 is	
understood	in	both	countries.	Whereas	Eritreans	still	feel	that	there	exists	a	special	
relationship	 between	 both	 countries	 (which	 influences	 the	 expectations	 thay	 have	
about	 Rome),	 this	 is	 not	 true	 of	 Italy.	 As	 the	 beginning	 of	 this	 chapter	 shows,	 the	
colonial	 venture	 never	 enjoyed	 the	 unanimous	 support	 of	 the	 Italian	 population.	
Even	 the	 political	 elite	 had	 divergent	 positions	 about	 it.	 Furthermore,	 the	 Italians’	
perceptions	 of	 colonialism	 in	 the	 Horn	 of	 Africa	 is	 linked	 to	 their	 attitude	 to	 the	
fascist	 regime.	 As	 Francesco	 Perfetti,	 a	 specialist	 of	 contemporary	 history	 at	 the	
LUISS	University	in	Rome,	expresses	it:		























‘So,	 you	 are	 interested	 in	 Eritrea,	 right?’	 Aklilu	 asks	me.	He	 is	 a	 twenty-seven-




‘You	 have	 to	 write	 that	 our	 revolution	 has	 been	 betrayed	 by	 the	 same	






the	 colonial	 experience,	 it	 has	 influenced	 the	 development	 of	 Eritrean	 society	 and	
Eritrean	identity.	As	many	other	African	countries,	caught	between	global	pressures	and	
national	agendas,	today’s	Eritrea	is	very	much	the	product	of	its	colonial	period,	of	the	
strife	 that	 followed	 its	 decolonization,	 and	 of	 its	 conflictual	 relationship	 with	 its	
neighbour	 Ethiopia.	 As	 Tricia	 Redeker	 Hepner	 and	 David	 O’Kane	 put	 it,	 ‘from	 Italian	







This	 chapter	 gives	 an	 account	 of	 the	 liberation	 movement	 and	 its	 later	







British	 Military	 Administration	 (1941-1952)	 of	 Eritrea	 is	 not	 the	 focus	 of	 this	
dissertation,	it	is	important	to	note	that	those	whom	I	interviewed	considered	this	short	
interlude	 to	be	very	controversial.	Although	 it	 is	 true	 that	British	rule	did	not	 impede	
the	development	of	modern	socio-political	institutions	such	as	syndicates	and	political	
parties	(Redeker	Hepner	and	O’Kane,	2001:	viii)	–	which	had	already	emerged	during	
the	 Italian	 colonial	period59	–	many	Eritreans	nevertheless	vividly	 remember	 that	 the	
new	 administrators	 dismantled	 and	 gave	 away	 most	 of	 the	 industrial	 infrastructure	
which	had	been	built	in	the	previous	decades.		
																																																								




residing	 in	 Eritrea	 (estimated	 at	 around	 25,000).	 The	 Italian	 government	 believed	 that	 the	 division	 of	
Eritrea	 or	 its	 annexation	 to	 Ethiopia	 would	 be	 detrimental	 to	 the	 interests	 of	 the	 Italian	 community.	
Although	 ultimately	 Italy	 did	 not	 attain	 the	 result	 it	 was	 seeking,	 its	 work	 in	 favour	 	 of	 independent	
political	organisations	benefited	the	Eritrean	independence	movements	(Negash,	2004).	
	 114	





and	annexed	 to	 Sudan	and	Ethiopia.	Ethiopia	wanted	 to	 annex	Eritrea	and	 the	 Italian	
Somaliland;	some	Arab	states	were	in	favour	of	Eritrea’s	independence,	and	supported	
the	 Independence	 Bloc	 of	 Eritrean	 parties	who	 constantly	 petitioned	 the	 UN	 General	
Assembly	that	a	referendum	be	held	to	determine	the	future	of	the	country	(Sabbatucci	
and	Vidotto,	2002).		
Finally,	 in	 December	 1950,	 during	 its	 fifth	 session,	 the	 UN	 General	 Assembly	
adopted	Resolution	390(a-V),	 indicated	 that	Eritrea	would	be	 federated	with	Ethiopia	
under	 the	 rule	 of	 the	 Ethiopian	 Emperor,	 Haile	 Selassie	 I60.	 Elections	 were	 held	 in	
electoral	 colleges	 in	 1952,	 which	 led	 to	 the	 appointment	 of	 a	 multi-party	 Eritrean	
Assembly	 that	 adopted	 a	 UN-drafted	 Eritrean	 constitution	 (Mekonnen	 and	 Tronvoll,	
2014:	24).	This	 constitution	also	 incorporated	Human	Rights:	 for	 the	 first	 time	 it	was	
officially	stated	that	Eritreans	had	rights	on	which	ruling	authorities	could	not	impinge.	
The	Eritrean	Assembly	passed	laws	which	applied	to	Eritrean	citizens,	and	which	aimed	











movement	 or	 institution	 that	 could	 be	 considered	 separatist,	 such	 as	 syndicates	
(officially	banned	in	1958),	student	movements,	and	parties	(officially	banned	in	1955).	




unanimously	 by	 the	 Ethiopian	 Parliament	 and	 the	 Eritrean	 Assembly	 in	 1962	
(Andebrhan,	 2014).	 	 Ultimately,	 the	 Ethiopian	 government	 also	 turned	 against	 its	
Eritrean	 allies,	 and	 intervened	 on	 a	 massive	 scale	 in	 the	 day-to-day	 running	 of	 the	
‘Eritrean	Administration’,	causing	disputes	between	the	two	capitals.		
The	 annexation	 to	 Ethiopia	 was	 a	 serious	 blow	 to	 the	 aspirations	 of	 a	 large	
proportion	of	Eritreans,	 as	many	–	 especially	urbanites	 –	 considered	Ethiopia	 to	be	 a	
backward	country	compared	to	the	level	of	development	already	reached	by	the	small	
country	on	 the	Red	Sea.	During	 these	years,	many	Eritrean	 intellectuals,	 students	and	
professionals,	who	had	been	forced	into	exile,	tried	to	organise	a	resistance	movement	
against	 the	 imperial	 government.	 In	 1958,	 a	 general	 strike	 was	 organised	 by	 a	
movement	 of	 workers	 and	 intellectuals	 with	 broad	 popular	 support,	 but	 it	 was	
immediately	 crushed	 by	 Haile	 Selassie	 (Killion	 1997).	 As	 many	 have	 argued,	 the	
repression	of	the	popular	resistance	movement	led	to	a	new	form	of	militant	resistance	
dominated	by	more	conservative	groups	 (Treiber	2007a;	Treiber	2007b).	These	were	
the	 early	 days	 of	 a	 debate	 that	 would	 gain	 momentum	 in	 the	 following	 decades,	







grew	 stronger	 among	 the	 intellectual	 elite.	 The	 end	 of	 the	 British	
Protectorate	 was	 seen	 as	 the	 chance	 to	 finally	 have	 an	 independent	
country	ruled	by	Eritreans.’	
The	 1960	 creation,	 in	 Cairo,	 of	 the	 Eritrean	 Liberation	 Front	 (ELF)	 led	 by	 the	
émigré	Idris	Muhammad	Adam63	(a	leading	political	figure	in	Eritrea	in	the	1940s)	and	
the	1961	establishment	of	 its	armed	wing,	 the	Eritrean	Liberation	Army	(ELA),	 led	by	
Idris	Hamid	Awate64,	represented	the	first	step	in	the	1961	war	for	independence,	also	
known	as	Gedli	(the	long	war)	or	‘the	Struggle’.		
There	 were	 different	 currents	 within	 the	 Eritrean	 independence	 movement,	
informed	by	different	agendas	and	different	understandings	of	Eritrea’s	political	future,	
and	 they	 ultimately	 resulted	 in	 the	 social	 fractures	 that	 still	 persist	 to	 this	 day	 in	
Eritrean	 society.	 At	 its	 beginning,	 the	 armed	 rebellion	 had	 a	 conservative	 Muslim	
leadership	 based	 outside	 the	 country65,	 mainly	 composed	 of	 Eritreans	 from	 the	
pastoralist	 western	 lowlands	 and	 from	 the	 eastern	 coastal	 areas,	 who	 accused	









were	 also	 wary	 of	 people	 talking	 about	 the	 importance	 of	 nationalist	










about	 the	 liberation	war.	 There	 is	 a	 consensus	 about	 the	 fact	 that	 ELF	 leaders	 had	 a	
powerful	 vested	 interest	 in	 preventing	 initiatives	 meant	 to	 promote	 social	
transformation	and	to	further	a	nationalist	agenda	(Connell,	2001:	346).	This	was	also	
reflected	 in	 the	 ELF’s	 methods	 and	 strategy,	 which	 were	 inspired	 by	 the	 Algerian	
National	Liberation	Front	(Redecker	Hepner	and	O’Kane,	2001:	xix;	Connell,	2001:	348)	
and	in	the	way	the	Eritrean	Front	was	organised,	being	separated	into	four	independent	
geographical	 and	 clan-based	 sections,	 which	were	 essentially	 fiefdoms	 dominated	 by	
local	warlords	who	cooperated,	but	did	not	act	as	a	national	army	(Connell,	2001:	348).	
This	 reinforced	 sectarianism.	 These	 divisions	 soon	 became	 five,	 as	 a	 new	 one	 was	
formed	 in	 the	Hamasien	 highlands,	mostly	 composed	 of	 Tigrinya-speaking	 Christians.	
By	the	mid-1960s,	many	Christians	had	joined	the	ranks	of	the	ELF,	creating	a	problem	
for	 the	 leadership.	As	Birhane	points	 out,	 showing	me	a	big	E	 cut	 into	his	upper	 arm	
when	he	pledged	allegiance	to	the	ELF	and	still	visible	despite	his	age:		
‘There	were	different	trends	within	the	ELF,	there	were	the	conservatives	




imperial	 government	was	 joined,	 at	 an	 early	 stage,	 by	many	 young	 and	 not-so-young	
individuals	who	came	into	contact	with	leftist	nationalist	 ideas	while	studying	in	Arab	
countries,	where,	 at	 that	 time,	 nationalist	 discourses	were	 being	developed	 and	were	
taking	 root.	 Even	 on	 the	 Eritrean	 and	 Ethiopian	 campuses,	 stories	 about	 resistance	







the	 Eritrean	 front	 into	 further	 confusion,	 and	 definitely	 undermined	 its	 efficiency	 in	




Several	 cases	 of	 internal	 splintering	 occurred	 since	 the	 end	 of	 the	 1960s,	 the	





in	 1970	 (Connell,	 2001;	 Redecker	 Hepner	 and	 O’Kane,	 2001;	 Sabatucci	 and	 Vidotto,	
2002).	Very	importantly,	this	new	group	established	a	secret	Marxist	party,	the	People’s	
Party	 (PP)	 that	was	meant	 to	 lead	 the	Front	 ideologically	during	 the	 fight	 against	 the	
Ethiopians.	The	PP	was	 in	 charge	of	 transforming	 the	EPLF	 into	 a	political	 and	 social	
force	 able	 to	 promote	 new	 values	 and	 to	 develop	 a	 new	national	 identity	 that	would	
overcome	 sectarian	 and	 tribal	 divisions;	 its	 task	 was	 to	 work	 for	 the	 creation	 of	 a	
modern	 Eritrean	 society.	 This	 transformative	 revolutionary	 project	 was	 pursued	
through	a	pragmatic	approach	typical	of	the	Maoist	interpretation	of	Marxism.	The	idea	
of	‘modernity’	as	a	driver	for	revolution	can	be	traced	back	to	the	Italian	legacy	and	in	







‘The	 party	 was	 created	 to	 reduce	 infighting.	 In	 1973	 a	 wing	 of	 the	 ‘Ala	
group’	[PLF2]	was	trying	to	speed	up	the	unification	with	other	groups.	It	
was	 taking	 too	 long	 and	 that	 was	 undermining	 the	 military	 resistance	






population.	 This	 was	 also	 hieghtened	 by	 the	 international	 isolation	 of	 the	 EPLF	
movement	 that	 did	 not	 receive	 enough	 external	 support.	 To	 put	 it	 bluntly,	 using	
Birhane’s	words,	 ‘nobody	 cared’.	 The	 EPLF	 could	 rely	 only	 on	 itself,	which	 led	 to	 the	
development	of	 the	notion	of	 ‘self-reliance’	as	a	pillar	of	 the	 liberation	struggle	and	of	
national	identity.		
Meanwhile,	on	the	Ethiopian	side,	the	emperor	was	ousted	by	a	military	coup	in	
1974	 that	 put	 the	 Derg	 –	 a	 communist	 military	 junta	 –	 in	 command.	 Haile	 Mariam	
Mengistu,	a	prominent	officer	in	the	Derg,	was	appointed	as	its	chairman;	this	marked	
the	 beginning	 of	 another	 truly	 dictatorial	 regime,	 which	 soon	 alienated	 other	 leftist	
movements,	such	as	the	Ethiopian	People’s	Revolutionary	Party	(EPRP)68,	which	began	
to	closely	collaborate	with	the	EPLF.	After	assuming	power,	the	Derg	pursued	a	military	
campaign	 against	 rebellious	 ethnic	 groups	 and	 the	 political	 opposition.	 The	 latter	





the	 Eritrean	 People’s	 Liberation	 Front	 (EPLF)	 was	 also	 made	 possible,	 for	 the	 Derg	
represented	a	common	enemy.		
The	fight	against	the	Soviet-backed	Derg	could,	at	the	ideological	 level,	threaten	
the	 internal	 coherence	 of	 the	movement,	which	 adopted	 (at	 least	 formally)	 a	Marxist	
ideology.	This	dilemma	was	solved	by	adopting	pragmatism	as	an	 ideological	position	
(see	also	Redecker,	Hepner	and	O’Kane,	2001;	Pateman,	1998).	Although	the	movement	
presented	 itself	as	 fundamentally	anti-colonialist,	 it	 founded	 its	 rhetoric	on	notions	of	
modernity	 and	 avant-garde	 that	 were	 typical	 of	 Italian	 Fascism.	 It	 also	 aligned	 itself	
with	 Arab	 nationalism	 but	 was	 critical	 of	 Islamic	 conservatism.	 It	 coped	 with	 these	
ideological	 contradictions	 by	 creating	 a	 narrative	 based	 on	 key	 ideological	 concepts	
which	were	selected	pragmatically	according	to	the	needs	of	the	moment.	In	the	case	of	
the	 fight	against	 the	Derg,	more	emphasis	was	put	on	 the	 idea	of	 self-reliance	and	on	
nationalist	discourse.	
	By	 1977	 the	 ELF	 and	 the	 EPLF	 controlled	 almost	 all	 of	 Eritrea,	 except	 a	 few	
major	cities	(Pool,	1993).	But	a	USSR-backed	Ethiopian	offensive	in	1978	pushed	back	
the	 two	 fronts,	 mobilising	 the	 peasant	 youth	 (Pool,	 1993).	 	 By	 1981	 the	 infighting	
between	ELF	and	EPLF	was	so	strong	that	the	former	was	driven	out	of	the	country,	and	
many	 of	 its	 members	 scattered,	 joining	 the	 Eritrean	 diaspora,	 which	 was	 already	
numerous.		The	Ethiopian	campaigns	in	1982	and	1983,	and	the	famine	that	broke	out	
in	1984	put	 a	 strain	 on	 the	EPLF	 and	on	 its	 humanitarian	branch,	 the	Eritrean	Relief	
Association	(ERA),	which	was	carrying	out	a	cross-border	relief	operation	with	almost	
no	external	support.		
By	 the	 second	 half	 of	 the	 1980s,	 the	 EPLF	 had	 been	 swelled	 by	 an	 increasing	
number	of	 fighters	who	 joined	 its	 ranks.	This	meant	 that	running	 the	PP	secretly	was	
becoming	more	and	more	difficult,	especially	considering	the	geographical	expansion	of	
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the	 Front	 (Connell,	 2001).	 Therefore	 a	 new	 shift	 occurred	 within	 the	 EPLF,	 which	
renamed	 the	 PP	 the	 Eritrean	 Socialist	 Party	 (ESP)	 and	 which	 adopted	 a	 more	
democratic	modus	operandi.	The	idea	was	that	the	party	should	engage	the	masses,	who	
would	 cooperate	 in	 shaping	 the	 National	 Democratic	 Program,	 which	 would	 lay	 out	




how	 to	establish	new	governments	 through	 the	 reorganisation	of	 the	 state	and	of	 the	
military	(Campbell	2009).	On	the	Eritrean	side,	as	the	need	for	a	military	organisation	
diminished	following	the	Ethiopian	regime’s	defeat,	resources	were	shifted	in	order	to	





early	 high-ranking	 fighters	 were	 not	 included	 into	 the	 political	 and	





agreements	 between	 the	 two	 were	 concluded	 that	 foreshadowed	 Eritrean	
independence	in	1993	(Brietzke	1995).	The	Eritrean	leadership	was	aware	not	only	that	
the	 Ethiopian	 transitional	 government	 would	 not	 oppose	 independence,	 but	 that	 the	
international	community	was	also	 in	 favour	of	 it	 for	 three	main	reasons.	First	 the	 fact	
that	 during	 the	1984	 famine,	 the	ERA	had	 already	 collaborated	with	 several	Western	
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governments,	 and	 therefore	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 latter	 and	 the	 EPLF	 was	
already	established	and	had	the	support	of	public	opinion	in	the	West.	Secondly,	in	the	
aforementioned	1987	National	Democratic	Program,	the	EPLF	had	radically	changed	its	
Marxist	 language	 and	 orientation	 to	 a	more	 nationalistic	 discourse	which	 recognised	
(on	paper	at	least)	the	importance	of	establishing	a	multi-party	system,	and	of	attracting	




backlash	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 resurgence	 of	 a	 nationalist	 sentiment	 among	 Ethiopians,	 in	
which	case	resources	would	have	had	to	be	reallocated	to	pay	for	military	expenditure	
rather	than	to	development	programs.	Furthermore,	the	size	of	the	Eritrean	community	
in	 Ethiopia	 was	 another	 element	 that	 played	 an	 important	 role	 in	 balancing	 the	
transition	towards	independence.	In	particular,	among	the	Eritrean	emigrés	in	Ethiopia	
there	 were	 a	 considerable	 number	 of	 committed	 nationalists	 (engineers,	 skilled	
workers,	 teachers,	 administrators,	 etc.)	 who	 organised	 support	 networks,	 collected	
funds	 and	 passed	 on	 information	 to	 the	 Eritrean	 fronts	 (Pool,	 1993:	 393).	 As	 it	 was,	
holding	the	referendum	was	viewed	as	crucial	 to	 international	 legitimacy	(Pool,	1993:	
393).	
The	 referendum	 was	 ultimately	 held	 in	 1993	 under	 UN	 supervision	 and	 was	
widely	supported	by	the	diaspora	community:	this	is	also	important,	as	it	allows	us	to	at	
least	approximately	assess	the	number	of	Eritrean	refugees.69	On	23-25	April	1993,	the	






Afewerki,	 the	 secretary-general	 of	 the	 EPLF,	 was	 made	 president	 of	 a	 transitional	
government,	and	on	May	24	he	proclaimed	Eritrea	officially	independent.	
As	 a	 new	African	 state,	 Eritrea	was	 granted	membership	 in	 the	 UN	 and	 in	 the	
Organisation	 of	 African	 Unity	 (OAU)	 and	 received	 the	 support	 of	 the	 international	
community,	 which	 empowered	 its	 authority	 over	 its	 territory	 and	 citizens	






2.	 THE	 IMPACT	 OF	 THE	 INDEPENDENCE	 WAR	 AND	 ITS	 IMPORTANCE	 IN	 THE	
FORMATION	OF	NATIONAL	IDENTITY		
The	liberation	war	was	pivotal	in	different	ways	as	it	contributed	strongly	to	the	




One	hotly	debated	 issue	among	scholars	 is	how	to	determine	what	support	 the	
independence	war	enjoyed	among	urban	and	rural	Eritreans	respectively.	Settling	 the	
question	of	whether	 the	 ‘revolution’	did	or	did	not	occur	 from	below	 is	of	paramount	
importance	 to	understand	 the	 identity	 formation	of	Eritreans.	 In	general,	 the	ELF	and	
the	 EPLF	 (now	 the	 PFDJ)	 have	 constantly	 reinforced	 the	 idea	 that	 the	 independence	
struggle	expressed	the	desire	of	Eritrean	people	for	self-determination	and	for	the	right	
to	 live	 in	 a	 free	 Eritrea	 (Mahrt,	 2011).	 This	 idea	 is	 repeated	 endlessly	 and	 it	 is	
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emphasized	 by	 top-down,	 demonstrative	 displays	 of	 nationalism,	 such	 as	 parades	
during	 the	 celebration	 of	 Independence	 (24	 May).	 Among	 scholars	 (see	 for	 instance	
Pool,	1993;	Connell,	2001;	Pateman	1998)	there	is	a	widely	shared	assumption	that	this	
support	 was	 based	 on	 an	 understanding	 which	 existed	 between	 the	 liberation	
movements	and	the	population	about	the	cause	which	the	movements	were	fighting	for.	
This	 argument,	 however,	 does	 not	 appear	 to	 be	 completely	 consistent	with	 historical	
accounts	about	the	formation	of	the	liberation	movements	and	with	the	testimonies	that	
exist	about	those	years.	This	is	not	to	say	that	the	claim	is	wrong,	only	that	it	cannot	be	
generalised	 to	 the	 Struggle	 as	 a	 whole.	 	 In	 particular,	 as	 it	 emerges	 from	 Birhane’s	
account,	 the	 liberation	 movements	 were,	 at	 the	 beginning,	 quite	 elitist,	 	 since	 their	
leaderships	 were	 composed	 of	 a	 few	well-educated	 individuals,	 some	 of	 whom	were	
exposed	to	external	ideological	influences.	Secrecy	was	one	of	the	main	characteristics	








was	 secret.	 In	 general,	 the	 front	 had	 secret	 cells	 in	 the	 cities	 that	would	
give	 information	 about	 the	 Ethiopian	 government	 and	 its	 supporters.	 If	










the	 liberation	war	or,	 later,	 to	 the	1998-2001	border	war	with	Ethiopia.	Nevertheless	
the	perception	of	the	30-year	war	in	rural	areas	is	not	what	one	would	expect.	Efrem,	a	
sixty	 years	 old	man	 from	 a	 village	 some	 kilometres	 south	 of	Mendefera,	 close	 to	 the	
border	 with	 Ethiopia,	 talks	 about	 that	 time	 as	 gezie	 shaebia	 (the	 time	 of	 the	 PFDJ),	
whereas	he	refers	to	the	previous	period	as	gezie	Derg,	gezie	Selassie,	gezie	Englizi,	and	
gezie	Tilliani.	In	the	conversation,	there	is	no	indication	that	the	events	of	the	liberation	
war	 (such	 as	 the	 annexation	 in	 1962,	 the	 liberation	 in	 1991,	 or	 the	 independence	 in	
1993)	 constitute	 important	 time	 markers	 for	 him.	 This	 may	 confirm	 Mahrt’s	 (2011)	
thesis	that	the	liberation	war	was	perceived	from	a	specific	spatiotemporal	perspective	
that	 did	 not	 correspond	 to	 the	 nationalistic	 notion	 of	 Eritrea	 as	 a	 limited,	 sovereign	
geopolitical	space.	This	argument	is	very	comprehensively	outlined	in	his	ethnographic	
work	 about	 the	 villages	 during	 the	war,	 and	 how	 they	 perceived	 space,	 time	 and	 the	
nation	 differently.	 Building	 on	 Benedict	 Anderson’s	 concept	 of	 the	 ‘imagined	
community’	 (1991),	 and	 on	 Tuan’s	 (1977)	 ideas	 about	 the	 creation	 of	 space	 through	
spacial	practice,	as	well	as	on	Deleuze	and	Guattari’s	ideas	of	war	as	a	special	practice	
(1986),	Mahrt	 argues	 that	daily	 life	 in	 the	village	 revolves	 around	 localized	economic	
and	social	activities,	whereas	changes	in	the	government	tend	to	follow	principles	that	
are	unrelated	 to	day-to-day	 life	 in	 the	villages	 (20).	This	 thesis	 is	underpinned	by	 the	
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fact	that,	prior	to	1991,	the	main	point	of	contact	between	villages	and	the	government	





the	 other	 in	 space	 (29).	 Becoming	 a	 shifta	 usually	 implied	 disobedience	 to	 the	
established	 authorities	 or	 breaking	 the	 rules	 governing	 the	 village	 (for	 instance	 by	
appropriating	another	villager’s	plot	of	land).	The	shifta	was	forced	into	hiding	until	his	
family	or	 the	 community	 could	 solve	 the	dispute.	Liberation	 fighters	were	considered	
rebels	 as	 they	 were	 fighting	 against	 the	 ruling	 authorities	 and	 since	 they	 were	 also	
constantly	on	the	move,	they	were	became	equated	with	shifta	(Mahrt:	24).			
In	 the	 interviews	 I	 carried	out	with	 some	members	of	 the	Eritrean	diaspora	 in	






















strategy.	An	important	aspect	to	note	 in	this	regard	is	 that	the	fighters	did	not	stay	 in	
the	villages	 to	provide	protection	 for	 the	 residents.	 	Furthermore,	as	 it	was	discussed	
earlier,	 the	 lack	 of	 a	 unified	 front	 and	 the	 many	 rivalries	 that	 existed	 between	 the	
liberation	movements	–	often	based	on	 tribal	 loyalties	–	 complicated	 the	situation	 for	
the	villagers,	also	in	terms	of	their	adherence	to	the	cause.	
However,	the	increasing	brutality	of	the	Ethiopian	government,	especially	in	the	
border	 areas,	was	 an	 important	 factor	 contributing	 to	 a	 change	 of	 perception	 among	
many	 villagers.	 The	 increasing	 violence	 of	 the	war	 and	 the	 indiscriminate	 oppression	





my	 grandfather,	who	was	 the	 chica-shum72,	 to	 tell	 us	 that	we	 needed	 to	
hide	because	the	Ethiopians	were	coming.	[…]	How	did	he	know	they	were	
Ethiopians?	 Because	 of	 the	 uniforms	 they	were	wearing.	 It	 was	 actually	
very	 easy	 to	 distinguish	 who	 was	 who	 by	 their	 clothes	 and	 also	 their	
overall	 demeanour.	 […]	 My	 grandfather	 wanted	 us	 to	 hide	 because	 we	
were	young	and	able	to	work	the	land.	He	was	afraid	that	something	bad	
would	happen	 to	us.	 So	we	hid	 in	 the	 forest.	We	could	hear	 the	 screams	
from	there.	The	Ethiopians	had	entered	the	village,	burnt	down	the	houses	














perceptions	 of	 their	 own	 position	 in	 the	 conflict	 –	 from	 actors	 worried	 about	 their	
survival	to	actors	engaged	in	the	conflict	because	of	the	physical	space	they	occupy	in	
the	Ethiopian-Eritrean	geographical	landscape.	
From	 the	 end	 of	 the	 1960s	 onwards,	 as	 historical	 analyses	 demonstrate,	 the	
support	 for	 the	 liberation	movements	 grew	 stronger	 as	 fighting	 intensified	 in	 border	









The	 EPLF,	 on	 the	 contrary,	 made	 decisive	 interventions	 in	 line	 with	 its	 efforts	 to	
transform	Eritrean	society	and	to	build	a	new	nation.	In	the	villages,	they	promoted	land	











rural	 areas	 in	 order	 to	 reorganise	 it	 in	 a	 more	 effective	 and	 egalitarian	
way’.		
Villages	usually	had	‘a	chica-shum,	danya,	or	lay	judge,	that	dealt	with	all	types	of	
civil	 and	 criminal	 cases,	 ranging	 from	 petty	 theft	 to	 arson	 and	 murder	 (but	 did	 not	
involve	crimes	against	the	government,	such	as	tax	avoidance	and	disobedience	of	any	







interest	 in	 blocking	 land	 reform	 (Pool,	 1993).	 Representatives	were	 selected	 by	 each	
sub-group	and	formed	the	village	assembly.	This	system,	although	it	was	later	changed,	
allowed	for	the	empowerment	of	all	groups,	including	women,	who	had	representation	
quotas	 in	 the	 assembly,	 and	 even	 of	 the	 young.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 this	 process	 was	
beneficial	 to	the	party	since	it	served	as	recruitment	mechanism	for	new	members.	 In	
fact,	 this	corrective	mechanism	counteracted	 the	earlier	bias	which	had	existed	 in	 the	
recruitment	of	party	members	because	of	the	secrecy	of	the	organisation:	opening	up	to	
the	masses	led	to	a	more	competitive	selection	process.		In	general,	elections	were	held	
every	 three	 or	 four	months	 and	 they	 were	 an	 important	 occasion	 for	 evaluating	 the	
performance	 of	 the	 representatives	 (Connell,	 2001);	 in	 a	 way,	 it	 can	 be	 argued	 that	




A	 second	pillar	was	 education,	which	has	 always	been	an	essential	 tool	 for	 the	
EPLF	and,	later,	for	the	PFDJ	regime.	Since	the	stated	aim	of	the	EPLF	was	to	work	for	
social	revolution	and	for	development,	they	needed	to	mobilise	the	masses,	and	this	was	
achieved	by	 the	diffusion	of	 ideology	 through	education.	The	primary	 subjects	 of	 this	
policy	were	the	EPLF’s	own	rank	and	file	fighters,	and	the	people	living	in	the	territories	
under	 their	 control.	 Education	 was	 organised	 in	 stages,	 with	 a	 growing	 level	 of	
sophistication.	 For	 instance,	 during	 the	 first	 stage,	 newly	 recruited	 fighters	 were	
required	 to	 attend	 training	 camps,	 which	 lasted	 for	 around	 six	 months.	 The	 second	
stage	entailed	attending	discussion	meetings	on	political	subjects	three	or	four	times	a	
week	with	EPLF	cadres.	As	Ermias,	a	former	EPLF	fighter	now	living	in	Rome	recalls:		
‘we	 would	 meet	 to	 discuss	 Eritrean	 history.	 For	 instance,	 before	 the	
Struggle,	there	was	the	colonial	period,	then	the	occupation	of	Eritrea.	We	
learnt	that	we	were	fighting	for	auto-determination,	liberation.	In	order	to	
reach	 that,	 we	 had	 to	 study	 the	 Marxist	 revolution,	 its	 goals	 and	
methodology’.		
Ermias’s	 account	 highlights	 an	 important	 aspect	 of	 education,	 that	 is	 the	
establishment	 of	 an	 empty,	 homogenous	 time	 line	 (Anderson,	 1991)	 on	 which	
nationalist	 discourse	 can	 be	 based.	 This	meant	 inculcating,	a	 posteriori,	 the	 idea	 that	
there	 existed	 such	 a	 thing	 as	 an	 Eritrean	 nation	 subsuming	 all	 ethnic	 and	 tribal	
differences,	 a	nation	which	had	 a	 clearly	demarcated	 territory	 that	was	occupied	 and	
needed	to	be	liberated.	As	part	of	this	discourse	about	a	nation	going	through	different	
phases	in	different	times,	the	Struggle	was	presented	as	the	process	through	which	the	
nation	 could	 reach	 its	 final	 destiny	 (this	 was	 the	 teleological	 orientation)	 (see	 also	
Connell,	2001;	Mahrt,	2011;	Hepner,	2011;	Pool,	1993).	In	this	view,	liberation	fighters	
were	presented	as	tegadelti	(fighters)	rather	than	shifta.	Society	was	to	be	transformed	
at	 large	 by	 shaping	 its	members	 through	 political	 education.	 Once	 educated,	 the	 idea	
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was	 that	 they	 would	 actively	 participate	 in	 the	 shaping	 of	 the	 EPLF’s	 politics,	 in	
accordance	with	 the	 nation’s	 teleological	 goals.	 	 The	EPLF	 also	 ran	 school	 for	 cadres,	
where	 more	 advanced	 subjects	 were	 studied,	 such	 as	 historical	 and	 dialectical	
materialism,	and	other	topics	core	to	Marxist	doctrine.		
Throughout	 the	 1970s,	 as	 the	 EPLF	 was	 swelling	 its	 ranks,	 adult	 literacy	
programs	were	carried	out	across	the	country.	In	Ermias’s	experience,		





1975,	a	book	entitled	General	Political	Education	 for	Fighters	 and	produced	under	 the	
party’s	 direction	was	 issued.	 This	 book	was	 used	 by	 cadres	 for	 teaching	 fighters	 and	
civilians	 and	 was	 usually	 relied	 on	 at	 different	 educational	 stages	 –	 the	 same	 topics	
would	 feature	 in	 various	 syllabi	 but	 would	 be	 treated	 at	 a	 basic	 level	 in	 elementary	




as	a	description	of	 the	 traditions	of	Eritrea’s	various	ethnic	groups.	The	 third	chapter	
dealt	with	the	country’s	political	history,	and	included	a	definition	of	the	nation,	and	an	








chapters	 covered	 Eritrea’s	 economy	 and	 provided	 an	 analysis	 of	 the	 reigning	 class	
structure	in	Eritrean	society	with	a	special	focus	on	the	importance	of	the	working	class.	
The	history	of	the	Eritrean	revolution	followed;	it	was	separated	in	periods	according	to	
the	 status	 of	 the	 nation’s	 geopolitical	 space	 (liberated	 or	 occupied)	 and	 it	 showed	
Eritrea	 moving	 toward	 the	 achievement	 of	 its	 final	 destiny,	 liberation.	 Very	
interestingly,	 this	 chapter	 also	 included	 a	 section	 on	 the	 civil	 war	with	 the	 ELF.	 The	
second	part	of	the	book	contained	less	factual	information	and	was	instead	intended	to	






of	 society	 by	 describing	 the	 various	 political	 economic	 phases	 it	 had	 to	 go	 through	
(primitive	society,	slave	society,	feudal	society,	capitalism,	imperialism,	and	so	on)	(see	
also	Connell,	1997:	322-323).	This	 syllabus	was	modified	 in	1989,	 following	 the	1987	






matters.	 If	 you	 said	 something	 not	 completely	 in	 line	 with	 the	 EPLF	
account,	 you	would	be	viewed	 suspiciously,	 and	maybe	 they	would	 start	
																																																								
75	Here	an	explanation	of	the	difference	between	freedom	(political	independence)	and	liberation	(social	










	The	EPLF	was	 Janus-faced;,	 the	authoritarian	 tendencies	 that	characterised	 the	
PFDJ’s	 rule	 and	 which	 had	 been	 reinforced	 by	 the	 border	 war	 were	 always	 present	









that	were	 then	shaping	 the	reconstruction	of	Eritrea	and	concluded	that	 ‘the	shape	of	
future	national	structures	in	Eritrea	is	as	yet	unclear.	There	was	talk	in	Asmara	of	the	
EPLF	 becoming	 a	 party,	 of	 two	parties	 emerging	 from	 the	 Front	 and	 of	 a	multi-party	
system.	 […]	 The	 EPLF	 has	 generally	 been	 considered	 authoritarian.	 Elections	 to	 the	
provincial	assemblies,	however,	appear	to	have	been	competitive	and	PGE	[Provisional	
Government	 of	 Eritrea]	 guidance	 has	 been	 limited	 to	 specifying	 representations	 for	
women	 and	 minorities	 and	 nominated	 members	 of	 the	 EPLA	 [Eritrean	 People’s	
Liberation	Army]	provincial	units”	(401-402).		Many	post-colonial	theorists,	academics,	
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Following	 independence,	Eritrea	appeared	 to	be	enjoying	a	period	of	 economic	
growth,	 despite	 its	 poor	 relations	 with	 neighbouring	 countries,	 with	 the	 noteworthy	
exception	 of	 Ethiopia.	 It	 is	 clear	 now,	 more	 than	 a	 decade	 after	 the	 declaration	 of	
independence,	 that	 the	 high	 hopes	 that	 existed	 for	 development	 and	 democracy	 in	
Eritrea	 have	 not	 been	 fulfilled,	 as	 constant	 wars	 and	 border	 disputes	 with	 Sudan,	
Yemen,	 Djibouti	 and	 Ethiopia	 have	 shattered	 Eritrea’s	 earlier	 economic	 and	 political	
progress.	Tension	with	Sudan	throughout	the	1990s	centred	on	mutual	allegations	that	
each	country	had	attempted	to	destabilize	the	other.	In	 late	1995	and	in	1996,	Eritrea	
engaged	 in	 a	 brief	 but	 violent	 conflict	 with	 Yemen	 over	 the	 Hanish	 Islands,	 an	
archipelago	 in	 the	 Red	 Sea	 claimed	 by	 both	 countries	 but	 ultimately	 recognized	 as	
Yemeni.	Even	relations	with	Ethiopia,	 initially	good,	became	 tense	due	 to	 trade	 issues	
and	to	the	fraught	question	of	Ethiopia’s	access	to	Eritrea’s	Red	Sea	ports	(Sabatucci	and	
Vidotto,	2002).		
In	 1998	 relations	 between	 Ethiopia	 and	 Eritrea	 deteriorated	 rapidly	 when	 a	
border	dispute,	which	had	 to	do	with	 the	settlement	of	Badme,	erupted	 into	violence.	
Although	three	decades	of	 liberation	war	had	 led	to	a	sense	of	unity	among	Eritreans,	
the	 fluid	border	between	Ethiopia	 and	Eritrea	 (1998-2000)	 gave	both	 governments	 a	
free	 space	 to	 carry	 out	 ethnic	 cleansing	 and	 to	 deport	 more	 people,	 creating	 large	
population	movements.	 After	 a	 peace	 agreement	 was	 established	 in	 2000	 (Treaty	 of	
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Algeri),	 the	UN	 ran	a	peacekeeping	mission	along	 the	border,	which	ended	 in	200876.		
Finally,	relations	were	also	strained	with	Djibouti,	due	to	another	border	dispute	in	the	
Ras	Doumeira	area,	which	escalated	into	conflict	in	2008.		
Following	 the	 1998-2000	war,	 the	 Provisional	 Government	 of	 Eritrea,	 ruled	 by	
the	 People’s	 Front	 for	 Democracy	 and	 Justice	 (PFDJ)	 –	 	 the	 former	 EPLF	 –	 led	 by	
President	 Afewerki,	 postponed	 the	 promulgation	 of	 the	 country’s	 constitution,	 which	
had	 been	 ratified	 in	 1997,	 and	 indefinitely	 deferred	 parliamentary	 and	 presidential	
elections.	 After	 seizing	 power,	 Afewerki’s	 government	 abolished	 the	 free	 press,	 and	
started	 implementing	compulsory	conscription	policies	based	on	 forced	recruitment77	
carrying	 out	 searches,	 and	 killing	 deserters	 (HRW)78.	 Scholars	 are	 divided	 about	
whether	 this	 authoritarian	 turn	was	 or	was	 not	 caused	 by	 the	 conflict	 However,	 as	 I	
mentioned	earlier,	authoritarian	tendencies	had	always	been	intrinsic	to	the	liberation	
movement.	
The	 new	 Eritrean	 government	 established	 a	 society	 based	 	 on	 a	 two-layered	
structure,	 in	 accordance	 with	 what	 Ong	 (1999)	 would	 call	 a	 ‘principle	 of	 graduated	
sovereignty	and	citizenship’.	 It	differentiated	between	 the	Tegadelti	 (fighters)	and	 the	
Hafash	 (masses)	 (Woldemikael	 2013).	 The	 former	 were	 mostly	 EPLF	 members	 who	
fought	 in	 the	 independence	 war.	 Since	 the	 blood	 they	 have	 shed	 contributed	 to	 the	
nation-building	 process,	 they	 are	 considered	 to	 be	 the	 most	 deserving	 citizens	 and,	
therefore,	 receive	 higher	 salaries	 and	 occupy	more	 important	 positions.	 For	 instance,	
																																																								
76	Relations	also	soured	with	the	UN.	As	Ethiopia	refused	to	leave	the	territory	it	had	occupied	and	which	
had	 been	 declared	 Eritrean	 by	 the	 international	 border	 commission,	 the	 PFDJ	 regime	 accused	 UN	
peacekeepers	of	espionage.		
77	 The	 Eritrean	 school	 system	 was	 reformed,	 centralising	 12th	 grade	 education	 at	 the	 Sawa	 military	
training	centre	 in	order	 to	 restrict	 the	 students’	movements.	 Students	have	 to	enlist	with	 their	 fathers,	
and	 a	 photograph	 of	 both	 assures	 that	 the	 father	 can	 be	 held	 responsible	 should	 his	 daughter	 or	 son	
disappear.	However	parents	who	are	accused	or	imprisoned	have	the	possibility	to	be	released	by	paying	
a	 significant	 compensation	 in	US$.	This	way,	 even	desertion	benefits	 the	 finances	of	 the	 regime,	which	
needs	foreign	currency	(Treiber	and	Tesfaye	2008).	
78	 Within	 the	 government	 there	 is	 an	 almost	 total	 denial	 of	 any	 involvement	 or	 responsibility	 for	
violations	of	human	rights.	
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50%	of	 seats	 in	 the	national	assembly	are	reserved	 for	 former	 fighters,	although	 they	
represent	a	minority.		In	addition,	all	members	of	the	Cabinet	of	Ministers	are	Tegadelti.	
The	Hafash,	on	the	other	hand,	 include	those	who	were	not	members	of	the	EPLF	and	
are	 not	 either	 members	 of	 the	 PDFJ,	 civilians	 in	 Eritrea	 and	 in	 the	 diaspora	
(Woldemikael	2013).	
The	 economic	 and	 political	 crisis	 which	 began	 with	 the	 thirty-year	 war	 with	
Ethiopia	was	made	more	severe	by	short-sighted	economic	reforms	aimed	at	imposing	
state	 control	 over	 labour	 and	 natural	 resources,	 and	 by	 UN	 sanctions	 which	 were	
imposed	 in	 2009	 (Security	 Council	 Resolution	 1907)	 as	 a	 consequence	 of	 Eritrea’s	
support	 for	 the	 ‘al-Shabaab’	 terrorist	 group	 trying	 to	 overthrow	 the	 emerging	 Somali	





confrontation	 between	 Christians	 and	Muslims.	Whereas	 they	 coexisted	 peacefully	 in	
the	past,	the	relations	between	these	two	communities	have	now	changed.	As	an	Italian	
diplomat	in	Eritrea	told	me,		
‘since	 independence,	 Christians	 have	 held	 key	 positions	 in	 Eritrean	
institutions;	the	only	activity	that	was	 left	to	Muslims	was	sheep	farming	
in	 the	 lowlands	 and	 fishing.	 The	 State	 is	 ruled	 by	 Christians;	 although	






	‘in	 the	 army,	 there	 are	 different	 views:	 some	 –	 those	 who	 hold	 key	
positions	 in	 the	 Eritrean	 establishment	 -	 still	 have	 a	 Soviet	 or	 Chinese	
approach,	 as	 they	 were	 trained	 by	 the	 former	 USSR	 and	 the	 Chinese;	
others	have	been	educated	in	the	West79’.		
The	 government	 exploits	 regional	 insecurity	 to	 further	 its	 portrayal	 of	 the	
country	 as	 being	 under	 siege,	 through	 practices	 that	 perpetuate	 a	 despotic	 mode	 of	
governance	and	which	rely	on	surveillance	on	every	aspect	of	social	life	(Bozzini,	2011).	
President	 Afewerki	 has	 repeatedly	 claimed	 that	 he	 intends	 to	 defend	 the	 country	
against	 ‘external	 aggressions’	 (also	 referring	 to	 human	 rights	 activists	 and	 the	
international	community).	Having	centralised	all	power,	he	thus	exercises	strict	control	





however,	 keeps	 perpetrating	 massive	 violations	 of	 human	 rights,	 including	 arbitrary	
arrests	 and	 torture.	 The	 latter	 mainly	 relates	 to	 the	 treatment	 of	 forced	 labourers	
working	 for	 the	government	 in	 the	 fields.	However,	 since	 it	 is	not	possible	 for	human	
rights	 organisations	 to	 openly	 work	 in	 Eritrea81,	 the	 extent	 of	 these	 violations	 is	
																																																								
79	 Some	 have	 studied	 in	 Italy,	 a	 few	 others	 in	 the	 UK,	 one	 group	 in	 the	 US	 during	 the	 first	 period	 of	
independence.	
80	 Among	 the	ministers,	 the	Minister	 of	 Defence,	 Sebhat	 Ephrem	 is	 the	most	 targeted.	 Even	 if	 Ephrem	
fought	 alongside	 Afewerki	 during	 the	 liberation	 war,	 he	 has	 been	 repeatedly	 presented,	 by	 some	
members	of	the	diaspora	as	well	as	by	the	international	community,	as	the	only	person	who	could	replace	
Afewerki.	He	 is	believed	 to	be	 less	despotic	 than	 the	president,	 and	more	prone	 to	 compromise	and	 to	
finding	 solutions	 for	 the	 good	 of	 the	 country.	 Also,	 there	 a	 widespread	 belief	 that	 he	 would	 	 only	
occasionally	resort	 to	 force	and	violence,	and	only	 in	extreme	circumstances,	not	 in	 the	same	continual	
and	 systematic	way	 as	 the	 actual	 president.	 The	Minister	 of	 Information,	 Ali	 Abdu	Ahmed,	 defected	 in	
November	2012	during	a	business	 trip	 to	Europe,	and	has	since	claimed	asylum	in	Sweden.		His	 father,	
brother	and	fifteen-year-old	daughter	were	arrested	in	Eritrea	shortly	after	his	defection.	






the	 government	 of	 keeping	 detainees	 in	 jails	 with	 tin-plated	 roofs.	 It	 so	 happens,	






The	 Press	 Proclamation,	 the	 Transitional	 Penal	 Code	 for	 Eritrea,	 and	 the	
Proclamation	 to	 Determine	 the	 Administration	 of	 Non-governmental	 Organisations	
allow	authorities	 to	 repress	dissent	 (Article	19,	2013).	However,	 as	Fnan,	 an	Eritrean	
teacher	in	Asmara,	says:		
‘if	 you’re	very	 careful,	 and	keep	yourself	 away	 from	any	kind	of	political	















good	 advice’	 –	 as	 Sambene	 from	 Senegal	 put	 it.	 Abel,	 a	 diminutive	 young	man	 in	 his	




But	 if	you’re	caught	you’re	dead.	But,	 I	guess,	 if	you	serve	 in	 the	military	
you	are	dead	anyway’.	
Abel’s	account	is	echoed	by	the	testimonies	of	the	many	men	and	women	I	met	
during	my	 fieldwork.	 In	 the	name	of	 ‘national	 security’,	 the	current	dictatorial	 regime	
has	 taken	 a	high	 toll	 on	Eritrean	youth,	men	and	women	 living	 in	 the	 cities	 or	 in	 the	
rural	areas.	In	general,	Eritrean	young	people	have	always	faced	enormous	demands	as	
every	 ruler	 (from	 the	 colonial	 regime	 to	 the	 liberation	 movements,	 and	 the	 post-
independence	 government)	 has	 required	 that	 they	make	 the	 ultimate	 contribution	 to	
build	a	new	state.	 	The	young	now	carry	the	burden	of	being	warsay,	 that	 is,	 the	heirs	
and	the	social	subordinates	of	 the	ykealo,	 the	almighty	 liberation	 fighters	who	carried	
out	the	revolution.	
Today,	 the	 regime	 presents	 Eritrea	 as	 a	 developmental	 state	 that	 attempts	 to	
















of	 18	 to	27).	 It	 entailed	 six	months	of	military	 training	 and	one	more	 year	 of	 civilian	
reconstruction	activities,	either	in	development	projects	or	in	the	public	administration.	
Although	 this	 policy	 was	 not	 welcomed	 by	 the	 general	 public,	 especially	 those	 who	
thought	that	they	could	seek	remunerative	position	in	the	private	sector	following	the	
end	 of	 the	 war,	 or	 even	 just	 undertake	 their	 missed	 higher	 education,	 resistance	 to	
conscription	was	not	so	strong.	
	‘We	were	 frustrated,	 but	we	 understood	 that,	 in	 the	 end,	 it	was	 a	 small	
price	to	pay	for	the	country’s	development.	Just	one	year	and	a	half’		
Mekonnen	tells	me,	who	was	20	at	the	time.		









Today,	 Eritrean	 youth	 are	 exposed	 to	 a	 global	 environment	 and	 to	 external	
cultural	influences	through	music,	cinema,	and	the	Internet.	The	seeds	of	discontent	are	
present	everywhere	as	young	men	and	women	feel	deprived	of	their	future.		
‘There	 is	 no	 true	 war.	 I	 don’t	 understand	 why	 we	 have	 to	 serve	 in	 the	
military	 forever.	 I’ve	 always	 wanted	 to	 travel	 abroad.	 I	 feel	 like	 it	 will	
never	be	possible	for	me	to	do	what	I	really	want.	It	is	just	very	unfair’		
says	 Fatimah,	 a	 young	 girl	who,	 at	 the	 time	 of	 this	 study,	was	 attending	 ninth	 grade.	
Despite	 exercising	 a	 high	 degree	 of	 control	 over	 its	 citizens,	 whom	 it	 indoctrinates	
through	 education,	 the	 legitimacy	 of	 the	 ruling	 clique	 is	 vacillating	 and	 attitudes	 of	
resistance	are	emerging	among	the	young.		
Education	 is	 one	 of	 the	 most	 important	 tools	 the	 regime	 uses	 to	 promote	 its	
desired	 social	 agenda.	 It	 can	 be	 argued	 that	 the	 militarisation	 of	 society	 also	 occurs	
through	 education,	 especially	 after	 the	 implementation,	 in	 2003,	 of	 new	 promotion	
policies	in	Eritrean	secondary	schools.	Although	an	accurate	discussion	of	the	Eritrean	
education	policies	 is	 beyond	 the	 scope	of	 this	 thesis,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 say	 that	 these	
were	aimed	at	avoiding	 ‘wastage’	 in	Eritrean	society	(see	Riggan,	2011).	 In	the	official	
discourse	of	 the	Ministry	of	Education,	 the	problem	was	 that	 the	Eritrean	system	was	
too	competitive,	causing	the	majority	of	students	not	to	complete	high	school,	which	left	
them	with	 no	 opportunity	 to	 enter	 higher	 education.	 Underlying	 this	 system	was	 the	
belief	 that	only	hard	work	and	good	 students	 could	 contribute	 to	 the	development	of	
the	state	and	of	Eritrean	society.	In	a	way,	‘competition	for	the	scarce	opportunities	for	
university	 education	 combined	 with	 the	 university’s	 symbolic	 value	 as	 a	 marker	 of	




passed	 the	 twelfth	 grade	 would	 attend	 twelfth	 grade	 in	 the	 Sawa	 military	 boarding	
school,	located	in	the	Western	lowlands,	demonstrated	that	the	real	intent	of	the	policy	
was	to	change	the	role	of	secondary	education	 into	that	of	 transforming	students	 into	
soldiers.	Moreover,	 from	2003	 onwards	 no	 students	were	 sent	 to	 Asmara	University,	
which	 was	 closed	 down	 and	 replaced	 by	 a	 newly	 built	 campus	 in	 Mai	 Nefhi,	 a	 few	







testifies	 to	 the	widespread	perception	 that	having	a	bright	 future	by	working	hard	 in	
secondary	education	was	no	longer	possible.		




be	 open	 to	 everyone,	 but	 access	 is	 regulated	 by	 the	 state.	 Every	 university	 faculty	 is	
under	 the	 authority	 of	 the	 corresponding	 ministry,	 which	 makes	 them	 subject	 to	
political	 interference.	 Students	 who	 wish	 to	 enter	 higher	 education	 have	 to	 take	 a	
matriculation	 exam.	 On	 the	 basis	 of	 their	 scores,	 students	 are	 allocated	 to	 various	
departments,	 irrespective	 of	 their	 individual	 preferences.	 Scholarships	 to	 pursue	
further	studies	abroad	are	frowned	upon,	as	the	university	(that	follows	state	directives	
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the	 nature	 of	 which	 depends	 on	 the	 country’s	 need	 (which	 are	 decided	 by	 the	
government).	 From	 the	 state’s	point	of	 view,	 this	mandatory	 state	 labour	 (ma’atot)	 is	
seen	as	a	way	transforming	students	into	citizens	able	to	administrate	the	land.	But	they	
are	 also	 presented	 as	 the	 ‘nation’s	 children’,	who	 harvest	 the	 fields	 of	 elderly	 people	
whose	children	were	martyred	or	conscripted	into	the	EDF,	a	form	of	replacement	for	
missing	 kin	 (Poole	 2011).	 One	 episode	 is	 often	 mentioned	 in	 the	 interviews	 I	 have	
carried	 out82,	 maybe	 because	 it	 happened	 in	 2001,	 at	 at	 time	 when	 (unlike	 today)	
disappearances,	 imprisonments	 and	 political	 murders	 could	 still	 be	 debated	 in	 the	




were	 asked	 once	 again	 to	 gather,	 while	 others	 were	 rounded	 up	 in	 the	 dormitories,	
under	 the	 threat	 of	 having	 to	 face	 severe	 consequences.	 They	 were	 brought	 to	 the	






by	 the	 fact	 that	 students	 had	 to	 individually	 sign	 apology	 letters	 to	 the	 government.	
Failing	 to	 do	 so	 would	 have	 resulted	 in	 a	 longer	 stay.	 This	 early	 episode	 already	
demonstrated	the	extent	of	the	regime’s	authoritarianism.	
Stories	 of	 torture,	 disappearances	 and	 forced	 labour	 are	 also	 common	 among	
conscripts	 in	 the	 EDF.	 The	 Eritrean	 National	 Service	 consists	 of	 thousands	 of	 young	
people	who	are	mobilised	for	military	and	civil	purposes	by	the	state	(see	also	Bozzini,	
2011;	Hepner,	2011;	Wrong,	2005),	resulting	in	an	open-ended	system	of	forced	labour	
(Kibreab	2009).	Young	recruits	 (warsay,	 ‘my	heirs’),	 are	mistreated	and	humiliated	by	
their	superior	officers	(ykealo,	‘all	powerful’).	They	are	meant	to	serve	indefinitely	(until	
the	 age	 of	 50)	 in	 the	 National	 Service,	with	 no	 consideration	 of	 their	 own	 individual	
aspirations,	in	a	form	of	modern	bondage.	During	their	military	service,	conscripts	are	
trained	in	the	methods	and	ideology	of	national	defence	and	they	are	also	employed	in	
development	projects,	 such	as	 the	building	of	 infrastructure	or	agricultural	work.	Any	
infraction	 against	 the	 rules	 imposed	 on	 conscripts	 result	 in	 severe	 punishments,	
including	isolation	and	reclusion	in	sweltering	hot	buildings	in	the	desert.	
Abel’s	 story	 is	 representative	 in	 this	 respect.	 After	 completing	 twelfth	 grade	 in	
Sawa,	 Abel	was	 forced	 to	 remain	 in	 the	 ELD,	 as	 his	 grades	were	 not	 good	 enough	 to	
allow	him	to	undertake	a	university	education.		
‘It	was	very	tough’	he	says,	‘but	I	tried	to	be	a	strong	person	and	to	face	it	





curious,	 and	 bored.	 The	 Bible	 was	 something	 new.	 It	 helped	 me	 to	 go	
through	 the	 tough	 daily	 routine	 because	 I	 had	 something	 else	 to	 think	
about	all	day…a	sort	of	escape	from	my	life.	[….]	But	then	they	discovered	I	
had	 it.	 I	was	dragged	out	and	beaten	and	 then	 I	was	 locked	up	 in	a	dark	
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metal	shed.	There	was	another	person	there	with	me.	Another	man.	But	I	
couldn’t	 understand	him	 as	 he	 spoke	 another	 dialect.	 I	 really	 believed	 it	
was	 the	 end	 for	 me.	 But	 a	 miracle	 happened…that	 night,	 a	 guard	 was	
distracted	and	did	not	properly	close	the	shed.	There	was	a	gap	between	
the	 door	 and	 the	wall	 so	my	 companion	 and	 I	 had	 the	 same	 thought:	 to	
escape.	We	 escaped	 together	 all	 the	way	 to	 the	 border,	 but	 afterwards	 I	
have	never	seen	him	again’.	
Apart	 from	the	 terrible	effect	 they	have	on	 individuals,	 conscription	and	 forced	
labour	also	have	dire	consequences	on	those	development	policies	the	regime	purports	
to	 foster.	 Agrarian	 development	 in	 particular83	 is	 considered	 to	 be	 a	 pillar	 for	 the	
regime,	 since	 it	 couples	 the	 idea	 of	 national	 sovereignty	 with	 the	 onus	 on	 food	




disappearance	 of	 young	 people	 from	 rural	 areas,	 thus	 disrupting	 kinship	 and	
community	networks	on	which	the	traditional	communal	work	(wofara)	in	villages	was	
usually	 based.	 Old	 men	 and	 women,	 the	 only	 ones	 who	 are	 left	 in	 the	 villages,	 find	
themselves	 unable	 to	 cope	 with	 agricultural	 work,	 with	 severe	 consequences	 on	
productivity	 and	 therefore	 on	 food	 security.	 Community-level	 projects	 are	 now	
sometimes	carried	out	during	ma’atot,	the	mandatory	work	of	all	able-bodied	people	in	
the	 name	of	 development85	 (Poole,	 2011).	 	 Since	 able	 people	 tend	 to	 be	 either	 in	 the	
military,	or	performing	ma’atot,	 there	are	 few	of	 them	 left	 for	wofara86,	 resulting	 in	a	
problem	of	 food	sovereignty,	 that	 is,	 the	ability	of	 rural	villagers	 to	have	some	power	
over	food	production;	it	has	also	loosened	the	social	bonds	that	are	fundamental	for	the	
																																																								








mechanisation	 of	 labour:	 the	 government	 has	made	 tractors	 available	 (which	 are	 not	
the	 traditional	 instrument	used	by	villagers	 for	 farming),	but	 the	cost	of	 renting	 them	
cannot	 is	prohibitive	 for	poor	 farmers.	 	Conscription	has	also	resulted	 in	an	 increased	
dependence	on	state	intervention.	
Today,	many	Eritreans	question	 the	 state’s	 inability	 to	provide	people	with	 the	
means	to	build	a	secure	livelihood	for	themselves,	while	young	people	continually	flee	
the	country	in	the	search	for	a	future	somewhere	else.		In	stark	contrast	to	the	regime’s	
rhetoric	 of	 self-reliance,	 its	 insistence	 on	 work	 ethics	 and	 on	 national	 development,	
what	 the	 reality	 of	 life	 on	 the	 ground	 suggests	 is	 that	 the	 country	 is	 slowly	 being	




















the	 refugee	 journey	 is	 a	 powerful	 experience	 that	 affects	 individuals	 in	 life-changing	
ways.		
In	 general,	 asylum	 seekers	 relate	 to	 their	 journey	 as	 a	 very	 important	 part	 of	
their	lives.	It	represents	an	integral	part	of	their	life-story,	as	it	affects	their	sense	of	self	
and	 the	ways	 in	which	 they	 re-evaluate	 and	 re-construct	 their	 previous	 expectations	
about	 their	 ‘new	 life’	 in	 the	 country	 of	 destination	 (Benezer	 and	 Zetter,	 2014).	 As	
Mariam,	another	participant,	puts	it:		
‘The	 journey	 really	 changed	 me.	 I	 mean,	 it	 was	 so	 difficult	 I	 thought	 I	








‘I	knew	 it	was	dangerous,	but	 I	didn’t	quite	 realize	 to	what	extent.[…]	 In	
any	case,	the	situation	back	in	Eritrea	was	getting	too	hot	for	me,	I	knew	




of	 the	 risks	 they	 would	 incur;	 they	 expected	 the	 journey	 to	 be	 perilous	 to	 a	 certain	
(often	underestimated)	degree,	but	they	still	felt	they	had	to	leave.	What	then	were	the	
drivers	behind	their	decision	to	leave?	
From	 a	 macro-level	 perspective,	 poor	 economic	 conditions,	 a	 general	 lack	 of	
possibilities	 to	 fulfil	 personal	 life	 projects,	 continuous	 human	 rights	 violations,	 all	
represent	 triggers	 for	 the	 outward	 journey.	 This	 general	 explanation,	 however,	 is	 not	
completely	 satisfactory.	 Macro-level	 drivers	 are	 of	 course	 very	 important	 in	
determining	 the	 setting	 of	 asylum	 migration.	 Nevertheless,	 the	 decision	 to	 leave	 is	
generally	taken	at	the	individual	level	and,	therefore,	it	is	necessary	to	look	at	the	micro-
level	 to	 fully	 understand	 the	 triggers	 of	 the	 journey	 and	 the	 stages	 of	 the	 decision-
making	process.		
Many	 observers	 of	 the	 Eritrean	 domestic	 arena	 would	 argue	 that	 Eritrean	












well,	 if	 we	 couldn’t	 perform	 a	 task.	 Bad	 things	 happened	 to	 girls	
especially…you	know	what	I	mean…	I	was	lucky	because	I	was	assigned	to	
controlling	 the	access	 to	 the	barracks,	 it	was	not	a	physically	heavy	duty	
and	I	was	working	under	the	supervision	of	a	woman.	But	I	heard	terrible	




her	 family’s	 contact	 in	 order	 to	 be	 kept	 off	 the	 conscription	 lists.	 Nevertheless,	 her	
situation	 became	 worse	 in	 mid-2013.	 During	 this	 period,	 round-ups	 became	
increasingly	frequent,	and	they	were	complemented	by	workplace	and	house	searches.	
This	was	interpreted	by	locals	as	being	a	reaction	on	the	part	of	the	Government	to	the	
increasing	number	of	desertions	 from	the	army	and	of	escapes	 from	the	country.	As	 I	
later	 learned	 from	 my	 contact	 in	 Asmara,	 Aster	 was	 caught	 when	 her	 shop	 was	
searched.	She	was	reportedly	about	to	close	the	little	store	with	her	father	when	warsay	




were	 not	 safe	 enough	 as	 a	way	 of	 avoiding	 conscription.	 As	Abrihet	 came	 of	 age	 and	
completed	 high	 school,	 she	 married	 her	 second	 cousin,	 as	 married	 women	 have	 a	
greater	chance	of	being	exempted.		
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	The	 story	of	Aster	 and	Abrihet	 is	 echoed	by	 the	 experiences	of	 of	 other	participants,	
who	also	 saw	 the	many	dangers	of	 life	 in	Eritrea	as	being	negotiable,	 if	 only	one	was	
careful	enough	to	avoid	the	giffa	and	to	keep	a	 low	profile87.	Lindley’s	study	based	on	
the	 livelihood	analyses88	of	migrants	 fleeing	 from	Mogadishu	(Somalia)	 in	2007-2008,	





resources.	 For	 instance,	 bribing	 officials	 to	 avoid	 conscription	 has	 proved	 to	 be	 an	
effective	strategy	for	individuals,	especially	urban	middle	class	individuals,	who	can	rely	






without	 family	 subsidiaries	 (Treiber	and	Tesfaye,	2008:	282).	Marriage	 therefore	also	
depends	on	human/social	capabilities	and	assets.	Over	time,	marriage	has	also	become	
an	exit	mechanism:	as	women	are	often	demobilised	in	their	twenties,	educated	women	




88	 Livelihood	 analyses	 focus	 on	 the	 abilities	 and	 resources	 people	 have	 at	 their	 disposal	 (these	 can	 be	
natural,	physical,	human,	socio-political	and	financial	assets),	and	how	these	resources	are	mobilised	and	











21-year-old	student	 from	a	 rural	area	close	 to	 the	Mai	Nefhi	 campus.	As	he	was	good	
enough	academically	to	make	the	necessary	grades	to	enrol	at	the	Electrical	Engineering	
faculty,	 he	 soon	 perceived	 that	 controls	 and	 the	 harassment	 of	 students	 were	
increasing.		
‘I	 spent	 12th	 grade	 at	 Sawa.	 I	 had	 to	 enrol	with	my	 father.	 That	was	 the	
normal	procedure.	They	 [the	regime]	 force	parents	 to	register	with	 their	
children,	 so	 that	 they	 can	 be	 held	 accountable	 and	 imprisoned	 if	 one	 of	
their	 offspring	 goes	 missing.	 It	 was	 a	 difficult	 time,	 but	 in	 the	 end	 I	
managed	 to	 get	 into	university.	 I	 didn’t	 get	 to	 choose	what	 to	 study,	 but	
that	was	still	ok	with	me	as	I	really	didn’t	want	to	serve	in	the	military.	At	
the	campus	we	were	also	 forced	 to	perform	community	 tasks	other	 than	
studying.	For	 instance,	during	 the	summer,	we	would	be	sent	 to	work	 in	
the	fields.	We	were	often	intimidated	by	the	yikealo	or	older	warsay,	and	
they	 threatened	us	 that	our	parents	would	be	arrested	 if	we	didn’t	obey	





said	 he	was	 in	 contact	with	 some	Ethiopians,	 but	 I	 don’t	 know	 if	 that	 is	
true.	Anyway,	 the	 situation	 really	deteriorated	 for	us.	We	were	harassed	
all	the	time,	with	unexpected	searches	in	the	dorms	and	random	controls.	








to	 negotiate	 their	 livelihoods	 in	 their	 environment.	 In	 particular,	 the	 increasing	
repression	 of	 dissent	 since	 the	 2000s,	 the	 State’s	 growing	 control	 over	 all	 aspects	 of	
social	life,	the	tightening	of	conscription	provisions,	the	loss	of	socio-political	protection	
alongside	 severe	 economic	 stagnation	 led	 to	 mistrust,	 suspicion	 and	 rivalry	 about	
resources.	Denunciation,	for	instance,	was	heavily	used	as	a	means	to	secure	additional	
food	supplies	(cfr.	Treiber	and	Tesfaye,	2008).		 	














cousins,	 were	 conscripted	 and	 moved	 to	 other	 parts	 of	 the	 country.	
[…]Most	 of	 the	 people	 in	 the	 village	 relied	 on	 insufficient	 food	 supplies	
from	the	central	government.	One	day	the	officials	came	to	village	looking	
for	me	and	my	mother.	One	villager	had	told	them	that	we	were	Orthodox	
and	 had	 links	 with	 Ethiopia.	 Maybe	 he	 wanted	 an	 extra	 ration	 for	 his	
family	 or	 maybe	 he	 was	 suspicious	 and	 thought	 we	 had	 provoked	 the	
drought.	 Anyway,	 my	 uncle	 gave	 the	 officials	 100	 Naqfa	 and	 they	 went	
away.	But	we	knew	we	were	not	safe	anymore’.	
																																																								
89	 Biher-Tigrinya	 (Tigrinya	 Nation)	 is	 an	 Eritrean	 ethnic	 group	 that	 occupies	 most	 of	 the	 Eritrean	
highlands	and	the	Tigray	region	in	Ethiopia.	People	belonging	to	this	ethnic	group	are	often	referred	to	as	
the	‘people	of	the	highlands’	or	‘people	of	the	kebessa’	(kebessa	means	highlands).	In	Eritrea,	they	mostly	





exacerbation	 of	 the	 Eritrean	 government’s	 rhetoric	 against	 neighbouring	 Ethiopia,	
which	 fuelled	 a	 climate	 of	 suspicion	 among	 poor	 rural	 communities	 of	 mostly	 non-
educated	Eritreans,	leading	to	the	disruption	of	the	social	bonds	that	provided	Kifle	and	




mobility	 became	 a	 central	 part	 of	 the	 way	 people	 negotiated	 life	 in	 their	 modified	
environment.		
Several	 factors	 facilitate	 mobility	 in	 the	 Eritrean	 environment.	 Amongst	 other	
factors,	 two	 stand	 out	 as	 being	 the	most	 important	 for	 the	 participants	 in	 this	 study.	
First,	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 independence	 war,	 the	 border	 conflict	 with	 Ethiopia	 and	 the	
tensions	 with	 neighbouring	 countries	 have	 forced	 many	 Eritreans	 –	 especially	 those	
from	border	regions	–	to	leave	their	villages	and	to	move	to	other	parts	of	the	country.	
Younger	 generations	 have	 also	 experienced	 displacement,	 as	 part	 of	 the	 conscription	
program:	 young	 conscripts	 are	 not	 usually	 assigned	 to	 the	 areas	 they	 are	 from.	 As	 it	
emerged	 during	 this	 research,	 most	 of	 the	 young	 Eritreans	 fleeing	 from	 the	 army	
described	 moves	 within	 the	 country	 as	 their	 first	 experience	 of	 migration,	 since	 it	
already	entailed	uprooting	and	the	severing	of	existing	community	 ties	and	networks.	
As	Hayat	(22)	explains,	
‘I	 thought	 that	 going	 abroad	wouldn’t	 be	 so	 very	 different	 from	when	 I	
moved	 from	 the	 coast	 to	 the	 Ethiopian	 border.	 Everything	was	 different	
there,	 even	 the	weather.	 I	 thought	 that	 if	 I	 had	made	 it	 the	 first	 time,	 I	
could	make	it	a	second	time’.	
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The	 second	 factor	 that	 emerged	 as	 relevant	 was	 the	 existence	 of	 earlier	 successful	
experiences	of	migration	within	the	individual’s	family	or	community	network,	or	in	his	




‘The	 cousin	of	Yemane	 [a	 close	 friend	of	his]	 had	 to	 escape	 from	Eritrea	
because	 he	 thought	 the	 government	 wanted	 to	 imprison	 him.	 […]	




the	 family.	 […]	Then	 I	 thought	 that	 if	 things	became	bad	 for	me	 I	would	
escape	too.	After	all,	Yemane’s	cousin	was	doing	all	right’.	
If	positive	migration	experiences	empowered	people	and	reinforced	their	own	thoughts	





At	 the	 time	 when	 this	 study	 was	 carried	 out,	 Italy	 was	 facing	 a	 massive	 inflow	 of	
Eritreans	 seeking	 international	 protection	 under	 the	 Geneva	 Convention	 (they	
represented	 the	 second	 largest	 nationality	 among	 migrants).	 These	 were	 mostly	
recruits	from	the	Eritrean	Defence	Forces,	who	yearned	to	be	able	to	focus	on	their	own	
individual	life	projects	in	a	more	promising	post-war	situation	or	young	Eritreans	who	
feared	 being	 trapped	 in	 the	 country	 in	 an	 endless	 conscription	 that	 frustrated	 their	
dreams	of	a	better	future.			
	 155	
As	 the	 normalisation	 most	 Eritreans	 hoped	 for	 did	 not	 take	 place,	 many	 –	
including	 my	 participants	 –	 started	 to	 re-evaluate	 their	 existing	 conditions	 and	 the	
extent	 to	 which	 it	 allowed	 them	 to	 satisfy	 their	 desires	 and	 requirements.	 In	 this	
process,	 the	 possibility	 of	 satisfying	 personal	 aspirations	 and	 needs	 is	 evaluated	 not	
only	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 current	 personal	 situation	 in	 Eritrea,	 but	 also	 in	 relation	 to	
individual	perceptions	and	ideas	about	life	in	the	West	or	‘First	world’.	An	excerpt	from	
an	 interview	with	Adiam,	a	24-year-old	Eritrean	woman	I	met	 in	Asmara	four	months	
after	 she	was	 released	 from	 the	military,	 is	 very	 representative	 in	 this	 respect.	When	
asked	about	her	situation	in	Eritrea	and	how	she	envisioned	her	future,	she	replied:	
‘I’ve	been	in	the	army	for	six	years	and	I	was	released	some	months	ago.	
Because	of	 that,	 I	 couldn’t	 continue	my	studies	nor	 start	my	own	 family.	
[…]	Since	I	was	a	little	girl,	I’ve	always	wanted	to	become	a	physician.	My	
village	is	close	to	the	Ethiopian	border,	so	when	the	border	war	broke	out,	
many	 people	 were	 displaced	 or	 injured,	 including	 my	 little	 brother.	 A	
Sudanese	doctor	[from	the	Red	Cross]	helped	him.	So	I	thought	I	wanted	to	
become	a	medical	doctor	myself,	to	help	people.	Now	I	have	to	be	realistic.	
I	 know	 that	 I	 have	no	 chance	of	doing	 that.	 So	 I	 am	 just	 concerned	with	
getting	on	with	my	life,	with	finding	a	good	job.	But	here	this	isn’t	easy.	[…]	
I	 fear	 being	 forced	 to	 join	 the	 army	 again	 or	 being	 imprisoned	 by	 the	
government.	Several	 family	 friends	have	been	imprisoned.	Life	 in	Europe	
and	in	the	US	is	much	simpler.	People	have	good	jobs	and	a	good	life,	much	
better	than	here.	There	are	more	possibilities,	more	freedom.	[…]	I	know	
because	my	cousin	 is	 in	 Italy.	He	said	he	 found	a	 job	 in	a	restaurant	and	
that	he’s	doing	well.	He	 sends	 some	money	 to	 the	 family	 to	help	out.	He	
also	told	me	I	should	go	there,	but	I	don’t	want	to	leave	my	parents	here.’	
In	general,	my	participants’	perceptions	of	 the	West	or	 the	 ‘First	World’	–	as	many	of	
them	 call	 wealthy	 European	 countries	 and	 the	 US	 –	 were	 positive	 before	 their	










‘The	 first	 Eritrean	 migrants	 who	 fled	 from	 the	 Gedli	 had	 a	 stronger	
relationship	with	this	country	[Italy].	In	fact,	many	of	them	were	sons	and	
daughters	 of	 Ascari,	 and	 the	 others	 knew	 at	 least	 one	 person	 in	 their	
family	who	had	lived	under	the	Italian	colonial	rule.	In	addition,	until	that	
time,	 not	 only	were	 there	more	 Italian	 entrepreneurs	 in	 Eritrea,	 but	 the	
number	of	Italians	was	larger	in	general,	and	many	Eritreans	spoke	Italian.	
This	 means	 that	 Italy	 was	 a	 natural	 point	 of	 reference.	 Today,	 instead,	
young	 Eritreans	 are	 subject	 to	 multiple	 influences.	 They	 have	 access	 to	
diversified	 channels	 of	 information.	 Many	 already	 know	 that	 there	 are	
other	countries	in	Europe	that	have	better	provisions	for	asylum	seekers,	
for	 example	higher	 allowances.	 It	 is	 true,	 however,	 that	memories	 about	
Italy	 are	 still	 strong	 among	 some	 Eritrean	 youth.	 The	 accounts	 of	
grandmothers	and	grandfathers	about	Italy	still	play	a	role,	together	with	
stories	 of	 success	 and	 integration	 conveyed	 by	 the	 Eritrean	 diaspora	 in	
Italy’.	
Although	memories	and	traditions	play	an	important	role	in	determining	the	hierarchy	
of	 the	 countries	 in	 the	 preference	 scale,	 these	 are	 not	 the	 only	 factor.	 In	 fact,	 the	
elements	 taken	 into	 consideration	 by	 respondents	 to	 this	 study	 are	 diverse,	 and	 are	
related	to	different	domains.	The	most	common	concern	is	that	of	the	‘integration	offer’.	
In	the	interviewees’	views,	the	prospects	for	integration	in	the	host	country	were	very	




ties	 with	 the	 host	 community.	 A	 second	 concern	 taken	 into	 consideration	 by	
respondents	was	the	existence	of	personal	or	 family	 links	within	the	host	community.	




it	 is	 for	 the	migrant	 to	safely	arrive	 in	 the	country	and	to	be	recognised	as	an	asylum	
seeker.	Of	course,	 these	domains	are	 interrelated,	and	 individuals	weigh	 them	against	
each	other	in	an	assessment	process	that	continues	throughout	their	journey	every	time	
they	 gather	 a	 new	 piece	 of	 information	 about	 one	 of	 these	 domains.	 All	 of	 my	
respondents	took	them	into	account,	but	to	different	degrees.	As	I	will	explain	later	on,	
migrants	 collect	 information	about	 these	domains	before	and	during	 the	 journey,	 and	
even	 after	 arrival.	 	 They	 have	 a	 relevant	 role	 not	 only	 in	 determining	 the	 preferred	
country	of	destination,	but	also	in	shaping	later	trajectories.		
This	is	not	to	say	that	individuals	always	choose	their	intended	destination	prior	
to	 departure.	 As	 a	 matter	 of	 fact,	 when	 their	 situation	 suddenly	 becomes	 worse,	
individuals	typically	flee	with	no	further	plan	than	escaping	the	danger.	However,	when	
the	moment	then	comes	to	choose	the	intended	destination	–	and	this	can	be	either	at	















perilous	 travel	 across	 borders	 is	 a	 powerful	 life-changing	 experience	 that	 deeply	
influences	whoever	undertakes	 it.	The	central	 importance	of	 the	 journey	 is	evident	 in	
asylum	 seekers’	 accounts,	 which	 are	 always	 filled	 with	 references	 to	 it.	 The	 travel	
clearly	acts	as	a	watershed	and	neat	demarcations	between	the	time	‘before	the	journey’	
and	 ‘after	 the	 journey’	 are	 common	 in	 asylum	 seeker	 discourse.	 In	 my	 respondents’	
narratives,	 for	 instance,	 the	 travel	 represented	 a	 clear	 unit	 in	 itself,	 imbued	 with	 a	
specific	meaning	and	significance	(cfr.	Benezer,	2002:	9).	Moreover,	they	related	to	it	as	
a	very	significant	part	of	their	lives.	
Powerful	 changes	happen	during	 these	 journeys	 that	 affect	both	 the	 individual	
and	 the	 community	 in	 transformative	 ways.	 At	 the	 individual	 level,	 as	 I	 will	
demonstrate,	the	journey	affects	the	way	asylum	seekers	perceive	themselves.	As	they	
follow	their	route,	they	are	confronted	with	obstacles	and	have	to	negotiate	dangers	and	
to	 find	 strategies	 to	move	 forward	 that	 can	entail	playing	different	 roles	according	 to	
their	 needs,	 and	 this	 allows	 them	 to	 develop	 a	 greater	 general	 resourcefulness,	
particularly	in	terms	of	risk	awareness	and	of	the	speedy	identification	of	opportunities.	
During	the	journey,	asylum	seekers	are	confronted	with	shifting	normative	and	values	
systems,	where	 attributes	 such	 as	 resilience,	 coping	 abilities,	 and	 norms	 of	mutuality	
are	either	 sustained	or	 fractured	by	 the	demands	of	 the	 journey	 (Benezer	and	Zetter,	
2014:	311).	These	changes,	moreover,	mediate	the	way	asylum	seekers	experience	their	
arrival	 to	 the	host	 country	and,	as	we	will	 see,	 the	way	 they	 interact	with	 the	asylum	
system.	
At	the	community	level,	their	experiences	affect	the	way	in	which	migrants	from	
the	 same	 society	 perceive	 themselves	 as	 a	 group,	 and	 their	 social	 identity,	 as	well	 as	
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their	ensuing	expectations	regarding	the	receiving	society	and	the	way	it	will	treat	them	
(Benezer	and	Zetter,	2014:	303).	 	Eritrea	represents	a	case	 in	point	 in	 this	respect,	as	
the	 protracted	mass	 exodus	 has	 shaped	 the	way	Eritrean	 society	 perceives	 itself.	 For	
instance,	 the	Eritrean	diaspora	 in	Rome	has	 reconstructed	 its	 identity	 in	 Italy	 around	
the	myth	of	displacement	(see	Thompson,	1977).		
‘We	 are	 a	 diasporic	 country’	 says	 Daniel.	 ‘Displacement	 has	 become	 an	
integral	 part	 of	 how	 Eritreans	 perceive	 themselves.	 The	 journey	 is	 the	
common	 denominator	 of	 the	 people	 in	 the	 Eritrean	 diaspora’.	 As	 I	 will	






and	 disillusioning	 periods	 of	 monotonous	 waiting	 in	 unfriendly	 environments,	
sometimes	 quite	 similar	 to	 the	 one	 they	 left	 behind	 (Collyer,	 2005;	 Schuster,	 2005;	
Treiber,	2008).	It	is	difficult	to	ascertain	when	their	travels	actually	end,	whether	at	the	
reception	 centre	 or	 refugee	 camp,	 or	 at	 the	 moment	 of	 arrival	 to	 the	 intended	
destination.	As	we	will	see	later	in	the	next	chapter,	the	data	gathered	during	this	study	
suggests	 that	 asylum	seekers	 continue	 to	 think	 in	 terms	of	 ‘mobility’,	 even	within	 the	
host	society,	and	that	the	idea	of	‘arrival’	is	very	much	linked	to	the	goals	they	hope	to	
eventually	 achieve	 (for	 instance,	 in	 terms	 of	 different	 degrees	 of	 integration	 or	
fulfilment),	which	then	come	to	represent	the	‘end’	of	their	travel.	
Furthermore,	events	that	take	place	while	travelling	also	affect	asylum	seekers’	
perceptions	 of	 the	 country	 of	 destination	 and	 thereby	 impact	 their	 strategies.	
Developing	 an	 understanding	 of	 asylum	 seekers’	 journeys	 is	 therefore	 of	 the	 utmost	
importance.	 Of	 course,	 these	 travels	 are	 dependent	 on	 path	 availability	 -	 the	
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permeability	 of	 the	 boundaries	 is	 influenced,	 among	 other	 factors,	 by	 geopolitical	
change.	At	the	time	when	the	fieldwork	for	this	study	was	carried	out,	Eritrean	asylum	
seekers	 relied	 on	 three	 main	 routes	 to	 escape	 the	 country91:	 the	 first	 two	 entailed	
crossing	the	borders	with	Ethiopia	and	Sudan	respectively,	while	the	third	one	involved	
reaching	Yemen	by	boat.	A	fourth	migration	route	was	also	in	operation,	going	to	Israel	




improve	 their	 resourcefulness	 and	 general	 abilities,	 and	 help	 them	 to	 fine-tune	 their	
strategies,	thus	allowing	them	to	acquire	a	higher	status	among	their	fellow	travellers.		
In	 the	 pages	 that	 follow,	 the	 journeys	 of	 four	 respondents,	 Teodros,	 Semira,	
Habel	 and	 Isaias,	 will	 be	 examined	 in	 greater	 detail.	 They	 present	 common	


















‘I	was	 lucky	because	 I	 survived.	Not	all	of	us	made	 it.	People	were	really	
scared	 because	 the	 ship	wasn’t	made	 to	 cross	 the	Mediterranean	 and	 it	
was	 overcrowded.	 In	 addition,	 we	 were	 forced	 to	 hide	 under	 the	 deck	
where	we	couldn’t	breathe.	We	faced	rough	sea	for	two	days	before	being	
rescued.	At	that	time,	some	of	us	had	stopped	crying	or	screaming	because	
we	 were	 already	 dead,	 suffocated.	 A	 woman	 fell	 from	 the	 ship	 and	





that	 period,	 three	 of	 his	 comrades-in-arms	 disappeared;	 rumour	 had	 it	 that	 they	 had	
been	 transferred	 to	 the	 prison	 on	Nokra	 Island,	 for	 challenging	 orders	 given	 by	 their	
superiors.	No	one,	including	Teodros,	really	knew	what	had	happened,	but	according	to	
rumours	 that	 circulated	 in	 the	 camp,	 officials	 were	 still	 looking	 for	 other	 soldiers	
responsible	 for	 the	 unknown	 event.	 As	 covert	 conversations	 about	 this	 continued	
among	 recruits	 and	 soldiers,	 Teodros	 and	 two	 close	 friends	 started	 talking	 about	
escape.	Teodros	feared	that	his	commander	would	arrest	him	for	being	an	accomplice;	





stories	 about	 how	 easy	 it	 was	 to	 start	 out	 there.	 I	 had	 heard	 different	
stories	from	my	brother-in-law,	though:	that	the	crisis	had	hit	Italy	too	and	
that	today	it	was	better	to	go	to	the	US	or	to	northern	Europe.	But	how	bad	
could	 that	be?	For	sure	not	as	bad	as	here!	Plus,	 I	 thought	 that	maybe	 it	
was	easy	to	get	refugee	status	in	Italy,	as	many	Eritreans	had	already	been	
recognised	 as	 refugees.	 […]	 I	 thought	 that	 was	 partly	 the	 result	 of	 a	
preferential	 treatment	because	of	 the	strong	 ties	between	us,	or	because	
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there	 were	 many	 Eritreans	 there	 that	 were	 already	 working	 without	
creating	problems’.	
Teodros	and	his	friends	finally	decided	to	leave.	The	first	step	was	crossing	the	border	–	
which	was	close	enough	–	 to	get	 to	Ethiopia.	One	of	 them	had	previously	spoken	 to	a	
villager,	who	told	him	that	there	was	a	refugee	camp	not	too	far	away	from	the	border.	
So	Teodros	and	his	friends	agreed	that	they	would	try	to	get	to	the	camp	–	Shimelba	–	




border,	 Teodros	 and	 his	 friend	 escaped	 at	 night	 and	 entered	 Ethiopia.	 Other	
respondents	opted	 to	bribe	 the	Eritrean	officials	 in	charge	of	patrolling	 the	border,	 in	
order	to	cross	more	safely.	
‘My	 lungs	were	bursting.	We	 ran	 so	 fast…	 I	 thought	 I	would	die.	 I	 never	







from	Eritrea	 in	 June	2000,	 they	were	 followed	 into	Ethiopia	by	Kunama	and	Tigrinya	











due	 to	 a	 continuing	 flow	 of	 migrants	 from	 Eritrea,	 Ethiopian	 authorities	 decided	 to	





As	 scholars	 like	 Treiber	 and	 Tesfaye	 (amongst	 others)	 have	 pointed	 out,	
Shimelba	 is	 located	at	 the	bottom	of	a	hill,	where	 several	Ethiopian	and	 International	
offices	are	positioned.	The	camp	 is	overlooked	by	several	NGOs,	 the	UNHCR	office	 for	
the	 camp	 and	 the	 Ethiopian	 ‘Administration	 for	 Refugees	 and	 Returnees	 Affairs’	
(ARRA):	in	terms	of	spatial	semantics,	this	creates	an	opposition	between	the	‘top’	(the	
relief	 agencies)	 and	 the	 ‘bottom’	 (the	 recipients	 of	 aid)	 (Treiber	 and	 Tesfaye,	 2008:	
284).	 Living	 conditions	 are	 usually	 difficult.	 There	 are	 no	 provisions	 under	 Ethiopian	
law	 for	 the	 local	 integration	 of	 refugees	 (see	 Kibreab	 2004).	 While	 the	 country	 has	
reservations	about	 the	1951	Convention,	notably	 to	Articles	17-19,	 it	does	support	an	
out-of-camp	scheme	that	allows	refugees	to	live	outside	refugee	camps	and	to	engage	in	


















be	noticed	at	 first	sight	as	different	neighbourhoods	exist	 in	 the	camp	whose	 features	
reflect	 different	 life	 styles.	 On	 one	 side,	 tuculs,	 the	 traditional	 Eritrean	 sheds	 topped	



















People	 in	 the	 camp	 live	 in	 limbo,	many	waiting	 to	hopefully	 be	 relocated	 somewhere	
else	(especially	the	US	and	Canada),	others	just	lingering	around	and	trying	to	organise	
the	next	 stage	of	 their	 journey	 towards	 the	north.	 Living	 in	 the	 camp	 is	 considered	 a	





deep	 inside	 their	 hearts,	 they	 know	 they	 won’t	 and	 that’s	 why	 they	








‘In	 the	 camp,	we	would	hear	men	discuss	 the	 latest	 developments.	 […]	 I	
mean,	 things	 like	 the	best	 routes	 and	 the	best	 places	 to	 go,	 for	 example.	
They	 were	 curious	 about	 how	 we	 got	 there,	 and	 whether	 we	 were	
planning	to	stay	or	to	move	on.	They	said	the	safest	route	for	Europe	was	
through	Addis	Ababa,	then	to	Libya.	They	told	me	I	should	speak	to	a	man.	









Teodros’	 account	 clearly	 illustrates	 how	 perceptions	 are	 shared,	 reproduced	 and	
reinforced	 within	 the	 camp.	 It	 can	 be	 considered	 an	 ‘epicentre’	 for	 the	 diffusion	 of	
rumours	 and	 perceptions;	 as	 a	 matter	 of	 fact,	 it	 becomes	 the	 main	 hub	 for	
communication	 and	 the	 exchange	 of	 information	 between	 Eritrea	 and	 the	 diaspora	
abroad,	 through	 networks	 that	 are	 developed	within	 the	 camp98.	 It	 is	 also	 the	 space	
where	 perceptions	 are	 shaped	 through	 the	 elaboration	 of	 fictional	 futures:	 residents	
imagine	 desired	 outcomes	 in	 order	 to	 better	 tolerate	 present	 deprivations	 and	 bad	
living	conditions	(Schiffauer,	1991:	172).	Hope,	then,	plays	a	key	role	in	this	process,	as	
those	 trapped	 in	 delayed	 resettlement	 procedures	 anticipate	 brighter	 futures	
elsewhere.		Moreover,	their	dependence	on	aid	from	NGOs,	the	UNHCR,	ARRA,	etc.	has	a	







facilitators	 -	 as	 well	 as	 to	 individuals	 abroad	 willing	 to	 fund	 the	 travel	 of	 fellow-
nationals	 in	 exchange	 for	 the	 payment	 of	 high	 interest	 rates	 –	 and	 who	 also	 have	
convenient	links	to	the	camp	administration.	Informal	political	pressure	groups	exist	in	
the	 camp,	 who	 are	 able	 to	 push	 one’s	 cause	 and	 to	 cut	 waiting	 times.	 As	 Teodros	
explains,	
																																																								
98	 According	 to	 the	 data	 I	 gathered,	 communications	 between	 residents	 in	 the	 camp	 and	 their	 friends	
and/or	relatives	in	the	Diaspora	are	frequent.	Several	among	my	interviewees	said	that	people	living	in	
















there	 to	 Khartoum.	 It	 took	 them	 8	months	 of	work	 in	 the	 camp	 to	 raise	money	 as	 a	
deposit.	Since	it	was	not	sufficient,	Kifle	asked	his	cousin	in	Italy	to	send	more.	The	rest	
of	 the	 payment	 was	 to	 be	made	 upon	 arrival	 in	 Khartoum.	 This	 was	 actually	 a	 very	
favourable	condition,	as	payments	are	usually	requested	upfront	by	smugglers	since	the	
risk	 of	 asylum	 seekers	 not	 arriving	 alive	 to	 their	 destination	 is	 so	 very	 high.	 This	
agreement,	according	to	the	man	they	were	in	contact	with,	guaranteed	that	they	would	
arrive	 to	 their	 destination	 as	 smugglers	 had	 a	 greater	 incentive	 to	 keep	 them	 alive.	
Furthermore,	he	suggested	to	Teodros	and	his	friends	to	say	that	the	payment	would	be	
made	 by	 a	 contact	 in	 Khartoum	 once	 they	 arrived,	 to	 discourage	 smugglers	 from	
robbing	 them	 along	 the	 way	 or,	 at	 best,	 from	 abandoning	 them	 in	 the	 middle	 of	
nowhere.	In	Teodros’	view,	







close	 to	 the	 border.	 From	 there,	 the	 three	men	 walked	 with	 a	 local	 guide	 until	 they	
reached	 the	 border,	 where	 they	 were	 expecting	 to	 find	 another	 intermediary	 who	
would	 bring	 them	 to	 Khartoum.	 However,	 while	 crossing	 the	 border	 they	 were	
intercepted	by	Ethiopian	 guards.	Only	Teodros	managed	 to	 cross,	 only	 to	 realise	 that	
there	was	no	vehicle	on	the	other	side.		
‘I	was	 scared;	 I	 didn’t	 know	what	 to	 do	 really.	 Couldn’t	 see	 the	 others.	 I	
could	only	hear	some	open	 fire	and	men	shouting.	 I	 just	decided	to	keep	
going.	[…]	I	walked	a	long	distance,	all	night	long.	In	the	morning	I	saw	an	
old	 car	approaching,	 they	 said	 they	were	 looking	 for	me.	 I	 asked	 them	 if	
they	knew	about	what	had	happened	at	 the	border.	They	said	 it	was	our	
fault	because	we	were	too	early.	We	probably	ran	into	a	border	patrol.	[…]	






of	 dangers.	 As	 they	 ‘do	 not	 exist’	 in	 the	 country,	 once	 they	 are	 apprehended	 by	 local	
security	 forces,	 organ	 traffickers	or	 criminals,	 they	 can	 easily	disappear.	Recalling	his	




were	 caught	 and	 imprisoned,	 but	 others	 were	 sold	 by	 the	 smugglers	 to	
traffickers,	either	to	ask	their	families	for	ransom99	or	to	extract	organs	for	
wealthy	people.	I	also	think	that	life	was	so	hard	and	the	debts	so	difficult	
to	 repay	 that	 some	might	 well	 have	 sold	 a	 kidney	 or	 something	 else	 in	








rumours.	 In	 such	 dire	 straits,	 for	 example,	 Teodros	 and	 his	 roommates	would	 gather	






also	 transmitted	during	 those	 calls,	 thereby	 impacting	asylum	seekers’	perceptions	of	
the	 country	 of	 destination.	 For	 instance,	 one	 of	 Teodros’	 roommates	 ‘had	 news	 that	
getting	 to	 Italy	 was	 safer	 than	 getting	 to	 Malta,	 even	 though,	 if	 you	 want	 to	 go	 to	
Denmark	or	somewhere	else,	you	shouldn’t	get	your	fingerprints	taken100’.	
Finally,	 four	 years	 after	his	 arrival	 in	Khartoum,	Teodros	managed	 to	 continue	
his	journey	towards	Libya.	When	the	time	came,	the	young	Eritrean	approached	a	man	
he	had	heard	of	from	his	roommates	as	a	reliable	person	to	arrange	the	travel	to	Libya.	
However,	 the	 smuggler	 refused	 to	 arrange	 the	 trip,	 unless	 Teodros	 recruited	 more	
people	to	travel	with	him,	thereby	changing	Teodros’	role	from	that	of	smuggled	person	
to	 that	 of	 facilitator/intermediary.	 After	 three	 months	 of	 travelling	 across	 arduous	
Lybian	 terrain	 using	 different	 modes	 of	 transport	 (by	 vehicle	 or	 on	 foot)	 Teodros	
reached	Tripoli101.		









and	 the	main	 departure	 point	 towards	 Italy102.	 The	 business	 of	 illegal	 migration	 has	
flourished	 even	 more.	 Migrants	 leave	 from	 several	 coastal	 areas,	 such	 as	 Khums,	










The	 security	 situation	 in	 Libya	 was	 critical,	 due	 to	 confrontations	 between	 different	
militias.	In	this	context,	smugglers	from	Sudan	relied	on	their	connections	to	networks	
inside	the	country.	In	Teodros’	case,	a	boat	was	found	that	could	take	him	from	Tripoli	
after	 only	 two	weeks.	Very	 interestingly,	 a	 fellow	Eritrean	who	was	 also	 travelling	 to	
Italy	 told	Teodros	 that	he	had	a	cellular	phone	and	a	number	 to	call	a	person	 in	 Italy	
that	would	warn	the	Italian	coast	guard	that	a	boat	was	adrift,	in	case	things	went	bad.	
This	 strategy	 has	 proved	 to	 be	 very	 common	 and,	 most	 importantly,	 effective.	 As	 in	
Teodros’	 case,	 many	 migrants	 have	 been	 rescued	 by	 the	 Italian	 coast	 guard,	 thus	










I	 first	 met	 Semira,	 an	 Eritrean	middle-class	 woman,	 at	 the	 Baobab	 refugee	 centre	 in	
Rome	in	2013,	when	she	was	19	years	old.	Daniel	–	the	Eritrean	director	of	the	centre	–	
found	her	a	job	as	a	cook	there,	after	he	met	her	at	another	refugee	centre	for	women	
and	 families.	 Her	 journey	 was	 easier	 than	most,	 but	 certain	 aspects	 of	 her	 narrative	
shed	light	on	the	situation	in	Sudan.		
Semira	lost	her	father	at	a	very	early	age,	so	she	grew	up	living	with	her	uncle	in	
Asmara.	They	were	very	close,	 so	when	 the	girl	 started	high	school,	her	uncle	started	




‘My	 uncle	 told	 my	 mother	 that	 it	 was	 a	 good	 idea	 for	 me	 to	 leave	 the	
country,	but	in	a	safe	way.	They	didn’t	tell	me	until	they	found	a	way	to	do	
that.	[…]	My	uncle	had	many	important	friends,	being	an	official	at	the	time	



















where	 there	 is	 a	 strong	 Eritrean	 community,	 including	 Italy.	 In	most	 cases	 they	 have	
recourse	to	smugglers	to	do	so,	 including	high-ranking	officials	 in	the	Sudanese	Army,	
who	also	have	ties	to	the	smuggling	networks.	Police	and	other	security	officials	are	also	
involved	 insofar	 as	 they	 are	 often	 bribed.	 Migrants	 consider	 the	 border	 with	 Sudan	
easier	to	cross,	as	border	posts	are	easier	to	avoid.	






that	 you’ll	 have	more	 controls.	 […]	 I	 realised	 that	 the	 camp	wasn’t	 safe,	
because	people	disappeared	suddenly.	Also,	smugglers	in	the	camp	aren’t	




‘these	 practices	 are	 usually	 the	 work	 of	 Sudanese	 and	 Eritrean	 fellow	
nationals	 from	 the	 Rashaida	 and	 the	 Hidarib	 Bedouin	 tribes.	 Another	
problem	 in	 the	 camp	 is	 that	 reportedly,	 there	 are	 links	 between	 some	
people	in	the	camp	and	Eritrean	agents.	Furthermore,	the	Kessala	region	is	
not	 considered	 safe	 for	 Eritrean	 refugees,	 as	 the	 regional	 government	
allows	 the	 Eritrean	 military	 forces	 to	 deport	 deserters	 back	 to	 Eritrea.	
Therefore,	 draft	 dodgers	 tend	 to	 use	 the	 camp	 as	 a	 temporary	 base	 to	
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organise	 further	 travel.	 Some	 of	 them	 come	 from	 camps	 in	 Ethiopia.	 In	
fact,	mobility	between	camps	is	high105’.	











one	 of	 the	 Ethiopian	 camps	 reported	 having	moved	 to	 the	 Sudanese	 camps	 as	 part	 as	 their	migration	
journey.	
	 175	
People	 involved	 in	 this	 parallel	 economy	 also	 hold	 valuable	 information	 for	 asylum	








for	 asylum	 seekers.	 But	 I	 didn’t	want	 to	 go	 through	Greece,	 but	 through	
Italy.	 […]	In	any	case,	even	 if	 I	have	to	stay	 in	 Italy,	 that’s	ok,	 I	 thought.	 I	
could	always	then	try	to	move	north;	Italians	are	lazy	in	their	controls!	But	










or	 harassed.	 Furthermore,	 non-Muslim	 strangers,	 such	 as	 Semira,	 face	 discrimination	
and	are	often	the	victims	of	round-ups	or	assaults.		
The	girl’s	 situation	worsened	 three	months	after	her	arrival,	when	she	 learned	
that	her	uncle	had	been	considered	responsible	for	her	flight	and	incarcerated.	However	
he	 had	 been	 given	 the	 chance	 to	 buy	 himself	 out	 of	 prison	 for	 3000	 USD.	 This	 is	 a	
common	strategy	used	by	the	Eritrean	regime,	which	 is	notoriously	 in	need	of	 foreign	
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currency,	 to	 even	 turn	 desertion	 into	 a	 way	 of	 filling	 its	 own	 coffers.	 At	 this	 point,	
Semira’s	relatives	refused	to	help	her	pay	her	uncle’s	bail.	In	her	words,		
‘They	 told	me	 they	 couldn’t	 help	me.	 That	 it	 was	 already	 dangerous	 for	
them	that	I	stayed	there,	since	I	was	Christian,	and	that	it	wasn’t	good	for	
their	business.	At	that	point,	I	had	already	made	up	my	mind	that	I	wanted	
to	 leave.	 I	 didn’t	 want	 to	 live	 in	 such	 a	 place,	 where	 I	 didn’t	 have	 any	
options	about	my	future.	No	further	education.	No	possibility	to	find	a	job	
and	 to	 be	 independent.	 I	 used	 to	 spend	 time	 on	 the	 internet,	 looking	 at	
places	to	go	and	how	to	get	there.	There	were	several	online	forums	about	
this.	 […]	 I	decided	 that	 I	wanted	 to	 come	 to	 Italy	because	Asmara	 is	 like	
Italy.	And	my	uncle	had	 taught	me	some	word	 in	 Italian,	 that	he	 learned	








from	 the	 Eritrean	 embassy	 in	 Khartoum.	 This	 is	 not	 surprising,	 as	 the	 embassy	 in	
Khartoum	will	 issue	 a	 passport	 for	 about	 100USD	 within	 a	 few	 days,	 ever	 since	 the	
Ethiopian	 embassy	 began	 to	 do	 so.	 This	 has	 become	 a	 part	 of	 the	 ongoing	 rivalry	
between	the	two	countries;,	emigrants	to	the	West	represent	a	future	influx	of	cash	and	
are	 therefore	 considered	 a	 government	 investment106	 (see	 on	 this	 Treiber	 and	
Gebereigthabher,	2009).		
As	for	Amang,	he	ended	up	going	to	Cairo	as	a	step	on	his	journey	to	Libya	and	









the	 image	 it	 projects	 in	 the	West,	 actually	 remains	 largely	 powerless	 and	 tied	 up	 by	
bureaucratic	hurdles	(Treiber	and	Gebereigthabher,	2009).	
Opting	 for	 a	 strategy	 of	 maximal	 invisibility	 (see	 on	 this	 also	 Kibreab,	 1999),	
Amang	and	other	Eritrean	migrants	used	 to	meet	 in	 specific	neighbourhoods,	 such	as	








who	 was	 meeting	 different	 people	 very	 frequently,	 and	 had	 a	 different	







Although	 most	 of	 the	 respondent	 to	 this	 study	 reported	 having	 travelled	 through	
Ethiopia	and	Sudan,	a	few	told	me	of	their	previous	migration	experiences	in	the	Gulf,	
and	 these,	 even	 if	 they	 turned	 out	 to	 be	 unsuccessful,	 represented	 a	 practice	 run	 for	
their	 later	migration	 to	Europe,	 especially	 in	 terms	of	 learning	how	 to	negotiate	 risks	
during	the	asylum	journey.		
Among	 them,	 two	brothers,	Habel	 and	 Isaias,	 told	me	of	 their	migration	 to	 the	
wealthy	Gulf	states	in	2012,	in	particular	to	Saudi	Arabia,	having	been	attracted	by	the	
possibility	 of	 working	 and	 of	 earning	more	money.	 Both	 of	 them	 first	 tried	 to	 reach	
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Yemen	by	boat.	This	trajectory	was	not	particularly	difficult,	for	two	main	reasons:	first,	

























in	 the	 construction	 sector.	 Those	 who	 manage	 to	 reach	 Saudi	 Arabia	 were	 usually	





the	 sponsor	 decides	 they	 are	 not	 needed	 anymore,	 the	 migrants	 are	 brought	 to	 the	
police,	to	be	either	expelled	or	detained	if	they	are	guilty	of	committing	some	crime	or	
offence	(see	De	Bel-Air	,2014;	and	van	Reisen	et	al.,	2013).	
However,	 since	 March	 2013	 the	 Kingdom	 has	 faced	 such	 a	 constant	 inflow	 of	
migrants	from	the	Horn	of	Africa	and	South	Asia	that	it	has	put	stricter	rules	in	place	in	
order	 to	 limit	 the	 presence	 of	 illegal	 immigrants,	 and	 it	 has	 reformed	 its	 job	market	
legislation.	Moreover,	 it	has	repatriated	almost	2	million	illegal	workers,	most	of	them	
from	 Ethiopia	 and	 Yemen,	 and	 it	 tries	 to	 control	 movements	 at	 the	 Yemeni	 border,	
partly	 by	 constructing	 a	 1,800	 km	 fence	 between	 the	 two	 countries.	 	 These	 new	
developments,	 together	 with	 army	 operations	 against	 the	 Houthis	 in	 Yemen	 and	 the	
general	 instability	 that	 characterises	 the	 region,	 have	 made	 it	 more	 difficult	 for	
Eritreans	to	reach	the	Gulf	countries,	and	 it	 is	yet	 to	be	seen	whether	the	flow	will	be	
diverted	onto	other	routes.	
Habel	 and	 Isaias	 returned	 to	 Eritrea	 after	 eight	 months,	 as	 the	 circumstances	
were	not	favourable,	in	order	to	try	to	reach	Italy	instead	(which	they	did	in	2014).	At	




these	 kinds	 of	 dangers	 when	 we	 fled	 to	 Saudi	 Arabia.	 We	 were	 more	
experienced	than	other	migrants.	So	when	we	were	staying	with	them	in	
the	 safe-houses,	 they	 would	 ask	 us	 or	 the	 others	 about	 our	 previous	
experience.	[…]	I	think	this	was	to	see	whether	they	could	learn	any	useful	
lesson	 from	 us	 that	 they	 didn’t	want	 to	 ask	 us	 directly.	 […]	Maybe	 they	








and	 friends	who	had.	This	 is	a	really	dangerous	route,	as	 it	entails	 travelling	 from	the	
coast	 by	 sea	 or	 through	 Egypt	 by	 land.	 The	 risks	 pertain	 to	 trafficking	 and	 to	 the	
practice	of	torture	in	the	Sinai	region;	there	is	also	the	risk	of	being	imprisoned	in	Egypt,	
or	of	being	pushed	back	from	the	Israeli	border	(van	Reisen	et	al.,	2013).		
Smugglers	 are	 very	 active	 in	 Egypt.	 There	 are	 specific	 places	 in	 Cairo	 where	
migrants	 know	 they	 can	 contact	 smugglers:	 specific	 cafés,	 small	 retail	 stores	or	 small	
money	exchange	offices.	However,	the	risk	of	being	tricked	and	to	fall	prey	to	trafficking	






the	 tales	of	hardships	 told	by	 fellow	nationals,	 or	by	a	 third	party.	Eritreans	 refugees	
seem	 to	 be	 more	 vulnerable	 than	 people	 of	 other	 nationalities,	 as	 they	 are	 more	
appealing	to	traffickers,	who	usually	ask	for	a	higher	ransom	from	them:	they	are	aware	
that	 thanks	 to	 the	 Eritrean	 community	 (and	 the	 diaspora),	 Eritreans	 are	 able	 to	 pay	
higher	prices.	Being	deported	back	to	Eritrea	is	another	possible	outcome.	Despite	the	
fact	 that	 Egypt	 is	 party	 to	 all	 the	 relevant	 international	 conventions	 and	 legal	
	 181	
instruments	 designed	 to	 combat	 human	 trafficking	 (see	 Law	 n.	 64),	 it	 de	 facto	
criminalises	 the	 victims	 of	 trafficking.	 If	 traffickers	 are	 arrested	 by	 the	 army	 or	 the	
police	forces,	their	hostages	are	put	in	detention	centres,	sometimes	for	several	months	
(even	 though	 Egyptian	 national	 Law	 n.64	 in	 theory	 provides	 some	 form	 of	 victim	
protection)	and	 they	are	not	entered	 into	 the	asylum	system.	Moreover,	 they	have	no	
access	 to	 legal	 advice	 or	 to	 translators.	 Their	 only	way	 out	 is	 to	 be	 deported	 back	 to	
their	home	country,	 but	 first	 they	have	 to	 collect	 enough	money	 to	pay	 for	 the	 travel	
expenses.	
In	Israel	the	situation	was	very	difficult	as	well.	After	Israel	built	a	fence	on	its	border	
with	 Egypt,	 the	 number	 of	 migrants	 entering	 Israel	 dropped	 drastically.	 Moreover,	
Israeli	 law	metes	out	 severe	punishments	 to	 so-called	 “infiltrators”,	 that	 is,	 to	anyone	
crossing	 the	border	 illegally107.	 	 The	 law,	 for	 instance,	mandates	 the	 imprisonment	of	
asylum	 seekers	 in	 closed	 or	 open	 facilities,	 for	 three	 years	 or	 more	 before	 their	
deportation.	In	these	camps,	asylum	seekers	are	encouraged	to	leave	voluntarily.	Some	
Eritreans	still	try	to	enter	the	country	by	pretending	that	they	are	Jewish	Ethiopians108.	










108	 Ethiopia	 has	 long	 had	 a	 significant	 Jewish	 population	 (also	 called	 Beta	 Israel),	 in	 particular	 in	 the	
Ahmara	 and	 Tigray	 regions.	 	 The	 Mossad	 has	 evacuated	 many	 members	 of	 this	 community	 to	 Israel	





The	 examples	 presented	 above	 illustrate	 how	 asylum	 seekers	 develop	 different	






Attempting	 an	 exhaustive	 analysis	 of	 the	 role	 of	 emotions	 in	 changing	 people’s	
situations	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	research;	nevertheless,	the	data	gathered	provides	
material	 to	 explore	 the	 interrelation	 between	 the	 emotions	 experienced	 by	 asylum	
seekers	and	their	agency.		
Emotions	 permeate	 all	 dimensions	 of	 social	 existence;	 they	 are	 part	 of	 our	
response	to	our	environment,	and	they	shape	our	actions	(Reed	2004:664).	According	
to	 Jack	 Katz	 (1999),	 emotions	 are	 invisible	 forces	 that	 provide	 a	 form	 of	 mediation	
between	embodied	subjectivity	(i.e.	the	bodied	individual/self)	and	perceived	objectivity	
(e.g.,	the	social	environment,	‘other’	people).		
‘Emotions	 are	 situation-responsive	 and	 situation-transcendent	 narrative	
projects	 that	 allow	 an	 individual	 to	 navigate	 social	 situations	 or	 to	
establish	 ontological	 security	 when	 unforeseen,	 unexpected,	 or	 extra-
ordinary	 circumstances	 violate	 an	 individual’s	 embodied	 sense	 of	 social	
reality’	(Katz,	1999:	6-7).	
In	other	words,	emotions	must	be	understood	as	a	sort	of	‘existential	toolkit’	that	links	a	
personal	problem	to	a	broader	 issue	and	helps	to	elicit	a	response	that	 is	adequate	 in	
order	to	overcome	the	problem.		
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When	 individuals	 find	themselves	 in	a	situation	that	violates	 their	expectations	
of	reality,	emotions	serve	several	purposes.	First	of	all,	they	amplify	the	perception	that	
the	situation	in	which	individuals	find	themselves	is	indeed	unfamiliar.	Secondly,	their	
emotional	 response	 helps	 individuals	 to	 recognize	 how	 their	 behaviour	 relates	 to	 a	
wider	 interactional	 context	 that	 they	 typically	 take	 for	 granted	 and	 that	 shapes	 their	
experience	(Reed,	2004:	665).	This	happens	when	asylum	seekers	feel	that	they	are	in	
the	 hands	 of	 forces	 beyond	 their	 control.	 In	 this	way,	 emotions	 help	 individuals	who	
find	 themselves	 in	 unknown	 circumstances	 to	 re-define	 their	 situation,	 to	 determine	
possible	courses	of	action,	and	to	overcome	the	situation.	In	other	words,	emotions	help	
to	interpret,	construct	and	transcend	a	given	situation.		











Emotions,	 therefore,	can	be	understood	as	 toolkits	 that	shape	agency,	 thereby	 leading	
individuals	 to	 overcome	 unknown	 situations.	 Furthermore,	 as	 Reddy	 points	 out,	
emotions	 are	 both	 an	 individual	 and	 a	 collective	 medium	 of	 communication	 that	




fear.	 The	 two	 had	 different	 repercussions	 on	 the	 respondents’	 agency.	 Hope	 has	 an	
empowering	 effect	 (see	 Jasper,	 1997:	 114),	 as	 it	 leads	migrants	 to	 look	 forward	 to	 a	
better	 situation	 in	 the	 future.	 Hope	 allows	 individuals	 to	 project	 themselves	 in	 the	
future,	to	evaluate	their	goals,	and	to	determine	the	best	way	to	reach	them.	This	ability	




projects,	 but	 it	 can	 also	 encourage	 people	 to	 take	 action.	 Fear	 helps	 actors	 to	 realise	
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where	 their	 interests	 lie,	 and	 can	 point	 them	 in	 the	 right	 direction	 to	 achieve	 them	
(Barbalet,	1998:	149).	
Asylum	seekers’	accounts	show	that	even	 if	emotions	can	be	pre-reflective	and	
individuals	 occasionally	 overwhelmed	 by	 them,	 this	 does	 not	mean	 that	 they	 always	
neutralise	an	individual’s	ability	to	pursue	specific	goals.	On	the	contrary,	they	become	a	
constituent	part	 of	 the	process	 that	helps	 individuals	 to	 realise	 these	 goals.	 Emotions	
are	 not	 ‘irrational’	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 they	 do	 not	 challenge	 reason	 (Read,	 2004:	 664).	
Instead,	 emotions	 and	 reason	 are	 mutually	 constitutive.	 My	 research	 highlights	 the	






the	 interviews	conducted	for	 this	study,	 there	are	numerous	allusions	to	what	asylum	
seekers	knew	or	heard	about	changing	circumstances	elsewhere,	that	led	them	to	leave,	
to	choose	or	avoid	specific	routes,	that	shaped	the	way	they	dealt	with	traffickers,	that	











in	 ambiguous	 contexts	 characterised	 by	 information	 scarcity.	 	 Oman	 (1918),	 Prasad	
(1935),	R.	H.	Knapp	(1944),	Carrard	(1953),	and	Shibutani	(1966)	have	all	specified	that	
rumours	 develop	where	 there	 exists	 an	 unsatisfied	 need	 for	 information.	 Individuals	
who	find	themselves	in	new	circumstances	very	often	act	on	the	basis	on	rumours,	not	





Asylum	 migration	 movements	 represent	 a	 very	 favourable	 environment	 for	 the	
emergence	of	rumours.	These	movements	are	triggered	by	problematic	situations	over	
which	 individuals	 have	 little	 control.	 Events	 suddenly	 become	 the	 focus	 of	 excessive	
attention	 since	 they	 break	 the	 individuals’	 usual	 routine,	which	 is	 normally	 based	 on	
predictable	expectations.	 	As	Shibutani	points	out,	 each	 individual	 shapes	his	 conduct	




onto	 the	 wider	 environment,	 they	 become	 sensitive	 to	 the	 cues	 that	 are	 relevant	 to	
understand	 whether	 their	 expectations	 are	 going	 to	 be	 fulfilled.	 If	 expectations	 are	
already	 firmly	 established,	 then	 fewer	 cues	 are	 needed	 to	 confirm	 them	 (Shibutani,	
1966:	86).		
When	 expectations	 are	 not	 fulfilled,	 the	 need	 to	 adjust	 one’s	 perception	 of	 the	




stress	 that,	 as	 Shibutani’s	 ground-breaking	 work	 points	 out,	 it	 is	 not	 so	 much	 the	
intrinsic	 importance	 of	 an	 event	 as	 the	 existence	 of	 a	 problematic	 situation	 that	
converts	 what	 would	 otherwise	 be	 an	 ordinary	 piece	 of	 information	 into	 news.	
Whenever	 the	situation	 is	ambiguous,	whenever	 there	are	alternatives	 to	be	weighed,	
whenever	important	decisions	have	to	be	made,	any	item	that	might	affect	the	outcome	
becomes	“live	matter”	(1966:	40).	
If	 there	 is	 a	 shortage	 of	 useful	 information	 from	 reputable	 sources,	 or	 if	 the	
available	 information	 is	 not	 trusted	 –	 as	 is	 the	 case	 with	 Eritrean	 government	
information	(in	general,	censorship	 increases	rather	than	decreases	the	 importance	of	
rumours)	–	then	the	ambiguity	of	the	situation	remains	unresolved	and,	consequently,	
the	 information	 gap	 remains	 unfilled	 and	 action	 cannot	 be	 undertaken.	 Therefore,	 a	
definition	 must	 be	 improvised.	 Rumour	 is	 the	 collective	 transaction	 that	 makes	
improvisation	possible	(Shibutani,	1966:	57).	As	Hudson	(1954)	points	out	in	his	work,	
the	first	step	in	solving	this	ambiguity	through	the	construction	of	rumours	is	to	project	
hypotheses.	 As	 Teodros’	 account	makes	 clear,	 what	 finally	 pushed	 him	 into	 escaping	
from	 Eritrea	 was	 the	 fear	 of	 being	 killed	 or	 arrested,	 after	 some	 of	 his	 comrades	
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suddenly	disappeared	and	the	explanation	that	began	to	circulate	among	warsays	was	
that	 they	 had	 been	 arrested.	 Amang,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 saw	 that	 people	 were	
disappearing	from	the	refugee	camp	in	Sudan	where	he	was	staying;	he	explained	it	by	
hypothesising	that	they	had	been	kidnapped	by	traffickers.		
During	 asylum	 migration,	 the	 need	 for	 action	 may	 arise	 very	 quickly:	 some	
situations	call	for	very	rapid	responses.	This	leads	to	a	very	rapid	circulation	of	rumours	
among	 the	 relevant	audience.	This	 includes	everyone	who	 is	potentially	 interested	by	
the	 ambiguous	 event,	 that	 is,	 everyone	who	 is	 preoccupied	 by	 it	 because	 he/she	 can	
potentially	 be	 affected	 by	 it.	 In	 fact,	 as	 the	 literature	 points	 out,	 ‘an	 area	 of	
preoccupation	 is	 one	 that	 is	 unstable	 and	 only	 partially	 organised;	 a	 preoccupation	
represents	a	mobilisation	to	act	that	has	been	interrupted.	The	initial	selection	of	topics	
of	conversation	occurs	on	the	basis	of	shared	interest.	Rumours	are	always	timely;	they	
are	 usually	 a	 better	 index	 of	 the	 preoccupation	 of	 a	 public	 than	most	 other	 forms	 of	
verbalisation.’	 (Shibutani,	 1966:	 64-65).	Of	 course,	 the	more	 important	 the	 event,	 the	
more	rumours	will	begin	to	circulate	about	it.		
As	 asylum	 migration	 relies	 on	 smuggling	 or	 trafficking	 channels	 that	 survive	
thanks	to	their	secrecy,	there	is	no	official	information	to	be	had	about	them	that	asylum	
seekers	could	rely	on.	 Instead,	as	the	present	research	illustrates,	official	channels	are	
routinely	and	 totally	disregarded:	 for	 instance,	none	of	my	participants	had	consulted	
the	 embassies’	 official	 information	 about	 how	 to	 apply	 for	 a	 visa,	 as	 that	 information	
was	neither	trusted	nor	deemed	reliable.	In	these	circumstances,	people	rely	mostly	on	




A	 peculiar	 characteristic	 of	 rumour	 construction	 in	 the	 context	 of	 asylum	
migration	 is	 that,	as	 individuals	 realise	 that	 they	all	 share	 the	same	difficult	 situation,	
they	become	willing	to	share	news	with	each	other.	Sharing	is	also	important	in	order	to	
validate	 one’s	 own	 information	 and	 to	 assess	 the	 reliability	 of	 one’s	 own	 sources.	
However,	 since	 news	 are	 so	 valuable,	 asylum	 seekers	 do	 not	 often	 share	 them	
completely.	This	 is	mainly	done	 in	two	ways:	on	the	one	hand,	 they	report	their	news	
but	disclaim	any	 responsibility	 about	 their	 reliance,	 and	 they	 share	 the	news	without	




‘slanting’	 (Shibutani,	 1966:	 44),	 that	 is,	 they	 try	 to	 create	 the	 desired	 impression	 by	
omitting	relevant	parts	of	the	rumour.	
As	this	research	shows,	 the	circulation	of	 information	among	Eritrean	migrants	
happens	 very	 quickly.	 The	 speed	 of	 this	 process	 is	 related	 to	 the	 communication	
channels	 that	 are	 developed	 within	 the	 community.	 As	 we	 know,	 Eritrean	 society	 is	
characterised	by	a	high	degree	of	transnationality,	and	the	links	between	the	homeland	
and	 the	 diaspora	 abroad	 are	 very	 strong.	 As	 the	 interviews	 demonstrate,	 contacts	
between	individuals	in	the	diaspora	and	friends	and	family	members	at	home	are	very	
frequent,	and	even	refugee	camps	often	constitute	communication	hubs.	The	structure	
of	 these	 communication	 channels	 also	 impacts	 asylum	 seekers’	 assessment	 of	 the	
credibility	of	rumours.	As	some	respondents	have	explained	to	me,	they	would	consider	
those	rumours	that	came	from	established	channels	as	more	reliable,	as	these	channels	
have	 usually	 generated	 rumours	 that	 were	 either	 true	 or	 useful.	 When	 migrants	
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frequently	 turn	 to	 the	 same	 channels,	 these	become	well-established	 and	are	 thereby	
considered	more	reliable.		
Migrants	also	ascribe	a	high	credibility	to	news	generated	by	renowned	fellow-
migrants,	 people	 who,	 due	 to	 their	 particular	 circumstances	 or	 to	 their	 previous	
migration	experience,	have	acquired	a	high	status	in	the	asylum	seekers’	community.	It	
is	 important	 not	 to	 forget,	 however,	 that	 these	 exchanges	 of	 information	 also	 have	 a	
power	 dimension	 that	 is	 clearly	 perceived	 by	 migrants.	 In	 Teodros’	 account,	 for	
instance,	he	specifically	mentioned	Tekle,	whose	acquaintances	in	the	camp	and	among	
the	administrators	 (and	whose	 consequent	 access	 to	 information	unavailable	 through	
other	channels)	had	given	him	a	very	influential	position	in	the	camp.	
As	Isaias	acknowledged:	
‘in	 the	 end,	 it’s	 all	 about	 negotiation.	 We	 negotiate	 our	 lives,	 trying	 to	
reduce	 the	 level	 of	 risk.	 But	 in	 a	 dangerous	 situation	we	 are	 powerless,	
unless	 we	 either	 have	 money	 to	 buy	 passage	 or	 something	 even	 more	
















forties	who	works	 at	 the	Baobab	 refugee	 centre	 in	Rome.	 ‘But	 you	 learn	how	 to	 deal	









is	 his	 third	 attempt,	 as	 the	 paperwork	 is,	 in	 his	 own	 words,	 ‘very	 complicated’.	
‘Honestly,	I’m	quite	depressed.	I’ve	already	tried	twice	but	the	Questura		[the	provincial	
police	 station]	 is	 complicating	 things	 all	 the	 time.	 […]	 But	 I’m	 sure	 I	 will	 find	 a	 way	
around	it!’.	





asylum	 seekers’	 agency	 (see	 also	 Brekke	 and	 Brochmann,	 2014).	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	
procedures	and	reception	conditions	constrain	the	opportunities	asylum	seekers	have	
to	 achieve	 their	 goals	 but,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 they	 also	 leave	 gaps	 that	 they	 can	
strategically	 make	 use	 of.	 As	 we	 will	 see,	 perceptions	 matter	 a	 lot.	 In	 fact,	 these	
perceptions	typically	undergo	a	change	when	the	migrants	encounter	the	Italian	asylum	
system,	 thereby	 providing	 them	with	 elements	 to	 elaborate	 strategic	 solutions	 to	 the	
obstacles	they	encounter,	and	to	define	possible	means	of	integration	(a	lot	depends	on	








undergone	 by	 the	 asylum	 framework	 of	 the	 European	 Union	 (EU),	 which	 aims	 to	
gradually	 harmonise	 national	 asylum	procedures	 and	 reception	 conditions.	 For	many	
years,	EU	member	states	have	cooperated,	establishing	a	‘burden	sharing’	arrangement.	
This	 began	 with	 the	 Dublin	 Convention	 (1990),	 and	 was	 further	 developed	 with	 the	
Dublin	II	(2003)	and	Dublin	III	regulations	(2014),	which	ostensibly	replaced	the	 first	
Dublin	Convention.	They	form	the	cornerstone	of	the	Dublin	System,	which	is	made	up	
of	 the	 Dublin	 Regulation	 and	 of	 the	 EURODAC	 Regulation,	 which	 established	 a	
centralised,	 European-wide	 fingerprint	 database	 comprising	 the	 prints	 of	 all	
unauthorised	 entrants	 to	 the	 EU.	 According	 to	 the	 Dublin	 Regulation,	member	 states	
have	to	assess	which	member	state	is	responsible	for	processing	an	asylum	application	
lodged	 in	 their	 territory,	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 objective	 and	 hierarchical	 criteria.	 As	 I	 will	




Many	 criticisms	 have	 been	 levelled	 at	 this	 system.	 The	 European	 Council	 of	
Refugees	 and	 Exiles	 (ECRE)	 and	 the	 United	Nations	High	 Commissioner	 for	 Refugees	
(UNHCR),	 for	 instance,	have	 reiterated	 that	 the	 system	does	not	provide	 fair,	 efficient	
and	effective	forms	of	protection,	and	that	it	impedes	the	legal	rights	and	the	personal	
welfare	 of	 asylum	 seekers,	 including	 their	 right	 to	 a	 fair	 examination	 of	 their	 asylum	
claim	and,	if	it	is	recognised	as	valid,	their	right	to	obtain	effective	protection;	they	also	
criticise	 it	 for	 impeding	 the	even	distribution	of	asylum	claims	among	member	states.	
As	 O’Sullivan	 (2009)	 points	 out,	 ‘this	 agreement	 does	 not	 set	 out	 any	 harmonised	
standards	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 definition	 of	 a	 refugee	 or	 to	 refugee	 decision-making	
procedures,	and	it	is	generally	considered	to	have	been	of	limited	success’	(242).	
In	 general,	 it	 can	 be	 argued	 that	 since	 its	 inception,	 the	 EU	 asylum	 system	
developed	with	little	regard	to	humanitarian	norms,	and	with	only	a	partial	transfer	of	
sovereignty	 from	member	 states,	 and	 a	 limited	 amount	 of	 cooperation	between	 them	
(Lavenex	2001).	However,	ever	since	the	European	Council	summit	held	in	Tampere	in	
1999,	this	approach	has	changed,	and	the	focus	has	shifted	towards	an	externalisation	
of	 refugee	 policy,	 and	 towards	 the	 creation	 of	 a	 ‘Common	 European	 Asylum	 System’	
(CEAS)109	obtained	by	harmonising	asylum	law	(Boswell	2003).	The	focus	was	both	on	
the	 better	 control	 of	 and	 on	 the	 prevention	 of	migration.	 The	 first	 concern	 led	 to	 an	
increase	 in	 controls	 at	 the	 external	 border	 of	 the	 EU,	while	 the	 second	 attempted	 to	
reduce	 the	 number	 of	 migrants	 arriving	 in	 Europe	 by	 addressing	 the	 root	 causes	 of	
forced	migration,	and	by	providing	forms	of	protection	in	the	areas	from	which	refugees	
																																																								
109	 The	CEAS	 consists	 of	 four	EU	Directives:	 the	Dublin	Regulation	 (2003/343/CE)	 and	 its	 revisions	 in	
2003	 (Dublin	 II)	 and	 2014	 (Dublin	 III);	 the	 Asylum	 Procedure	 Directives	 (2013/32/EU,	 processing	





2008:	 186).	 This	 has	 led	 several	 other	 international	 actors,	 such	 as	 the	 UNCHR,	 to	
express	their	concerns	as	regional	protection	could	undermine	the	right	to	seek	asylum,	
by	 limiting	 the	 opportunities	 to	 exit	 the	 country	 of	 origin	 and	 by	 keeping	 asylum-
seekers	in	a	situation	of	insecurity.	
As	 a	 result,	 while	 the	 externalisation	 of	 protection	 has	 fostered	 a	 more	
humanitarian	approach	outside	 the	EU’s	borders,	 ‘security’	remains	an	 issue	managed	
at	 the	 international	 level	 through	 strict	 control	 procedures.	 Because	 of	 the	
externalisation	 of	 EU	 asylum	 policies,	 the	 dimensions	 which	 are	 still	 managed	
internally,	 at	 the	 level	 of	member	 states	 (such	 as	 the	welfare	 provisions	 for	 asylum-
seekers,	 the	 provision	 of	 support	 services	 and	 of	 resettlement	 programs)	 has	 been	
neglected.	The	EU	has	recently	sought	to	address	this	gap	by	the	Procedure	Directive	n.	
2013/32/UE	 (recast)	 and	 the	 Reception	 Condition	 Directive	 n.	 2013/33/UE	 (recast).	
The	 former	 especially	 aims	 to	 improve	 the	 efficiency	 and	 the	 fairness	 of	 asylum	
procedures,	by	strengthening	 the	minimal	guarantees	and	by	 facilitating	 the	access	of	
claimants	 to	 asylum	 and	 appeal	 procedures.	 The	 idea	 is	 to	 guarantee	 both	 an	 easier	
















(ECHR),	 which	 came	 into	 force	 in	 1953.	 While	 it	 does	 not	 directly	 mention	 asylum-
seekers,	 it	made	 important	contributions	 to	 their	protection.	Firstly,	 it	established	the	
European	Court	 of	Human	Rights,	which	 individuals	 can	 have	 recourse	 to	 if	 they	 feel	
that	 their	 rights	have	been	violated	under	 the	Convention.	 Secondly,	 the	 sentences	of	
the	 Court	 are	 binding	 for	 member	 states	 and	 their	 execution	 is	 monitored	 by	 the		
Council’s	 Committee	 of	Ministers.	 The	 Convention,	 therefore,	 allows	 the	 individual	 to	
play	 an	 active	 role	 in	 the	 international	 arena.	 On	 different	 occasions,	 asylum-seekers	
and	 refugees	have	made	use	of	 this	 right,	 in	particular	 in	 relation	 to	Article	3	 (which	
prohibits	the	forced	return	of	a	person	to	a	country	in	which	there	is	reason	to	believe		
that	 he/she	 runs	 a	 real	 risk	 of	 torture	 or	 inhuman	 and	 degrading	 treatment	 or	






‘the	regulation	of	asylum	rights	 in	 Italy	 is	 the	result	of	a	complex	history	
involving	 two	 parallel	 and	 underdeveloped	 systems	 of	 protection.	 The	
country’s	 constitution	 recognizes	 asylum	 in	 very	 generous	 terms,	 but	
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these	norms	are	seldom	applied	in	practice.	The	Refugee	Convention	was	
ratified,	but	 implemented	 in	a	rudimentary	way.	More	recently,	 the	right	
to	 asylum	 has	 fallen	 victim	 to	 the	 over-politicization	 of	 the	 immigration	
debate.	 This	 has	 led	 to	 misunderstandings	 about	 the	 options	 legally	
available	to	policy-makers	and	about	their	obligations	under	international,	
European	and	constitutional	law’.	
As	 Francesca	 points	 out,	 Italy’s	 approach	 to	 asylum	 migration	 is	 ambiguous.	
Asylum	 law	 reflects	 the	 way	 societies	 perceive	 themselves	 and	 their	 attitude	 to	
migration;	 more	 specifically,	 it	 often	 indicates	 whether	 they	 predominantly	 perceive	
themselves	as	 sending	or	as	host	 societies.	 Italy	 is	a	 case	 in	point,	 as	 it	 still	perceives	
itself	 as	 a	 country	of	 emigration	 rather	 than	 immigration	 (El	Hariri,	 2010).	There	 are	
historical	reasons	for	this:	around	the	time	of	its	unification,	in	1861,	Italy	was	mostly	a	
country	of	emigration,	and	this	remained	true	 for	most	of	 the	 twentieth	century.	Only	
recently,	due	to	the	problematic	 integration	of	second-generation	immigrants	and	due	
to	 the	 increase	 in	 immigration	 following	 the	 so-called	 ‘Arab	 Spring’,	 does	 one	 note	 a	
slow	 evolution	 towards	 a	 more	 accurate	 perception	 of	 Italy	 as	 an	 immigration	 and	
transit	country	(El	Hariri,	2010).	Furthermore,	asylum	has	played	a	very	important	role	
in	 Italian	 contemporary	 history.	 During	 the	 fascist	 period	 (1922-1943),	 many	
opponents	of	Mussolini’s	regime	sought	political	asylum	abroad;	thus,	when	they	drew	
up	the	new	constitution	(1947),	its	authors	were	acutely	conscious	of	the	importance	of	
asylum	 since	many	 of	 them	 had	 experienced	 political	 persecution	 (Bonetti	 2004).	 So	
they	 introduced	 Article	 10	 paragraph	 3110	 ,	 which	 features	 among	 the	 Constitution’s	











geographically	 and	 temporally	 limited	 definition	 of	 ‘refugee’	 –	 mostly	 designed	 to	
protect	 Europeans	who	had	been	persecuted	before	1951	 -	which	 sharply	 contrasted	
with	the	intentions	of	the	drafters	of	the	Constitution.	The	temporal	limit	was	removed	
in	1970	–	when	 Italy	 ratified	 the	1967	New	York	Protocol	 –	but	 the	geographical	one	








it	 turns	 out,	 Article	 10	 paragraph	 3	 was	 interpreted	 in	 a	 restrictive	 way	 until	 1997,	
when	 the	Corte	 di	 Cassazione	 clarified	 its	 scope	 and	 defined	 the	 right	 to	 asylum	 as	 a	
‘perfect	 subjective	 right’	 in	 Italian	 legal	 terminology:	 this	 means	 that	 the	 right	 is	
conferred	to	the	individual,	who	can	claim	it	directly,	and	that	it	has	to	be	recognised	by	
the	 court.	 Nonetheless,	 due	 to	 the	 absence	 of	 rules	 clarifying	 the	 conditions	 and	
procedures	 of	 constitutional	 asylum,	 the	 courts	 have	 interpreted	 the	 content	 of	 the	









Rome,	which	was	 to	make	 the	decisions.	 In	general,	 the	 idea	was	 that	asylum-seekers	
would	file	their	request	at	the	local	police	office,	and	would	then	be	asked	to	return	to	
be	 photographed	 and	 to	 provide	 details	 about	 their	 experience.	 He/she	 would	 then	
receive	a	receipt,	which	would	later	be	replaced	by	a	temporary	residence	permit.	A	few	
months	 later,	 he/she	would	 be	 called	 for	 an	 interview	with	 the	 Central	 Commission.	
Many	 NGOs	 have	 considered	 this	 interview	 one	 of	 the	 main	 flaws	 of	 the	 system:	
according	to	Marco,	from	the	Lunaria	NGO,	‘the	interview	is	very	brief,	and	the	claimant	
is	 offered	no	 legal	 support’.	 Claimants	 are	 then	 finally	 notified	 of	 the	 outcome	by	 the	
police	–	and	in	the	case	of	a	negative	outcome,	it	is	possible	to	ask	for	a	judicial	review.	




‘Bossi-Fini	 Law’,	which	 established	 seven	 Local	 Commissions112	with	 the	 authority	 to	
decide	on	asylum	cases.	Moreover,	 the	Central	Commission	in	Rome	was	renamed	the	
National	 Commission,	 and	 given	 a	 supervisory	 role	 and	 the	 competence	 to	 revoke	
refugee	status	(Messineo	2010).	It	also	made	possible	the	detention	of	asylum-seekers	
in	certain	specific	circumstances	–	for	instance,	if	they	needed	to	be	identified	–	which	in	
effect	meant	 that	 almost	 97%	of	 asylum-seekers	 ended	 up	 being	 detained	 during	 the	
																																																								
111 Presidential Decree of 15 May 1990 n. 136 . 





Borders’.	 If	 the	 Local	 Commission	 issues	 a	 negative	 decision,	 the	 claimant	 is	 then	
expulsed.	 The	 Local	 Commission	 can,	 however,	 recommend	 the	 police	 authorities	 to	
grant	 ‘humanitarian	 protection’	 to	 those	 they	 reject.	 This	 grants	 them	 a	 one-year	
residence	permit	–	which	 is	very	difficult	 to	renew	–	as	well	as	the	right	to	access	the	
Italian	health	system	and	the	right	to	work	(which	in	practice	means	the	right	to	work	
in	 the	 informal	 economy).	 In	 spite	 of	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 number	 of	 people	 granted	
humanitarian	 protection	 increased	 following	 its	 implementation,	 this	 Act	 was	 very	
much	criticised,	 and	 some	of	 its	provisions	were	 called	unconstitutional	because	 they	
violated	 the	 non-refoulement	 principle	 –	 for	 instance,	 an	 appeal	 against	 a	 negative	
decision	does	not	automatically	suspend	the	effect	of	a	deportation	order.	
A	third	development	concerns	the	‘Security	Pack’	adopted	in	2008.	This	resulted	
from	 the	 implementation	 of	 two	 Common	 European	 Asylum	 System	 Directives:	 EC	
































phases.	The	 first	 step	 is	when	 the	claimant	undergoes	 the	so-called	 fotosegnalamento,	
during	 which	 the	 authorities	 take	 pictures	 and	 fingerprints	 of	 the	 applicant.	 At	 this	
stage,	if	the	asylum	request	is	presented	at	the	Questura,	the	applicant	needs	to	indicate	









to	 present	 an	 address,	 and	 they	 receive	 a	 verbale	 di	 invito	 to	 go	 to	 the	 competent	
Questura	 to	 complete	 the	 procedure.	 According	 to	 several	 lawyers	 working	 at	 CIR	
(Comitato	 Italiano	 per	 i	 Rifugiati	 –	 the	 Italian	 Refugee	 Committee),	 ‘sometimes	 it	 is	
difficult	for	asylum	seekers	to	go	to	the	Questura	from	the	border	location,	as	they	lack	
financial	support	to	pay	for	public	transportation.	This	is	sometimes	provided	by	NGOs	
working	 at	 the	 border,	 but	 it	 is	 dependent	 on	 establishing	 an	 agreement	 with	 the	
Prefettura	[that	is,	the	office	of	the	Ministry	of	Interior	responsible	for	representing	the	
Government	at	the	province	level]’.		
The	 second	 step	 is	 when	 the	 asylum	 request	 is	 formally	 registered	 at	 the	
Questura	 (verbalizzazione).	During	 this	 stage,	 a	 form	 (Modello	 C3,	 also	 called	Verbale)	









necessarily	 take	 place	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 especially	 in	 large	 cities.	 As	 a	matter	 of	 fact,	
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most	of	the	asylum	seekers	I	interviewed	were	formally	registered	several	weeks	after	






A	 modernization	 process	 began	 in	 2009	 that	 aimed	 to	 completely	 automate	 the	
administrative	 procedures	 related	 to	 immigration	 and	 to	 issues	 of	 civil	 liberty.	 It	
resulted	in	the	creation	of	a	unified	immigration	registration	database	(BAI-	Banca	Dati	




VESTANET-C3	 online	 system,	 which	 enables	 the	 Questura	 to	 transmit	 asylum	 claim	
forms	electronically	(Modello	C3	or	verbale)	to	the	competent	Territorial	Commissions	
for	 the	Recognition	of	 International	 Protection114.	According	 to	 the	 law	 implementing	
the	 Regulation	 (CE)	 No.	 343/2003,	 the	 Dublin	 Unit	 is	 also	 involved	 in	 this	 system,	
through	the	DUBLINET	application.		
An	 important	 aspect	 of	 this	 procedure	 pertains	 to	 the	 information	 provided	 to	
the	 applicant	 at	 the	 time	 of	 registration.	 This	 is	 one	 of	 the	 areas	 with	 the	 greatest	
divergence	 between	 theory	 and	 practice.	 According	 to	 Article	 10	 of	 the	 Legislative	
Decree	25/2008,	police	authorities	must	 inform	the	claimant	about	his/her	rights	and	
																																																								




obligations	during	 the	asylum	procedure,	and	of	all	 the	means	 that	are	put	at	his/her	
disposal	to	support	the	application.	Moreover,	according	to	Article	3	of	the	Legislative	
Decree	 140/2005	 (Reception	 Decree),	 within	 15	 days	 of	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	
application,	 police	 authorities	 shall	 provide	 the	 claimant	 with	 information	 about	 the	
reception	 system.	 In	both	 cases,	 information	 is	provided	 through	 information	 leaflets,	
which	are	issued	in	10	different	languages.	However,	in	practice,	these	leaflets	are	very	
seldom	distributed,	 and	neither	 is	 the	 right	 information	always	provided	orally,	 since	
the	 law	does	not	explicitly	mandate	 it.	 	As	a	consequence,	given	their	poor	Italian,	 the	











the	 staff	 of	 specialised	 international	 organisations	 should	 participate	 in	 the	 decision-
making	process.	This	is	meant	to	ensure	a	more	comprehensive	approach	to	the	asylum	
claim,	 and	 to	 guarantee	 a	 fair	 decision.	 	 Therefore	 the	 Territorial	 Commissions	 are	
composed	of	 two	 representatives	 from	 the	Ministry	of	 the	 Interior	 (one	of	which	 is	 a	
																																																								
115	Because	of	the	increasing	number	of	applications,	in	2014	the	Italian	legislature	increased	the	number	
of	 Territorial	 Commissions	 from	 10	 to	 20,	 and	 created	 30	 additional	 Sub-Commissions	 (Decree	 No.	
119/2014).			
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senior	 police	 officer),	 one	 representative	 from	 the	 local	 authorities	 (the	municipality,	
the	 province	 or	 the	 region),	 and	 one	 representative	 from	 the	 UNHCR.	 	 Although	
decisions	 are	 made	 by	 majority	 vote,	 only	 one	 member,	 who	 then	 presents	 the	
claimant’s	 file	 to	 the	 board,	 usually	 carries	 out	 the	 interview	 (in	most	 cases	 a	 ‘same	






days	 following	 the	 interview.	 According	 to	 Article	 27	 of	 the	 Legislative	 Decree	 No.	
25/2008,	 however,	 this	 term	 can	 be	 extended	 if	 the	 Territorial	 Commission	 needs	 to	
gather	 more	 information.	 In	 this	 case,	 both	 the	 asylum	 seeker	 and	 the	Questura	 are	
supposed	 to	 be	 informed.	 In	 spite	 of	 the	 law’s	 provisions,	 however,	 it	 usually	 takes	 a	
much	 longer	 time	 for	 the	 interview	 to	 be	 scheduled	 and	 for	 the	 final	 decision	 to	 be	
made.	 This	 mostly	 depends	 on	 the	 delays	 that	 build	 up	 between	 the	 applicants’	
fotosegnalamento,	their	verbalizzazione,	and	the	forwarding	of	their	applications	to	the	
Territorial	 Commission.	 In	 addition,	 the	 administrative	 paperwork	 also	 takes	 a	 long	
time,	 depending	 on	which	 Territorial	 Commission	 processes	 the	 claims.	 According	 to	
the	 Eritrean	 asylum	 seekers	 and	 the	 representatives	 of	 NGOs	 that	 I	 interviewed,	 in	
Rome	the	whole	procedure	can	take	from	6	to	10	months.	
According	to	Article	12	of	the	Legislative	Decree	No.	25/2008,	the	interview	is	to	







they	 are	 very	 few	 in	 number118.	 The	 transcript	 of	 the	 interview	 is	 to	 be	 given	 to	 the	
applicants,	so	they	can	add	comments	to	them.	In	practice,	however,	 there	are	usually	
concerns	 regarding	 the	 applicant’s	 ability	 to	 add	 comments	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 an	
interpreter.	Furthermore,	the	quality	both	of	the	interviews	and	of	the	transcripts	vary	
depending	 on	 the	 interviewer.	 Some	 of	 the	 transcripts	 consulted	 for	 this	 study	were	
undeniably	short,	and	relied	on	very	standard	questions.	
At	the	end	of	this	procedure,	the	Territorial	Commission	can	(AIDA,	2014):	










lawyer.	 Applicants	 detained	 in	 the	 CIEs	 (Centro	 di	 Identificazione	 ed	 Espulsione	 –	
identification	 and	 expulsion	 centres)	 and	 in	 the	 CARAs	 (Centro	 di	 Accoglienza	 per	
Richiedenti	Asilo	–	reception	centre	for	asylum	seekers)	have	only	15	days	to	appeal.	In	
effect,	 this	 prevents	many	 asylum	 seekers	 from	 appealing,	 since	 the	 short	 timeframe	
makes	 it	 almost	 impossible	 to	 find	 an	 interpreter	 and	 a	 lawyer.	Normally,	 the	 appeal	
																																																								
118	The	sensitive	nature	of	 these	of	 interviews	has	 led	 the	bar	of	 interpreters	and	 translators	 to	draft	a	
Code	of	conduct.	
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should	 automatically	 suspend	 the	 Territorial	 Commission’s	 decision119.	 The	 law	 also	
makes	 it	 possible	 to	 lodge	 second	 and	 third	 instance	 appeals	 to	 the	Court	 of	Appeals	
(within	30	days,	according	to	the	Civil	Procedure	Code),	and	to	the	Corte	di	Cassazione120	








d. the	 claimant	 has	 been	 convicted	 of	 crimes	 such	 as	 smuggling,	 sexual	 trafficking,	
drug	trafficking,	or	has	already	been	notified	with	an	expulsion	order.	
According	 to	 NGOs	 and	 asylum	 lawyers	 however,	 this	 procedure	 is	 mostly	
applied	 to	 applicants	 held	 in	 CIEs,	 especially	 if	 they	 fall	 in	 category	 a.	 In	 practice,	
vulnerable	asylum	seekers	may	at	times	benefit	from	this	procedure,	but	their	chances	
are	higher	 if	 they	 are	 assisted	by	 lawyers	or	NGOs.	As	 for	 victims	of	 torture,	 rape	or,	

















all	 member	 states	 to	 examine	 the	 asylum	 claims	 of	 those	 seeking	 international	
protection	 under	 the	 Geneva	 Convention	 and	 the	 EU	 Qualification	 Directive122.	 This	
document	is	the	pillar	of	the	so-called	Dublin	System,	which	also	relies	on	the	EURODAC	
Regulation,	 which	 establishes	 a	 European	 database	 that	 gathers	 fingerprints	 and	
information	on	all	undocumented	migrants	entering	Europe.		
This	system	was	actually	designed	with	a	dual	purpose	in	mind:	on	the	one	hand,	
its	was	 intended	 to	 ensure	 that	 asylum	 applications	would	 be	 examined	 by	 only	 one	
member	 state,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 it	 was	 designed	 to	 prevent	 further	 intra-European	





According	 to	 the	 Dublin	 procedure,	 during	 the	 registration	 phase,	 the	 asylum	
claimant’s	fingerprints	are	in	theory	checked	against	the	EURODAC	database.	If	there	is	





122	 The	 Dublin	 Convention	 was	 first	 replaced	 in	 2003	 by	 EU	 Regulation	 No.	 343/2003	 (Dublin	 II	
Regulation),	 and	most	 recently	 in	 2013	by	EU	Regulation	No.	 604/2013	 (Dublin	 III	 Regulation),	which	
came	into	force	on	1	January	2014.	
123	For	instance,	it	modified	the	definition	of	the	family	members	of	a	minor	by	making	specific	reference	
to	 a	 father,	mother	 or	 to	 any	 other	 responsible	 adult;	 it	 introduced	 the	 principle	 that	 an	 appeal	 could	
suspect	a	transfer	decision;	it	also	gave	guidelines	for	custody	in	case	of	flight	risks.	
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When	 another	 member	 state	 is	 considered	 responsible	 for	 examining	 the	
application,	the	“Dublin	Unit”	informs	the	asylum	seeker	(through	the	Questura)	that	the	
procedure	 is	 closed,	 and	 indicates	 where	 he/she	 will	 be	 transferred.	 They	 are	 also	
supposed	to	provide	information	about	how	to	appeal124	against	the	transfer	decision.		
Normally,	 the	 asylum	 claimant	 is	 asked	 to	 present	 him/herself	 in	 a	 location	
indicated	by	the	Questura	in	order	to	be	transferred.	If	he/she	does	not	do	so,	the	Italian	
authorities	can	ask	for	an	extension	of	up	to	18	months.		Only	the	applicants	held	in	CIEs	
are	escorted	 to	 the	border.	However,	 every	member	 state	has	 the	possibility	 to	apply	
the	 so-called	 “sovereignty	 clause”	 (ECHR).	 NGOs	 are	 increasingly	 pushing	 Italian	
authorities	 to	 apply	 the	 clause	 to	 suspend	 the	 transfer	 of	 asylum	 seekers	 to	 specific	
member	 states,	 namely	 Greece,	 Hungary	 and	 Malta	 (AIDA	 2013),	 where	 there	 is	 a	
significant	risk	that	their	human	rights	will	be	violated125.	
Dublin	 returnees,	 the	 so-called	 “Dubliners”,	 face	 very	 different	 situations	when	
they	are	transferred,	depending	on	whether	they	applied	for	asylum	before	moving	to	
another	 EU	 member	 state,	 or	 whether	 a	 decision	 had	 already	 been	 issued.	 If	 the	
returnee	has	previously	applied	for	asylum	and	if	the	Territorial	Commission	has	issued	
a	 positive	 decision,	 the	 claimant	 is	 issued	 a	 residence	 permit.	 If	 their	 application	 has	









125	 Several	 court	 judgements	 have	 declared	 the	 transfer	 to	 these	 member	 states	 as	 being	 unlawful	
(Tribunale	Amministrativo	del	 Lazio	 judgement	No.	 8508/2010	and	No.	 1363/2011;	Consiglio	di	 Stato	
parere	 cautelare	 ordinanza	No.	 3428/2009).	Making	 reference	 to	 EU	 jurisprudence,	 the	 Courts	 argued	
that	the	Dublin	Unit	must	enforce	the	“sovereignty	clause”	whenever	there	is	evidence	of	a	violation	of	the	
standards	 laid	 out	 by	 EU	 provisions.	 If	 not,	 Italy	 can	 be	 accused	 of	 infringing	 Articles	 3	 and	 13	 of	 the	
European	Convention	on	Human	Rights	
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order,	and	eventually	placed	 in	a	CIE;	 in	 the	second	case,	an	appeal	procedure	can	be	
started.	 If	 the	 asylum	 seeker	 did	 not	 present	 him/herself	 at	 the	 interview	 with	 the	
Territorial	Commission	because	he/she	had	already	left	the	country,	the	body	issues	a	
negative	decision	but	the	rejected	claimant	is	entitled	to	ask	for	a	new	interview.		
The	 Dublin	 Procedure	 permits	 travel	 to	 other	 European	 countries,	 but	 under	
certain	 strict	 conditions.	 If	 the	 asylum	 seeker	 has	 been	 issued	 a	 permit	 of	 residence	
he/she	 can	 travel	 freely	 within	 the	 Schengen	 area	 for	 a	 maximum	 of	 three	 months,	
beginning	 on	 the	 date	 of	 their	 official	 registration	 by	 the	 authorities	 of	 the	 state	 to	
which	 he/she	 travelled.	 Refugees	 and	 people	 who	 have	 been	 granted	 international	
protection,	who	formally	applied	for	asylum	at	least	five	years	earlier,	can	request	an	EU	
residence	permit	designed	for	long-term	residency,	that	makes	it	possible	to	stay	in	the	
Schengen	 area	 	 for	 longer	 than	 three	 months;	 however	 this	 permit	 has	 a	 limited	
duration.		
The	Dublin	procedure	has	a	 strong	 impact	on	 the	access	of	 Italian	 returnees	 to	
the	reception	system.	According	to	the	CIR	and	to	lawyers	from	the	“Fondazione	Astalli”,	
‘in	 practice,	 returnees	 have	 a	 limited	 access	 to	 reception	 facilities,	 as	 their	 asylum	
procedures	 are	 for	 the	 most	 part	 concluded	 once	 they	 are	 returned	 to	 Italy	 and,	
therefore,	they	are	no	longer	considered	asylum	seekers’	(CIR,	2010:	35).		
As	 Brekke	 and	 Brochman	 (2014:	 148)	 point	 out,	 far	 from	 preventing	 the	
secondary	migrations	 of	 asylum	 seekers,	 the	 Dublin	 procedure	 has	 really	 led	 to	 two	
major	 problems:	 first,	 the	 ‘first	 country	 of	 arrival’	 principle	 puts	 a	 disproportionate	
burden	on	Southern	European	countries;	secondly,	differences	in	how	easy	it	is	to	enter	
the	protection	regime,	 in	national	provisions	governing	the	access	 to	social	rights	and	
benefits,	 in	 reception	 conditions,	 coupled	 with	 structural	 differences	 in	 national	






As	 I	 stated	before,	 offering	 legal	 assistance	 to	asylum	seekers	 is	one	of	 the	key	
elements	 improving	their	chances	of	a	positive	outcome,	but	 it	 is	also	one	of	 the	most	
controversial	issues	in	the	asylum	procedure.			
According	 to	 Italian	 law	 (Legislative	 Decree	 25/2008),	 asylum	 seekers	 are	
supposed	to	pay	for	legal	assistance	with	the	asylum	procedure.	However,	legal	aid	is	in	
practice	 provided	 free	 of	 charge	 by	 several	 NGOs	 through	 national	 funds	 or	 private	
donations.		The	Italian	Ministry	of	the	Interior	has	established	a	“Fondo	nazionale	per	le	
politiche	e	 i	servizi	dell’asilo”	(National	Funds	for	Asylum	Policies	and	Services),	which	
allocates	 funds	 to	 local	 bodies	 running	 reception	 projects126	 for	 refugees	 and	 for	
individual	seeking	asylum	or	subsidiary	protection.	In	this	scheme,	funds	are	allocated	
for	legal	services	provided	in	the	CARAs	by	CARA’s	legal	staff.	Moreover,	State	funds	are	




Ø before	 the	 interview:	 lawyers	 prepare	 the	 claimants	 for	 the	 interview	 before	 the	
Territorial	 Commission,	 giving	 them	 information	 about	 the	 procedure	 and	 on	 the	
																																																								
126	Local	bodies	and	third	sector	parties	voluntarily	present	projects	in	response	to	a	public	invitation	to	
tender.	 The	 projects’	 consistency	 with	 the	 requirements	 of	 the	 invitation	 to	 tender	 is	 assessed	 by	 a	
Committee	 composed	 of:	 one	 representative	 of	 the	Ministry	 of	 the	 Interior;	 one	 representative	 of	 the	
“Associazione	Nazionale	dei	Comuni	 Italiani”	 (ANCI	 -	National	Association	of	 Italian	Municipalities);	one	
representative	of	the	“Unione	delle	Province	d’Italia”	(UPI	–	Italian	Provinces	Union);	one	representative	









times	 they	 contact	 the	 Territorial	 Commission	 to	 declare	 that	 the	 applicant	 is	
unable	or	unfit	to	undergo	their	interview;	
Ø during	the	interview:	although	the	applicant	is	supposed	to	answer	the	questions	on	
his/her	 own,	 the	 lawyer	 can	 intervene	 to	 clarify	 some	 aspects	 of	 their	 personal	
story.	
During	 the	 appeal	 phase,	 asylum	 applicants	 are	 entitled	 to	 free	 legal	 aid	
(Legislative	Decree	25/2008).	However,	the	law	sets	two	limitations,	which,	in	practice,	
makes	it	very	difficult	for	asylum	seekers	to	avail	themselves	of	this	right.		
Firstly,	 claimants	 must	 prove	 that	 they	 have	 an	 income	 lower	 than	 11,369.24	
Euros	per	year.	This	raises	the	issue	of	income	certification:	since	the	claimants’	income	
often	 comes	 from	 abroad,	 they	 need	 to	 provide	 the	 Bar	 Council	 with	 an	 income	
certificate	 from	 the	Consular	Authorities	of	 their	 country	of	 origin;	 alternatively,	 they	
can	provide	 a	 self-declaration	of	 income.	 In	practice,	 in	 some	municipalities,	Rome	 in	
particular,	the	Bar	Council	only	accepts	the	consular	certification,	thus	jeopardizing	the	
right	 to	 free	 legal	 aid127.	 	 In	 this	 respect,	 the	 Civil	 Court	 of	 Rome	 ruled	 in	 2014	 that	




Associazione	Progetto	Dirittti,	 Focus-Casa	dei	Diritti	 Sociali,	ASGI,	 Laboratorio	53,	Associazione	Europa	
Levante,	 Centro	 Astalli,	 Save	 the	 Children	 Roma,	 ARCI-	 Roma,	 A	 Buon	 Diritto)	 sent	 a	 letter	 to	 the	





Secondly,	 the	 Bar	 Council	 can	 refuse	 to	 provide	 free	 legal	 aid	 if	 it	 considers	 a	
claim	 to	 be	 unfounded.	 The	 issue	 here	 is	 that,	 in	 practice,	 because	 of	 the	 State’s	 long	
delays	in	paying	lawyers	for	asylum	appeals	and	because	of	the	small	amount	of	money	
they	 receive	 for	 each	 case,	 lawyers	 typically	 take	 quick	 case-by-case	 decisions	 on	
whether	it	is	worth	to	lodge	an	appeal.	
	
3. FROM	 THEORY	 TO	 PRACTICE:	 ASYLUM	 SEEKERS’	 PERSPECTIVES	 ON	 THE	
ASYLUM	PROCEDURE	
What	has	been	said	shows	very	clearly	to	what	extent	Italian	asylum	provisions	
are	 fragmented	 and,	 at	 times,	 contradictory.	 Although	 the	 Italian	 asylum	 system	
incorporates	most	EU	provisions,	in	practice	it	still	allows	for	some	degree	of	discretion	
in	 how	 liberally	 it	 grants	 asylum.	Moreover,	 the	 absence	 of	 a	 comprehensive	 text	 on	
asylum	makes	it	almost	impossible	to	gain	an	exhaustive	knowledge	of	how	the	system	
works.	This	is	particularly	true	for	asylum	seekers,	who	face	a	number	of	barriers	when	
they	 try	 to	 develop	 an	 understanding	 of	 the	 system.	 As	 I	 will	 discuss	 below,	 asylum	






As	 many	 of	 my	 respondents	 pointed	 out,	 information	 about	 how	 the	 system	
works	is	key	in	order	to	initiate	one’s	claim	in	the	right	way.	Abraham’s	story	illustrates	





wasn’t	 easy	 but	 I	 didn’t	 think	 it	 would	 be	 such	 a	 burden!	 Especially	 for	
Eritreans,	we	are	friends	after	all!’.		
As	his	statement	demonstrates,	Abraham	was	surprised	that	there	was	no	special	
provision	 for	 Eritreans	 allowing	 them	 to	 gain	 refugee	 status	 faster.	 He	 had	 trouble	
believing	that	he	had	to	undergo	the	same	procedure	as	‘everyone	else’,	as	he	routinely	
put	 it.	 	This	expectation	 turned	out	 to	be	quite	widespread	among	the	respondents	 in	




presence	 of	 a	 large	 Eritrean	 diaspora	 in	 Italy	 –	 mostly	 in	 Rome	 and	 Milan	 –	 all	
contribute	(alongside	other	factors)	to	giving	Eritreans	a	sense	of	entitlement,	and	the	
conviction	 that	 they	 will	 be	 given	 a	 preferential	 treatment	 during	 the	 asylum	
application	 process129.	 As	 Dan,	 a	 21-year-old	 Eritrean	 asylum	 seeker	 I	 met	 at	 the	
Baobab	refugee	centre	in	Rome,	puts	it:	
‘I	 mean…England	 gives	 preferential	 treatment	 to	 those	 who	 come	 from	
their	 former	 colonies.	 In	 France	 it’s	 the	 same.	Why	 doesn’t	 Italy	 do	 that	
too?	It’s	simply	ridiculous!	If	I	was	the	Italian	government	I	would	want	to	
first	 accept	 people	 coming	 from	 countries	 that	 have	 a	 relationship	with	
Italy,	 I	would	 think	that	 it	would	be	easier	 for	 them	to	 integrate.	Here	 in	
Rome	there’s	a	large	Eritrean	community.	They	came	during	the	war	and	










Before	 the	 European	 asylum	 system	 came	 into	 force	 in	 Italy,	 Eritreans	 were	




reach	 her	 husband	 in	 Italy.	 Now	most	 of	 her	 siblings	 are	married,	 have	 a	 family	 and	
keep	in	touch	via	Facebook	and	Skype.	At	the	time	of	this	study,	she	volunteered	for	a	
charity	 helping	 asylum	 seekers.	 On	 the	 matter	 of	 the	 perceived	 differences	 of	 the	
current	asylum	procedure	from	the	past,	she	argued	that:	
‘I’m	 in	contact	with	my	 family	 in	Eritrea.	 […]	We	used	to	 talk	a	 lot	about	
asylum,	in	the	past	when	I	was	in	the	process	of	applying	and	during	the	
following	years,	 because	many	wanted	 to	 come.	 So	 they	were	asking	me	
how	Italy	was,	especially	how	easy	it	was	to	get	asylum.	[…]	I	used	to	say	
that	 because	 of	 the	 ongoing	 war	 it	 was	 quite	 easy	 to	 get	 some	 kind	 of	
protection	and	that	the	real	problem	was	finding	a	place	to	live	and	a	job.	








one	 thing	 that	 hasn’t	 changed	 from	 before,	 I	 mean,	 there’s	 a	 certain		
reticence	about	talking	of	hardships.	I’ve	been	there	too:	I	didn’t	want	my	
family	 to	 worry	 so	 I	 didn’t	 tell	 them	 many	 things.	 Also,	 many	 young	
Eritreans	leaving	today	do	so	with	the	economic	support	of	their	families	




As	 Maryam	 explains	 very	 well,	 the	 migrants’	 feeling	 of	 entitlement	 might	 also	
derive	from	an	awareness	that	in	the	past,	asylum	was	granted	more	easily	to	Eritreans.	
Furthermore,	rumours	about	what	asylum	seekers	will	find	once	in	Italy	are	not	always	
accurate,	 especially	 because	many	 refugees	 tend	 to	 only	 talk	 about	 the	 bright	 side	 of	
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their	 experience.	 Of	 course,	 there	 are	 cases	 of	 individuals	who	 report	more	 accurate	
information	back	home;	however,	due	to	the	complexity	of	the	asylum	system,	it	is	very	
unlikely	 for	 specific	 and	 detailed	 information	 to	 be	 passed	 on,	 as	 asylum	 seekers	 are	
almost	unaware	of	the	system’s	technicalities.		
The	migrants’	 feeling	of	 entitlement,	 as	 I	mentioned	above,	 is	partly	due	 to	 the	
colonial	 relationship	 between	 Italy	 and	 Eritrea,	 to	 the	 perception	 that	 there	 exists	 a	
‘special	 bond’	 between	 the	 two	 countries.	 However,	 this	 perception	 soon	 fades	when	
Eritrean	asylum	seekers	realise	that	in	Italy,	there	are	no	obvious	traces	of	the	colonial	
period	and	 that,	as	we	saw	 in	 the	previous	chapters,	 there	 is	no	collective	memory	of	
those	years,	which	means	that	Italians	don’t	perceive	themselves	as	a	colonial	power.	As	
Gebrane	pointed	out,	
‘I	 was	 shocked.	 If	 you	 go	 walking	 in	 Asmara	 you	 can	 see	 signs	 of	 the	
Italians,	but	here	 there	are	no	signs	of	 the	empire.	Once,	 I	was	helping	a	
friend	 of	 mine	 that	 had	 an	 [illegal]	 stand	 at	 the	 street	 market.	 Some	
Italians	 called	me	marocchino	 [i.e.	 the	 Italian	word	 for	Moroccan]	 and	 I	
said	‘no,	I’m	from	Eritrea’;	one	of	them	replied	‘it’s	the	same,	to	me	there’	s	
no	difference’.	 I	was	so	disconcerted…Italians	are	so	 ignorant;	 they	don’t	
even	know	their	own	history!’	
Differences	 in	 the	meaning	 of	 the	 colonial	 period	 for	 Eritreans	 and	 for	 Italians	
become	visible	to	Eritreans	once	they	arrive	in	Italy,	and	it	typically	generates	feelings	
of	frustration	and	irritation.		
The	 feeling	 of	 entitlement	 can	 also	 derive	 from	 the	mode	 of	 travel	 adopted	 by	
Eritrean	 asylum	 seekers.	 During	 the	 interviews	 I	 carried	 out,	 a	 connection	 emerged	




‘We	 risked	 a	 lot	 to	 come	 here.	We	 suffered	 a	 lot.	 I	 was	 tortured	 in	 the	
desert.	I	left	my	children	behind	to	go	and	find	a	better	place	for	them	too.	
Do	you	think	 I	would	have	risked	everything	 if	 it	wasn’t	necessary?	 I	am	
not	a	‘bogus’	refugee.	I	didn’t	come	comfortably	by	plane.’	
According	to	the	data	gathered,	many	Eritreans	consider	their	journey	across	the	
Mediterranean	as	 the	ultimate	 evidence	of	 their	despair,	 a	 sort	 of	 proof	 that	 they	 are	
‘genuine’	asylum	seekers,	since	they	were	willing	to	risk	their	life	to	reach	Europe.	They	





broadly	 to	 people	 coming	 from	 the	 Horn	 of	 Africa]	 are	 not	 given	
precedence	over	other	migrants.	I	think	those	who	suffer	the	most	should	
be	accepted	first’.		
As	 we	 will	 see	 later,	 for	 those	 granted	 humanitarian	 protection,	 this	 sense	 of	
entitlement	 also	 translates	 into	 repeated	 requests	 to	 be	 allowed	 access	 to	 rights	 and	
services.	
Asylum	 seekers	 react	 differently	 to	 the	 frustration	 born	 of	 their	 feeling	 of	
entitlement.	 The	most	 common	 immediate	 emotional	 reactions	 are	 outrage,	 fear	 and	
despair.	 All	 these	 emotions	 lead	 the	 respondents	 to	 re-evaluate	 their	 relation	 to	 Italy	
and	 to	 Italian	 society,	 since	 their	 expectations	 have	 not	 been	 fulfilled,	 their	 dreams		
crushed,	and	their	expected	 feeling	of	closeness	 to	 Italy	 in	a	sense	denied;	as	a	result,	
the	informants’	perceptions	of	their	proximity	to	Italy	sometimes	changed.	As	Anbessa	
clearly	explains,	















‘When	 I	 realised	 it	 was	 more	 difficult	 than	 I	 had	 expected,	 I	 asked	 my	
cousin	 [who	 was	 granted	 subsidiary	 protection	 in	 Italy	 and	 who	 was	








Having	 their	 sense	of	entitlement	 frustrated	changes	 the	perceptions	of	asylum	
seekers.	As	I	mentioned	earlier,	the	encounter	with	Italians	changes	their	perceptions	of	
Italy	and	of	its	asylum	policies,	of	authorities	and	security	forces,	of	practitioners	in	the	
field	 of	 asylum,	 and	 of	 regular	 citizens.	 However,	 in	 the	 case	 of	 entitlement,	 what	 is	
important	 to	 highlight	 is	 the	 relational	 nature	 of	 the	 perceptions	 that	 change:	 having	
their	sense	of	entitlement	frustrated	leads	asylum	seekers	to	develop	a	new	awareness	
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of	 their	own	relationship	 to	 Italy	and	to	 Italian	society,	 that	 is,	 it	prompts	 them	to	re-




As	 we	 saw	 in	 the	 previous	 chapters,	 a	 crucial	 step	 in	 determining	 the	 asylum	
process	 is	 the	 interview	 before	 the	 Territorial	 Commission.	 During	 the	 interview,	
asylum	 seekers	 are	 asked	 to	 narrate	 their	 story,	 the	 credibility	 of	 which	 is	 then	
evaluated	by	the	commission	when	it	makes	a	decision	on	whether	to	grant	any	form	of	
humanitarian	protection	to	the	asylum	seeker.		
It	 must	 be	 noted,	 however,	 that	 in	 the	 course	 of	 the	 asylum	 process,	 asylum	
seekers	are	requested	to	narrate	their	story	several	times	to	different	audiences:	at	the	
Questura	for	the	registration	of	their	asylum	claim,	at	the	Territorial	Commission	when	
their	claim	is	assessed,	 in	court	 in	the	case	of	an	appeal,	 in	the	refugee	centres	 if	 they	
ask	 for	 legal	 and	 psychological	 support.	 During	 this	 process,	 asylum	 seekers	 meet	 a	
multiplicity	 of	 individuals	 –	 officials,	 interpreters,	 lawyers,	 judges,	 practitioners,	 and	
social	 workers	 –	 who	 are	 entitled	 to	 hear,	 collect,	 evaluate	 and	 ultimately	 challenge	
their	accounts.		
Asylum	 seekers	 quickly	 learn	 about	 the	 crucial	 importance	 of	 the	 interview.	





to	 be	 very	 careful	 because	 it	 would	 depend	 on	 the	 interview	 if	 I	 was	
accepted	[as	a	refugee]	or	not’.	
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Similarly	 to	 what	 happens	 with	 the	 choice	 of	 trajectories	 along	 the	 journey,	
information	 and	 rumours	 about	 the	 interview	 circulate	 a	 lot	 among	 asylum	 seekers.	
This	phenomenon	is	particularly	amplified	in	refugee	centres	and	squat	houses,	where	
there	are	large	communities	of	asylum	seekers.	Rumours	about	the	interview	procedure	
are	quite	vague;	 for	 instance,	many	respondents	 tried	 to	determine	whether	a	 lawyer	
would	be	present	and	in	what	role,	and	whether	someone	else	than	the	members	of	the	
commission	and	the	lawyer	would	be	present.	Of	course,	my	informants	often	reported	
having	 received	 this	 information	 from	 Italian	 officials	 or	 social	 workers,	 however	 as	
Biniam	argues,	
‘I	didn’t	 really	 trust	 them	[the	 Italian	social	workers	running	 the	refugee	
camp].	Honestly,	they	told	me	several	things	that	ended	up	not	happening	
the	way	they’d	said.	For	example,	they	told	me	I’d	meet	a	lawyer	before	the	
interview	but	he	never	 showed	up!	 […]	 the	best	way	 to	know	 important	
things	 is	 to	 ask	 those	who	have	 already	had	 their	 interview.	 If	 you	hear	
from	some	of	them,	then	you	get	an	idea	of	what	to	expect’.	
Confirming	Biniam’s	views,	the	majority	of	the	Eritrean	participants	in	this	study	
reported	 trusting	 the	 accounts	 of	 fellow	 nationals	 much	 more	 than	 the	 institutional	
information	given	to	them,	as	the	information	that	came	through	institutional	channels	
often	did	not	correspond	to	what	happened	in	practice.	In	the	refugee	centres	or	within	
the	 Eritrean	 community,	 small	 talk	 about	 the	 key	 aspects	 of	 the	 interview	 was	 very	
common.	 Respondents	were	 particularly	 interested	 in	 analysing	 the	 behaviour	 of	 the	
territorial	 commissioner,	 to	determine	his	propensity	 to	question	 the	asylum	seekers’	
accounts.	 In	 addition,	many	 tried	 to	keep	 track	of	 the	 success	 rate	of	 interviews	with	
specific	commissioners.	In	Kifle’s	words,	
‘I	 really	hoped	 I	wouldn’t	be	 interviewed	by	 ‘the	 spiteful	 guy’	 [nickname	




also	 spoken	 to	 the	 lawyer	 about	 this,	 even	 though	 I	 knew	 he	might	 not	
show	up	at	all,	but	at	the	time	I	really	felt	afraid’.	
According	 to	 my	 respondents,	 another	 very	 relevant	 figure	 is	 that	 of	 the	
interpreter.	 This	 is	 particularly	 true	 for	 Eritreans,	 because	 of	 the	 high	 level	 of	
surveillance	and	control	that	the	Eritrean	dictatorship	exerts	over	the	diaspora.	Asylum	
seekers	are	fully	aware	that	the	Eritrean	government	has	ramifications	abroad	and	that	
the	 information	 they	 share	 with	 Italian	 authorities	 can	 potentially	 endanger	 their	
relatives	 back	 in	 Eritrea130.	 They	 are	 therefore	 extremely	 wary	 of	 fellow	 nationals	
working	as	interpreters	during	the	asylum	interview.	Conversely,	when	the	interpreter	












is	Asmara?	And	so	on.	Also,	 they	 [the	 interviewers]	would	question	your	
story	a	lot,	like	they’d	interrupt	you	in	the	middle	and	ask	you	a	question	
about	something	you’d	said	before,	especially	about	details.	A	man	I	know	
was	 rejected	 because	 they	 said	 that	 his	 story	 was	 inconsistent.	








relevant	 public	 figures	 and	 locations	 in	 one’s	 country	 of	 origin,	 and	being	 able	 to	 tell	
one’s	 story	 in	 a	 ‘consistent’	 way	 are	 important	 elements	 in	 order	 to	 be	 deemed	
‘credible’.	Valerio,	an	official	in	the	Territorial	Commissions,	stated	that:	
‘We	 look	both	at	 the	evidence	provided	by	the	claimant	and	at	 the	story.	
[…]	 The	 story	 is	 a	 very	 important	 part	 of	 the	 assessment.	 Most	 of	 the	
rejections	actually	derive	from	problems	in	the	story.	Sometimes	accounts	
are	 inconsistent,	 for	 instance	 if	 they	 are	 not	 logical.	 Or	 the	 interviewees	
omit	information	that	was	presented	at	the	first	stage	of	the	procedure	or	
they	 present	 it	 differently,	 that	 is,	 they	 don’t	 follow	 the	 same	 line	 of	
argumentation	or	narrate	episodes	 in	a	different	order.	Sometimes,	what	
they	 say	 isn’t	 really	 credible.	 It’s	 too	 easy	 to	 say,	 for	 instance,	 that	 you	
were	captured	but	then	suddenly	released	because	someone	else	took	pity	
on	you.	In	these	cases,	we	really	need	to	make	sure	that	this	is	really	what	
happened.	 […]	 The	 story	 should	 flow	 easily	 and	 should	match	 the	 other	
accounts.	 […]	We	know	 that	 they	 speak	 to	 each	other	 about	what	 to	 say	
during	the	interview	so	we	look	for	contradictions.	[…]	It’s	a	difficult	task,	




noted	 that	 these	 concepts	 are	 affected	by	 cultural	 factors.	 Consistency	 and	 credibility	
are	 evaluated	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 asylum	 seekers’	 narratives	 and	 lot	 of	 importance	 is	
ascribed	 to	 details	 like	 how	 things	 happened,	 by	 whom,	 and	 when,	 as	 any	 of	 these	
variables	can	introduce	variations	in	the	account	that	can	affect	 its	consistency.	As	we	
said,	 asylum	 seekers	 typically	 tell	 their	 stories	 several	 times.	 Each	 time,	 the	 story	 is	
narrated,	 translated	 and	 transcribed	 by	 different	 persons	 in	 different	 versions,	 all	 of	
which	 are	 cross-examined	 by	 the	 commissioners	 and	 checked	 against	 the	 interview	





‘I	 felt	 totally	exposed.	 It	was	very	difficult	 to	tell	my	story	because	of	 the	
way	they	were	looking	at	me,	 like	they	didn’t	believe	me.	[…]	I	was	often	
interrupted	and	asked	to	go	back	and	forth	to	answer	questions.	Then	my	
lawyer	 would	 jump	 into	 the	 conversation	 to	 clarify	 one	 thing,	 it	 was	
difficult	to	keep	track	of	everything	that	was	happening	there’.	
In	 this	 respect,	 an	 important	 point	 must	 be	 made	 about	 the	 way	 stories	 are	
narrated.	 As	 the	 literature	 in	 the	 field	 of	 asylum	 and	 exile	 has	 underscored	 (see	 for	
example	 Wong,	 199;	 Vazquez	 and	 Araujo,	 1988),	 asylum	 seekers’	 accounts	 typically	
reflect	 a	 particular	 use	 of	 time.	 As	 we	 have	 seen	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter,	 time	 is	
perceived	 in	 a	 very	 subjective	way	 by	 asylum	 seekers	 as	 it	 is	marked	 by	meaningful	
events	-	 for	 instance,	relevant	encounters,	managing	to	reach	a	different	stage	in	their	
migration	 ‘plan’,	 a	 specific	 event	 that	 has	 a	 strong	 impact	 on	 the	 possibility	 to	move	
further,	 etc.	 	 This	 is	 reflected	 in	 the	 way	 asylum	 seekers	 tell	 their	 stories:	 they	 can	
completely	overlook	long	periods	without	meaningful	events	to	devote	more	time	to	the	
description	of	 (even	shorter)	periods	 that	were	significant	 for	 them	 in	different	ways.	
Moreover,	 their	narratives	often	move	back	and	 forth	between	 significant	 events	 that	
are	 not	 always	 ordered	 chronologically;	 as	 Valentina,	 a	 psychologist	 providing	
assistance	at	the	Comunità	di	Sant’Egidio	in	Rome,	points	out,	
‘Traumatic	 events	 are	 very	 difficult	 to	 reconstruct	 in	 a	 rational,	 orderly	
way.	 There	 are	 gaps,	 and	 memories	 are	 often	 ‘disconnected’	 from	 each	
other.	Moreover,	it’s	important	not	to	underestimate	the	influence	that	the	
characteristics	 of	 the	 interviewer	 can	 have	 (in	 terms	 of	 gender	 for	
instance)	 on	 what	 asylum	 seekers	 are	 willing	 to	 tell;	 there	 are	 cultural	
aspects	 that	 pertain	 to	 shame	 that	 are	 not	 taken	 into	 account	 by	
interviewers.	 […]	 Giving	 voice	 to	 those	 traumas	 during	 the	 interview,	
becomes	 extremely	 difficult,	 as	 interviewers	 expect	 that	 you	 remember	
things	chronologically	and	that	accounts	are	consistent’.		
Given	 that	 presenting	 the	 interviewers	 with	 a	 consistent	 and	 credible	 story	
represents	 one	 of	 the	 main	 obstacles	 for	 asylum	 seekers	 facing	 the	 Territorial	
Commission,	 there	 are	 many	 rumours	 that	 circulate	 about	 what	 the	 interviewers	
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consider	a	credible	and	consistent	story	to	be.	These	rumours	reflect	a	 ‘cultural	issue’,	
that	 is,	 the	 need	 to	 overcome	 cultural	 differences	 by	 presenting	 a	 story	 that	 will	 be	
considered	‘acceptable’	by	western	audiences	with	little	background	in	Eritrean	culture.	
Of	 course,	 this	 is	 not	 to	 say	 that	 stories	 are	 completely	 made	 up	 nor	 that	 the	
respondents	 in	 this	 study	deliberately	 tried	 to	 present	 false	 accounts,	 but	 rather	 that	
certain	 elements	 are	 believed,	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 successful	 interviews,	 to	 help	 the	
credibility	 of	 the	 narrative.	 These	 are	 often	 singled	 out	 and	discussed	with	 others.	 In	
some	cases,	 informants	modify	their	stories	slightly	to	include	some	of	these	elements	
and	 they	 also	 ‘rehearse’	 their	 stories	 with	 other	 ‘trustworthy’	 asylum	 seekers.	 As	
Geometra	points	out,	who	at	the	time	worked	as		a	social	worker	at	the	Baobab	refugee	
centre:		
‘It’s	 better	 to	 say	 that	 you	 fled	 abuse	 in	 the	 army,	 or	 that	 you	 faced	
religious	 oppression,	 rather	 than	 to	 say	 that	 you	 feared	 for	 your	 life	
because	of	your	political	opinions.	That’s	much	more	difficult	to	prove;	you	
need	 to	 prove	 that	 you	 were	 involved	 in	 some	 kind	 of	 political	
activity...they	don’t	understand	that	in	Eritrea,	you	can	be	arrested	even	if	
you	aren’t	actually	involved	in	anything,	you	can	be	arrested	only	because	
the	authorities	suspect	you.	But	 if	you	say	that	you	were	harassed	 in	 the	
army,	that	you	were	detained	in	tin-plated	sheds	under	the	blazing	sun	or	
that	 you	 were	 beaten	 or	 sexually	 harassed,	 it’s	 easier.	 They	 [the	
interviewers]	know	these	things,	because	they	have	been	told	about	them	
in	the	reports	of	human	rights	associations;	so,	you	don’t	have	to	convince	
them	 that	 these	 things	 happen	 in	 Eritrea.	 Plus,	 if	 you	 escape	 from	 the	
army,	 you’re	 a	 deserter.	 That	 means	 that	 even	 if	 they	 don’t	 completely	
believe	 you,	 they	may	 grant	 you	 protection	 anyway,	 because	 they	 know	
that	if	they	send	you	back	you’re	as	good	as	dead!’	
Geometra’s	 line	 of	 reasoning	 was	 frequently	 shared	 by	 other	 informants,	 who	
reported	having	learned	from	fellow	nationals	what	kind	of	stories	were	the	best	to	tell.	
As	Yemane	recalled:	
‘I	 was	 told	 by	 a	 friend	 in	 Anagnina	 [a	 squat	 building]	 that	 I	 had	 to	 be	
careful	not	 to	contradict	myself	and	to	remember	what	 I	said	every	 time	
social	workers	and	police	officers	asked	me	about	my	story.	He	said	‘keep	
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As	 these	 testimonies	 suggest,	 issues	 pertaining	 to	 the	 interview	 were	 often	
anticipated	by	asylum	seekers	who	developed	various	strategies	to	address	them,	based	
on	 trustworthy	 information.	 Again,	 as	 during	 the	 journey,	 the	 trustworthiness	 of	 the	
information	was	determined	not	on	the	basis	of	an	 institutional	source	but,	rather,	on	
the	 basis	 of	 their	 fellow	 nationals’	 experience.	 Perceptions	 about	 what	 the	 Italian	
authorities	expect	to	hear	–	on	the	basis	of	past	successful	interviews	-	provided	some	
respondents	 with	 elements	 which	 they	 used	 to	 re-adjust	 their	 narration	 in	 more	







of	 many	 Eritreans	 (34	 out	 of	 the	 52	 interviewed)	 who	 only	 considered	 Italy	 as	 a	
transition	point	on	their	 journey	towards	more	desirable	destinations.	Although	some	
participants	 (18	 out	 of	 52)	 decided	 during	 their	 journey	 that	 Italy	 was	 a	 good	
destination	in	the	end	(18	out	of	52)	–	mostly	because	of	family	ties	or	the	presence	of	
an	Eritrean	network	–	many	others	saw	Italy	as	a	gateway	to	Europe.	Rumours	before	
their	 departure	 or	 during	 the	 journey	 about	 the	 better	 living	 conditions	 available	 for	
asylum	seekers	 in	northern	European	countries	 led	many	of	 them	to	decide	 that	 they	
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would	 try	 their	 chance	 somewhere	 else.	 Even	 those	 who	 arrived	 in	 Italy	 with	 high	
hopes,	 were	 often	 disappointed	 and	 their	 expectations	 were	 frustrated.	 As	 we	 have	
already	 seen,	 changing	 perceptions	 of	 their	 opportunities	 and	 of	 their	 own	 position	
within	the	host	society	can	spur	a	re-evaluation	of	these	possibilities	and,	consequently,	
an	adjustment	of	the	migrants’	strategy.	By	the	time	I	conducted	my	fieldwork,	as	many	
as	 10	 out	 of	 of	 the	 respondents	 who	 had	 initially	 chosen	 to	 settle	 in	 Italy	 were	
considering	 moving	 further.	 This	 data	 reinforces	 the	 argument	 often	 made	 in	 the	
literature	that	 ‘safety	was	not	all	 that	they	sought	because	it	was	not	all	 that	they	had	
lost’	 (Zimmermann	 2009:	 14).	 As	 I	 have	 pointed	 out	 throughout	 this	 study,	 asylum	
seekers	 are	 concerned	with	 building	 better	 livelihoods,	 that	 do	 not	 only	 ensure	 their	
safety	or	their	access	to	work,	but	which	also	provide	them	with	other	forms	of	wider	
social	support.	
Asylum	 seekers	 are	 therefore	 very	 sensitive	 to	 rumours	 about	 the	 different	
opportunities	 available	 in	 various	 countries.	 This	 also	 emerges	 from	 Brekke	 and	
Brochmann’s	study	(2014)	on	the	secondary	movements	of	Eritrean	refugees	from	Italy	
to	Norway,	which	was	based	on	fieldwork	carried	out	in	2012	(at	the	same	time	as	the	
fieldwork	 for	 this	 research	 started).	 During	 this	 study,	 the	 perceived	 differences	
between	member	 states	encouraged	Eritrean	participants	 to	migrate	 further,	 towards	
other	 destinations	 (particularly	 the	 UK,	 Sweden	 and	 Norway).	 Some	 respondents,	
especially	those	who	depended	on	external	support	to	survive	during	their	stay	in	Italy,	
were	 encouraged	 to	 move	 to	 other	 countries	 by	 people	 within	 the	 network.	 For	
instance,	Yemane	told	me	of	being	persuaded	to	leave	by	his	mother	back	in	Eritrea,	
‘I	 needed	 to	 send	money	 back	 home,	 so	 that	my	 family	 could	 repay	 the	









he	was	 sending	more	money	home	 surely	because	 things	were	better	 in	
Sweden.	 I	 mean,	 there	 are	 better	 provisions	 than	 here.	 She	 suggested	 I	
should	go	there	too.	So	I	checked	with	some	Eritrean	friends	in	Collatina.	
They	said	it	was	true,	but	one	also	said	that	his	brother	had	been	there	but	
was	 returned.	 According	 to	 his	 brother,	 living	 in	 Sweden	 is	 difficult	
because	it’s	always	dark	and	you	feel	depressed.	[…]	In	the	end	I	decided	I	
would	try	to	move	to	Sweden	and	see	how	it	went’.	
Assessing	 the	 achievements	 of	 those	 who	 had	 stayed	 for	 a	 long	 time	 also	












or	 doing	 vocational	 training	 or	 anything	 like	 that!	 They	 were	 just	
abandoned!	 So	 I	 decided	 that	 I’d	 try	 to	 go	 where	 there	 are	 more	
opportunities	for	me’.	
As	this	example	demonstrates,	the	marginal	position	and	the	lack	of	 integration	
of	 fellow	 nationals	 who	 had	 stayed	 for	 a	 long	 time	 has	 an	 impact	 on	 newly	 arrived	




the	 contrary,	 positive	 examples	 of	 integration	 have	 the	 opposite	 effect,	 as	 Biniam	
argues:	
‘When	 I	 arrived	 at	 Baobab	 [the	 refugee	 centre]	 I	 was	 surprised	 to	 see	
Geometra	 and	 other	 Eritreans	 running	 the	 centre	 together	with	 Italians.	
[…]	 At	 Baobab	 there	 were	 always	 many	 Eritreans	 from	 Rome	 but	 also	
some	 coming	 from	 other	 countries	 to	 record	 their	 music	 [the	 centre	
comprises	 recording	 premises	 and	 musical	 equipment,	 and	 part	 of	 the	
activities	in	the	centre	revolve	around	music	production].	They	looked	like	
they	were	doing	well,	so	I	thought	that	after	all	I	could	make	it	too’.	
Information	 about	 how	 to	 circumvent	 the	 Dublin	 Procedure	 also	 circulates	
online.	During	my	fieldwork	in	the	Baobab	centre	in	Rome,	I	noticed	that	a	big	part	of	
the	asylum	seekers’	daily	activities	revolved	around	the	centre’s	 internet	access	point.	
At	 first	 sight,	 they	 mainly	 seemed	 to	 use	 social	 networks	 such	 as	 Facebook	 to	
communicate	with	relatives	and	acquaintances	residing	in	different	countries,	but	they	




‘they	 [the	 asylum	 seekers	 in	 the	 centre]	 regularly	 consult	 this	 kind	 of	
websites,	 in	 order	 to	 better	 understand	 how	 to	 deal	 with	 the	 system.	
Actually,	these	websites	give	valid	suggestions.	[…]	They	also	report	some	


















option	of	asking	 for	political	 asylum	and	remember	 to	explain	and/or	 to	
write	briefly	in	a	language	you	know	(or	with	the	help	of	a	translator)	why	
you	 cannot	 go	 back	 to	 your	 country	 and	 that	 you	 choose	 to	 apply	 for	
international	protection’	132	
and	in	the	section	about	the	so-called	‘Dubliners’:	
‘Remember	 that	you	can,	 in	any	case,	make	an	appeal,	with	 the	help	of	a	
lawyer,	by	invoking	the	“discretionary	clauses”	of	the	Dublin	Regulation133.		
These	 are	 the	 “sovereignty	 clause”	 and	 the	 “humanitarian	 clause”.	 Until	
your	appeal	has	been	examined	and	a	 final	decision	has	been	 taken,	you	
have	 the	 right	 to	 stay	 in	 the	 country	 where	 you	 wanted	 to	 apply	 for	
asylum,	 without	 being	 sent	 back	 to	 Italy.	 Contact	 the	 associations	 or	
lawyers	 in	 the	 European	 country	where	 you	 are	 at	 the	moment,	 so	 that	
they	can	help	you	to	lodge	an	appeal	against	your	refoulement	to	Italy.	You	
can	find	contacts	in	these	countries	here.’134	





whether	 or	 not	 they	 corresponding	 to	 reality,	 can	 be	 seen	 in	 some	 of	 the	 specific	
developments	 in	 migration	 flows	 that	 took	 place	 between	 2012	 and	 2014,	 when	 I	
carried	 out	 my	 fieldwork.	 A	 good	 example	 is	 the	 case	 of	 secondary	 movements	 to	
																																																								
132	http://www.w2eu.info/italy.en/articles/italy-dublin2.en.html	











decrease	 in	 late	 2012,	 following	 amendments	 to	 the	 federal	 law	on	 asylum,	 including	
the	 refusal	 to	 recognise	 refugee	 status	 in	 the	 case	 of	 conscientious	 objection	 or	 of	
desertion	 (DEMIG,	 2015).	 This	 shift	 in	 Swiss	 law	 was	 perceived	 as	 restrictive	 by	
Eritrean	 asylum	 seekers	 since	 they	 typically	 claim	 asylum	 on	 the	 ground	 of	 forced	
conscription	in	their	home	country.	The	news	about	this	circulated	very	fast,	so	much	so	
that	I	directly	witnessed	many	respondents	changing	their	minds	about	trying	to	reach	
Switzerland.	 These	 included	 Yohannes,	 a	 university	 student	 who	 arrived	 for	 a	





Most	 of	 the	 respondents	 in	 this	 study	had	 learned	 about	 the	Dublin	 procedure	
from	rumours	circulating	either	back	home,	during	their	journey,	or	after	their	arrival.	
Of	course,	 this	 information	was	 in	most	cases	not	very	accurate,	but	 it	 still	 influenced	
the	strategies	of	asylum	seekers.	Several	relevant	examples	of	this	emerged	during	my	
research.		
The	 first	 example	 is	 related	 to	 the	 EURODAC	 Database.	 Information	 about	 the	
Dublin	procedure	was	unevenly	distributed	among	asylum	seekers.	For	instance,	eight	
of	 my	 respondents	 were	 not	 fully	 aware	 of	 the	 different	 steps	 of	 the	 procedure.	
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However,	 rumours	 did	 circulate	 in	 migration	 networks	 about	 the	 importance	 of	
fingerprints,	 and	 many	 respondents	 were	 warned	 that	 being	 fingerprinted	 would	
prevent	 them	 from	going	elsewhere.	Hagos,	who	was	 rescued	at	 sea	 in	2014,	 told	me	
that	
‘Before	 arriving,	 I	 was	 told	 by	 my	 friend	 [who	 at	 that	 time	 had	 been	
returned	to	Italy	from	Germany	on	the	basis	of	the	Dublin	Regulation]	to	





and	 his	 traveling	 companions	 strongly	 opposed	 the	 Italian	 authorities’	 decision	 to	
















the	 radical	 increase	 in	 arrivals	 would	 lead	 to	 a	 lack	 of	 capillary	 control	 in	 migration	 flows	 and	 so	 to	
security	gaps	with	consequences	for	all	member	states.	
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trustworthy	 information.	 I	 spent	 seven	 months	 in	 Tripoli,	 at	 that	 time	
there	were	many	of	us	and	news	about	what	was	going	on	circulated	a	lot.	
[…]	 I	 wanted	 to	 avoid	 being	 fingerprinted.	 I	 learned	 that	 some	 people	
burnt	their	fingertips,	so	I	did	the	same.	[…]	But	I	ended	up	stuck	here	[in	
Italy]	anyway’.	
As	 this	 example	 shows,	 it	was	 clear	 to	many	 participants	 that	 detection	 at	 the	
border	 after	 their	 arrival	 –	 which	 in	 practice	 meant	 being	 fingerprinted	 and	
photographed	 –	 would	 prevent	 them	 from	 moving	 further	 towards	 their	 intended	
destination.	 Identification	 was	 generally	 considered	 as	 something	 to	 avoid,	 although	
dodging	controls	was	deemed	to	be	very	difficult.	Among	my	Eritrean	interviewees,	only	
four136	managed	to	avoid	detection	at	the	border	and,	by	the	time	I	met	them,	they	were	
staying	 for	a	couple	of	nights	 in	occupied	buildings,	with	 the	support	of	people	 in	 the	
Eritrean	network	 that	 they	 (or	other	 intermediaries)	had	previously	 contacted.	 	Once	




A	different	example	of	 the	 strategies	 shaped	by	 the	circulation	of	 specific	news	
are	 the	 returns	 from	 Norway	 under	 the	 Dublin	 Regulation.	 In	 January	 2011,	 the	
European	 Court	 of	 Human	 Rights	 (ECHR)	 issued	 an	 important	 ruling	 on	 the	 case	 of	
M.S.S.	 vs.	 Belgium	 and	 Greece	 (Application	 no.	 30696/09).	 The	 court	 decided	 that	
Greece	was	 violating	 the	 human	 rights	 of	M.S.S.,	 an	Afghan	 refugee,	 by	 detaining	 him	
under	inhuman	conditions	and	by	leaving	him	homeless.	It	also	judged	that	Belgium	had	
violated	 his	 human	 rights	 by	 deporting	 him	 back	 to	 Greece.	 Following	 this	 decision,	
several	 European	 countries	 stopped	 deporting	migrants	 back	 to	 Greece,	making	 it	de	





another	 European	 country.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 in	 Norway,	 NGOs	 opened	 up	 a	 debate	
about	prohibiting	returns	to	Italy,	arguing	that	the	country’s	reception	conditions	were	
insufficient.	 These	news	became	viral	 among	 asylum	 seekers	 including	 in	 the	Baobab	
centre	 or	 in	 the	 squat	 buildings,	 as	 they	 considered	 that	 it	 meant	 that	 they	 could	
perhaps	move	to	Norway	without	incurring	a	forced	return	to	Italy.	As	Birhane	told	me	
at	the	time,	
‘My	 brother’s	 in	 Norway	 now,	 he	 said	 that	 he’ll	 argue	 that	 he	 can’t	 be	
returned	to	Italy	because	of	the	lack	of	decent	reception	conditions.	This	is	
what	many	are	doing	there’.	
Some	 parts	 of	 this	 practice	 are	 also	 highlighted	 by	 the	 aforementioned	Brekke	
and	 Brochman’s	 study	 (2014),	 which	 confirms	 that	 asylum	 seekers	 are	 highly	
responsive	to	rumours.	





their	 friends,	 they	 were	 actually	 going	 there	 for	 other	 reasons.	 As	 we	 have	 seen,	
individuals	with	legal	residence	in	Italy	can	travel	within	the	Schengen	area	for	no	more	
than	 three	months.	However,	many	 of	 the	 people	who	 left	 did	 not	 return	within	 that	
time-span.	As	Geometra	pointed	out	:	
‘They	 try	 to	 see	 whether	 there	 are	 opportunities	 for	 them,	 I	 mean,	 for	
moving	 there.	Here	we	don’t	have	many	chances,	 there	 instead	you	have	
better	allowances,	for	instance,	and	better	housing’.	











I	 started	 learning	 German,	 I	 even	 had	 a	 job!	Now,	 I	 don’t	 have	 anything	
here.	I	don’t	belong	here!	I	have	to	start	all	over	again!’.	
As	 we	 can	 see	 from	 Samson’s	 words,	 being	 returned	 after	 a	 prolonged	 period	
abroad	puts	an	enormous	psychological	strain	on	asylum	seekers,	since	they	once	more	
feel	 deprived	 of	 the	 future	 they	 wanted	 for	 themselves.	 Many	 ‘Dubliners’	 represent	
useful	 sources	 of	 information	 for	 other	 asylum	 seekers	 who	 are	 evaluating	 the	
possibilities	open	to	them.	Some	of	them	return	with	sad	stories	and	provide	negative	
news	about	life	in	other	countries	(for	instance,	about	the	fact	that	people	in	Northern	
countries	 are	 ‘depressed’).	 This	 phenomenon	 has	 a	 double	 effect	 on	 fellow	 asylum	
seekers.	On	the	one	hand,	it	shows	that	expectations	can	be	disappointed,	as	Michael’s	
words	show:	




As	many	 others,	Michael	 had	 idealised	 life	 in	 the	 northern	 countries	 based	 on	
information	from	other	migrants	living	there.	As	we	have	seen,	though,	it	is	not	rare	for	




time’.	 	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 negative	 accounts	 also	 function	 as	 a	 deterrent	 for	 further	
migration.	At	 least	 twenty	of	my	 informants	had	at	 some	point	 thought	about	 leaving	
Italy	but	were	discouraged	by	negative	stories.	As	Samira	told	me,	
‘I	thought	of	moving	somewhere	else	but	I	was	afraid	it	could	turn	out	to	
be	 a	 fiasco.	 I	 see	 that	 here	 I	 don’t	 have	many	 opportunities,	 I	 thought	 it	







had	 to	 deal	 with	 their	 asylum	 application,	 they	 ended	 up	 in	 an	 ambivalent	 state	 of	
uncertainty,	 as	 they	were	 held	 back	 by	 fear	 but	 pushed	 to	 take	 action	 by	 hope.	 As	 a	








Despite	 attempts	 made	 at	 the	 EU	 level	 to	 harmonise	 asylum	 procedures	 and	
reception	conditions,	member	states	still	have	different	approaches	in	dealing	with	the	
reception	of	asylum	seekers	(Bank,	2000:	149).	In	Italy,	the	reception	system	for	asylum	
seekers	 is	 regulated	 by	 a	 plurality	 of	 laws,	 such	 as	 the	 Legislative	 Decree	 n.	
	 235	
140/2005137,	Presidential	Decree	n.	303/2004138,	and	Articles	20	and	21	of	Legislative	
Decree	n.	 25/2008139.	Besides	 these	 laws,	 the	 so-called	 “Puglia	Law”140	 is	particularly	
relevant	as	it	regulates	the	reception	centres	where	migrants,	including	asylum	seekers	
who	 travel	 in	mixed	 flows	 and	disembark	on	 the	 Italian	 shores,	 first	 arrive.	However	
this	 framework,	 does	 not	 make	 for	 a	 coherent	 reception	 approach,	 as	 there	 is	 no	
coordination	 between	 different	 laws,	 which	 results	 in	 gaps	 and	 in	 contradictory	
regulations	that	are	very	difficult	to	interpret	and	to	apply	(see	also	UNHCR	2013,	and	
UNHCR	2015).	
On	26	 June	2013,	 the	 recast	Reception	Condition	Directive	n.	2013/33/UE	was	
adopted.	 It	 is	 intended	to	provide	better	and	more	harmonized	standards	of	 living	 for	
those	 who	 apply	 for	 international	 protection	 throughout	 the	 EU,	 irrespective	 of	 the	
member	state	in	which	the	application	has	been	made.	It	sets	out	new	rules	governing	
detention	 and	 mandates	 better	 standards	 for	 vulnerable	 persons	 including	
(unaccompanied)	minors.	Moreover,	according	to	the	new	Directive,	member	states	that	
wish	to	do	so	can	adopt	even	more	favourable	rules.		The	Italian	legislative	branch	is	in	
the	 process	 of	 transposing	 it	 into	 domestic	 law141;	 in	 particular,	 as	 suggested	 by	 the	
President	of	the	Italian	Republic,	 the	Government	has	given	the	Parliament	a	mandate	
to	reform	national	asylum	laws	through	a	single	text	that	is	also	supposed	to	include	the	
transposition	 of	 EU	 laws	 on	 international	 protection.	 According	 to	 the	 experts	
interviewed,	this	could	represent	a	unique	chance	to	overcome	the	emergency	approach	










establishment	 of	 reinforced	 mechanisms,	 data-gathering	 tools,	 planning	 and	
monitoring.	
The	Italian	reception	system	was	established	very	late,	in	2001.	This	delay	can	be	
ascribed	 to	 the	 Italians’	 self-perception	 as	 a	 country	 of	 emigrants	 rather	 than	 a	
destination	country	for	immigrants.	Based	on	the	experience	of	associations	and	NGOs	
who	 have	 carried	 out	 decentralised	 and	 network-based	 reception	 activities	 around	




In	 general,	 the	 reception	 system	 is	 based	 on	 the	 SPRAR	 network	 (“Sistema	 di	
Protezione	per	Richiedenti	Asilo	e	Rifugiati“-Protection	System	for	Asylum	Seekers	and	
Refugees)	 and	 on	 other	 types	 of	 reception	 facilities,	 namely	 CPSA	 (“Centri	 di	 Primo	
Soccorso	ed	Accoglienza”	–	First	Aid	Reception	Centres),	CDA	(“Centri	di	Accoglienza”	–	
Reception	 Centres),	 CARA	 (“Centri	 di	 Accoglienza	 per	 Richiedenti	 Asilo”	 –	 Reception	




coordinated	 by	 the	 Servizio	 Centrale	 di	 Informazione	 Promozione,	 Consulenza,	
Monitoraggio	 e	 Supporto	 Tecnico	 agli	 Enti	 Locali142	 (Central	 Service	 providing	
Information,	Promotion,	Advice,	Monitoring	and	Support	to	Local	Bodies).	The	latter	is	
																																																								
142	 It	monitors	 asylum	 seekers	 and	 individuals	 under	 international	 protection;	 it	 has	 created,	manages	
and	updates	the	database	of	interventions	carried	out	in	favour	of	asylum	seekers	and	individuals	under	
international	 protection;	 it	 publicizes	 its	 interventions;	 it	 gives	 technical	 support	 to	 local	 bodies;	 and	




Local	bodies	have	access	 to	 the	 “National	Funds	 for	Asylum	Policies	and	Services”	 for	
projects	 related	 to	 “integrated	 reception”,	 and	which	 in	 theory	 provide	 not	 only	 food	
and	 accommodation	 but	 also	 information	 and	 guidance	 plans,	 in	 order	 to	 lay	 out	
individual	paths	for	socio-economic	integration.	For	instance,	activities	include	learning	
Italian,	 adult	 education,	 access	 to	 education	 (especially	 for	 minors	 subject	 to	
compulsory	 education),	 legal	 assistance	 and	advice	 about	 the	 rights	 and	duties	of	 the	
beneficiaries	 of	 international	 protection.	 The	 SPRAR	 network	 relies	 heavily	 on	 the	
voluntary	help	of	non-profit	organisations	that	contribute	in	fundamental	ways	to	ther	
projects.	 In	 practice,	 the	 SPRAR	 network	 consists	 of	 middle	 to	 small	 reception	
structures,	which	are	spread	out	over	the	Italian	territory.	SPRAR	facilities	are	mainly	
flats	 (76%),	 community	 homes	 (4%),	 and	 small	 reception	 centres	 (20%)	 (ANCI	 et	 al.	
2014:	 100).	 Projects	 usually	 last	 six	 months,	 although	 in	 some	 cases	 they	 can	 be	
extended	 to	 twelve	 months144.	 	 Some	 of	 these	 projects	 are	 specifically	 targeted	 at	
vulnerable	 individuals,	 such	 as	 victims	 of	 torture,	 individuals	 with	 disabilities,	
unaccompanied	minors,	pregnant	women,	and	single	parents.	Moreover,	the	“integrated	
reception”	 approach	 organises	 activities	 aimed	 at	 increasing	 awareness	 of	 asylum	
issues	among	local	residents,	thereby	establishing	links	with	the	local	community.	Due	
to	 the	 increase	 in	 the	 number	 of	 asylum	 claims	 compared	 to	 the	 limited	 number	 of	
spaces	available,	The	Ministry	of	the	Interior	has	called	for	the	creation	of	an	additional	
																																																								
143	 	 It	 is	 the	 body	 which	 ANCI	 has	 charged	 with	 research	 on	 issues	 considered	 relevant	 for	 Italian	
Municipalities.	Created	in	2008,	this	foundation	deals	with	issues	related	to	the	environment,	institutions	





16,000	 places	 in	 the	 period	 2014-2016145.	 In	 2014	 it	 also	 allocated	 an	 additional	 50	
million	Euros	to	the	“National	Fund	for	Asylum”.	
CARA146	 centres	were	 established	 in	 2008	 and	 replaced	 previous	 identification	
centres.	They	are	considered	as	“first	reception	centres”	in	which	migrants	are	allowed	
to	 stay	 for	 20-35	 days	 (although	 these	 limit	 are	 usually	 not	 respected,	 and	 can	 be	









The	Ministry	of	 the	 Interior	 set	 out	 common	minimum	standards	 for	CARAs	 in	
2008,	and	respecting	them	is	a	requirement	to	be	eligible	for	the	tender	process.	These	
centres	 can	 be	 run	 by	 local	 bodies	 and,	 more	 generally,	 by	 public	 or	 private	 bodies	
through	 case-by-case	 agreements	 for	 a	 three-year	 renewable	 period.	 In	 practice,	
though,	they	are	often	run	by	private	bodies	and,	in	particular,	by	cooperatives,	that	see	
the	 “reception	 business”	 as	 a	 profitable	 branch,	 which	 the	 so-called	 “Mafia	 Capitale”	
																																																								
145	 Ministry	 of	 Interior	 Decree	 n.9/2013.	 According	 to	 data	 from	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Interior,	 the	 places	
available	within	the	SPRAR	system	number	around	20,000	at	the	moment.	






scandal	 (that	also	 implicated	 the	CARA	 in	Castelnuovo	di	Porto,	a	 small	 town	close	 to	
Rome)	made	quite	clear.	
The	 quality	 of	 the	 services	 provided	 in	 such	 centres	 varies	 depending	 on	 the	
facilities	(UNHCR	2013:	12).		Some	of	them,	such	as	the	ones	in	Bari,	in	Catania	(Mineo)	
and	in	Gorizia	are	overcrowded,	and	are	located	in	remote	and	disconnected	places.	In	





CDA148	 and	 CPSA149	 centres	 are	 reception	 centres	 for	 undocumented	migrants,	
but	 often	 they	 also	 accommodate	 asylum	 seekers.	 These	 centres	 are	 intended	 for	
temporary	 stays,	 but	 in	 fact	migrants	 are	 often	 temporarily	 placed	 in	 CDAs	 or	 CPSAs	
depending	on	the	spaces	available,	and	the	identification	procedure	is	carried	out	there.	
They	are	then	transferred	to	other	facilities	(namely	CARAs	or	SPRAR	centres).		
The	 so-called	 “Centri	 Polifunzionali”	 were	 established	 in	 2007	 following	 an	
agreement	between	the	Ministry	of	the	Interior	and	the	cities	of	Rome,	Florence,	Milan	
and	 Turin,	 in	 order	 to	 help	 those	 municipalities	 to	 deal	 with	 their	 high	 number	 of	
beneficiaries	 of	 international	 protection	 and	 other	 vulnerable	 people.	 In	 some	 cases	
they	work	jointly	with	the	SPRAR	network.	








of	 distributing	migrants	 across	 the	 regions,	 according	 to	 the	 availability	 of	 reception	
facilities.	However,	 the	emergency	status	was	called	off	 in	2013	and	the	responsibility	
for	dealing	with	migration	flows	returned	to	the	competent	bodies150.	










The	 law152	mandates	 that	 the	access	 to	reception	centres	should	be	guaranteed	
once	an	applicant	lodges	his/her	asylum	claim153.	More	specifically,	asylum	seekers	who	
cannot	provide	adequate	living	standards	for	themselves	or	their	family	have	to	present	
a	declaration	of	destitution	and	a	 request	 for	 reception	when	 they	 lodge	 their	asylum	
request	 at	 the	Questura.	 However,	 despite	 these	 legal	 provisions,	 asylum	 seekers	 can	
only	access	the	reception	system	after	their	claim	has	been	formally	registered.	Because	
of	 the	 delay	 between	 the	 initial	 registration	 and	 the	 verbalizzazione,	 which	 can	 take	
several	 months,	 asylum	 claimants	 have	 serious	 problems	 to	 find	 other	 types	 of	
																																																								
150	 See	 Protezione	 Civile,	 Dossier	 Emergenza	 Nord	 Africa,	 available	 at	
http://www.protezionecivile.gov.it/jcms/it/view_dossier.wp?contentId=DOS24090.  








in	 occupied	 buildings,	 or	 who	 sleep	 in	 the	 streets.	 This	 situation	 mainly	 concerns	
asylum	 applicants	who	 lodge	 their	 claim	 at	 the	 police	 station,	 rather	 than	 those	who	






the	 CIR,	 in	 practice	 the	 Prefettura	 generally	 validates	 the	 claimants’	 self-declarations	
(see	also:	Benvenuti	2011).	According	to	Articles	6(2)	and	5(2)	of	the	Reception	Decree	
n.	 140/2005,	 the	 Prefettura	 is	 supposed	 to	 find	 a	 place	 for	 the	 asylum	 seeker	 in	 a	
reception	centre,	in	which	he/she	is	usually	free	of	their	movements154.	It	is	important	
to	 note	 that	 accommodation	 is	 supposed	 to	 be	 provided	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 asylum	
claimants’	needs	(that	 is,	special	consideration	 is	supposed	to	be	given	to	people	with	
special	needs	such	as	single	parents	with	children,	 families	or	vulnerable	people).	The	
Prefettura	 therefore	checks	SPRAR	availability.	However,	 if	 there	is	no	place	in	SPRAR	
facilities,	 claimants	 can	be	 referred	 to	CARAs.	By	 law155,	 if	neither	SPRAR	centres	nor	
CARAs	have	any	room,	the	Prefettura	has	to	grant	the	claimant	an	allowance156	until	a	









155 Article 6 (7), Reception Decree n. 140/2005. 
156  According to Article 6 (7), the allowance shall be provided in two instalments, and it amounts to 27.89 Euros 
per day. 
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there	are	no	vacant	places,	 thereby	increasing	their	overcrowding.	 	 In	general,	asylum	
applicants	are	supposed	to	be	given	access	to	the	reception	system	within	15	days	from	
the	presentation	of	their	request.	Again,	as	this	request	is	usually	processed	only	after	
the	 formal	 registration	of	 the	asylum	application,	 it	usually	 takes	 longer	 to	access	 the	
system.	 In	 addition	 to	 the	 services	 provided	 by	 CARAs	 and	 SPRAR	 centres,	 asylum	
claimants	receive	2.50	Euros	per	person	in	goods	or	as	pocket	money	from	the	CARAS	
and	from	1.50	to	2.50	Euros	in	SPRARs.		
The	 law	 indicates	 that	 family	units	 should	be	 respected	both	 in	 SPRAR	centres	
and	 in	 CARAs.	 This	 means	 that	 children	 cannot	 be	 separated	 from	 their	 parents.	
However,	 if	 the	 parents	 are	 accommodated	 in	 separate	wings	 or	 in	 different	 centres,	
children	are	usually	accommodated	with	their	mother.	Moreover,	asylum	seekers	who	
lodge	 an	 appeal	 against	 a	 negative	 decision	 are	 only	 entitled	 to	 access	 the	 reception	
system	 if	 they	 are	 not	 allowed	 to	 work	 or	 if	 they	 are	 prevented	 from	 working	 for	
psycho-physical	reasons.	
This	 system	 faces	 major	 hurdles,	 which	 limit	 both	 the	 efficiency	 and	 the	
prevailing	 standards	 of	 the	 reception	 system.	 In	 particular,	 there	 is	 often	 a	 lack	 of	
information	 available	 about	 the	 procedure	 to	 apply	 for	 accommodation.	 This	 is	
particularly	 true	 in	 Rome,	 where	 the	 problem	 is	 made	 worse	 by	 a	 shortage	 of	
interpreters	and	of	cultural	mediators.	Furthermore,	the	length	of	the	asylum	procedure	
(and	in	some	cases	of	the	appeal	phase),	together	with	the	limited	number	of	reception	
facilities,	make	 it	 difficult	 to	 provide	 new	 asylum	 seekers	with	 accommodation,	 since	
earlier	 applicants	 typically	 stay	 for	 long	 periods.	 In	 this	 regard,	 the	 situation	 is	
becoming	worse	due	to	the	continuing	flow	of	migrants.	This	has	led	to	a	proliferation	of	
occupied	 buildings,	 where	 neither	 security	 standards	 and	 nor	 minimum	 living	
standards	are	met.	 	Moreover,	another	 factor	 that	contributes	 to	overcrowding	 is	 that	
	 243	
many	asylum	seekers	do	not	want	 to	move	 from	SPRAR	centres	and	prefer	 to	 stay	 in	
those	that	are	close	to	large	cities,	as	it	makes	it	easier	for	them	to	find	a	job.	
As	 I	 briefly	mentioned	 above,	 under	 the	Dublin	Procedure	 asylum	 seekers	 face	
considerable	 difficulties	 when	 they	 try	 to	 access	 the	 reception	 system.	 According	 to	
Italian	 law,	 if	 the	 asylum	 claimant’s	 application	 has	 to	 be	 examined	 by	 another	 EU	
member	state	and	if	a	transfer	order	has	therefore	been	released,	the	asylum	seeker	can	
be	 accommodated	 in	 a	 reception	 facility	 under	 the	 same	 rules	 that	 apply	 to	 other	
asylum	 seekers157.	 The	 situation,	 however,	 is	 different	 for	 asylum	 claimants	 who	 are	
returned	 to	 Italy	 under	 the	 Dublin	 Procedure.	 Only	 those	 individuals	 who	 have	 not	
already	 benefited	 from	 accommodation	 provisions	 while	 they	 were	 in	 Italy	 are	 still	
entitled	to	enter	the	reception	system.	Given	that	it	can	take	a	long	time	to	find	available	
places,	many	of	 them,	 like	 the	 respondents	 in	 this	 study,	 are	 forced	 to	 resort	 to	 ‘self-







around	 the	 Termini	 and	 the	 Tiburtina	 stations	 as	 well	 as	 the	 neighbouring	 areas	 is	
enough	 to	 get	 a	 sense	 of	 the	 situation,	 with	many	 young	migrants	 –	 and	 even	 some	
migrant	 families	 –	 sleeping	 in	 cardboard	 boxes	 on	 the	 floor,	 on	 isolated	 benches,	 or	
inside	 the	 many	 tunnels.	 Zacharias	 is	 one	 of	 them.	 Like	 many	 of	 his	 young	 fellow	
nationals,	he	deserted	the	army	and	fled	the	country:	
																																																								
157  This is possible as the Italian law does not mandate that individuals waiting to be tranferred have to be 
detained. 
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‘I	hoped	 I	 could	 find	a	better	 life	 in	Europe.	 […]	 I	 came	 to	 Italy	by	plane	
from	Khartoum.	 I	had	a	 friend	 that	was	here,	he	was	a	 friend	of	a	 friend	
and	we	 talked	 over	 the	 phone	 and	 via	 Facebook	 and	Whatsapp.	 […]	 He	
promised	he	 could	help	me	with	 the	asylum	claim	and	 to	 find	a	place	 to	
stay.	 […]	At	 that	 time	he	decided	 to	 try	 to	move	 to	Germany,	but	 I	 could	







my	 process…they	 give	 me	 some	 food.	 […]this	 situation…	 it	 is	 so	
humiliating!’	
Zacharias’	case	 is	a	good	illustration	of	 the	situation	of	many	asylum	seekers	 in	
Rome.	Some	of	them	came	to	Rome	because	they	had	a	support	network	in	the	capital,	
others	 because	 they	 thought	 they	would	 be	more	 comfortable	 in	 Rome	 as	 they	were	
sure	that	‘Rome	looked	like	a	bigger	Asmara’.	This	reasoning,	which	might	sound	naïve	
to	 many,	 turned	 out	 to	 be	 recurrent	 in	 interviews	 with	 asylum	 seekers	 from	 urban	
areas,	 which	 suggests	 that	 a	 perceived	 familiarity	 with	 their	 natural	 environment	
provided	them	with	a	form	of	‘psychological	comfort’	that	mitigated	the	feeling	of	being	






that	 living	 in	 a	big	 city	 increased	 their	 chances	of	 getting	 a	 job.	Although	most	of	 the	
respondents	 expressed	 a	 clear	 preference	 for	 living	 in	 Rome,	 some	 like	 Medhin	
remarked	that:		
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travel	 to	 cities	 like	 Rome,	 where	 there	 are	 a	 larger	 number	 of	 secondary	 reception	
centres.	Rome158	has	thus	emerged	as	a	transit	point	for	Eritrean	asylum	seekers.		
At	 the	 time	of	my	 fieldwork,	 among	 the	different	 refugee	 centres	of	 the	SPRAR	
network,	the	Baobab	refugee	centre159	represented	a	‘one	of	a	kind’	project.	Located	in	
Rome’s	via	Cupa,	in	the	Tiburtina	area,	on	the	premises	of	a	former	glassworks	between	
Piazza	delle	Province	 and	via	Tiburtina,	 the	 centre	 is	 a	 privileged	 location	 to	 observe	









weddy	 ‘addey	 [it	 means	 ‘son	 of	 my	 mother’	 and	 is	 used	 to	 express	
companionship;	 it	 is	used	mostly	by	Eritreans	 to	address	Ethiopians	and	
vice	versa]	living	there;	we	didn’t	have	anywhere	else	to	go.	So	we	stayed	
there	 and	 organised	 ourselves.	 There	was	 a	 sort	 of	 governing	 body	 that	







‘humanitarian	emergency’	due	to	 the	sharp	 increase	 in	migrants	arriving	to	 the	country	by	sea.	 Instead	
Baobab	became	a	‘transit	centre’	that	is,	a	centre	for	migrants	transiting	to	northern	Europe.	According	to	















Geometra	 -	 became	 social	workers	 in	 the	 centre,	 in	 charge	of	 running	daily	 activities,	
including	 controls.	 The	 Baobab	 centre,	 which	 at	 the	 very	 beginning	 mostly	 hosted	
Eritreans	and	Ethiopians	as	well	as	a	small	minority	of	Somalis,	in	time	opened	its	doors	
to	asylum	seekers	of	other	nationalities160.		
Geometra’s	 account	 sheds	 light	 on	 very	 important	 elements,	which	 as	we	have	






‘We’re	 independent.	 It’s	 not	 good	 to	 depend	on	 the	 assistance	 of	 others;	
we	don’t	come	here	to	beg.	[…]	The	system	takes	everything	from	asylum	




refugees	 (allocated	 through	 the	USI	 circle,	 through	 two	different	kind	of	 agreements),	 but	 in	 fact	 there	
were	fewer	guests.	The	centre	also	had	other	40	spare	places	for	emergency	cases.	Men	from	the	Horn	of	




find	 a	 job,	 so	 instead	 of	 giving	 them	 the	 possibility	 to	 attend	 vocational	
training	they’re	just	given	3	Euros	and	thrown	in	the	street	during	the	day:	
go	and	find	a	job’.		














possible.	 The	 Baobab	 centre	 was	 intended	 as	 an	 answer	 to	 the	 claims	 voiced	 by	
Eritreans	from	‘Hotel	Africa’.	When	centres	for	Eritrean	asylum	seekers	were	set	up	and	
entirely	 run	 by	 NGOs,	 cooperatives	 and	 charitable	 associations	 –	 as	 in	 the	 case	 of	
Anagnina	 –	 the	 projects	 failed161	 and	 the	 buildings	 were	 eventually	 occupied	 by	
residents	who	 ran	 them	 on	 their	 own.	 	 As	 one	 can	 imagine,	 these	 experiences	 had	 a	
strong	repercussion	on	the	refugees’	 integration.	Although	determining	the	exact	 level	
of	 integration	 of	 refugees	 is	 beyond	 the	 scope	 of	 this	 research	 project	 and	 would	
necessitate	 a	 longitudinal	 study,	 it	 can	 be	 argued	 that	while	 experiments	 such	 as	 the	
																																																								
161	 The	 reasons	 for	 this	 failure	 can	 in	 part	 be	 attributed	 to	 constant	 changes	 in	 the	 municipality	
administration	that	had	a	negative	impact	on	tenders	for	the	management	of	SPRAR	centres	and	CARA	by	
third	 sector	 organisations.	 The	management	 of	 these	 centres	 has	 not	 always	 been	 transparent,	 as	 the	
‘Mafia	Capitale’	scandal	in	2014-2015	made	clear,	when	it	was	discovered	that	tenders	had	been	allocated	
to	specific	cooperatives	 that	ran	 them	as	profitable	business	 intended	 to	act	as	 	 covers	 for	other	 illegal	
businesses,	much	to	the	detriment	of	refugees	and	asylum	seekers.		
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Baobab	 centre	 enabled	 Eritrean	 residents	 to	 self-organise	 and	 to	 play	 a	 part	 in	 the	
managing	 of	 the	 centre,	while	 also	 creating	 a	 valuable	 space	 for	 residents	 to	 interact	
with	 inhabitants	 from	 the	 neighbourhood,	 failed	 experiences	 that	 turned	 into	
occupations	created	impenetrable	cultural	enclaves,	with	a	very	limited	interaction	with	
the	surrounding	Italian	environment.		
In	 spite	 of	 the	 fact	 that	 Eritrean	 refugees	 participated	 as	 social	workers	 in	 the	
Baobab	 reception	 centre,	 power	 relations	were	 still	 unbalanced,	 insofar	 as	 the	 Italian	
staff	(made	up	of	four	people)	ran	the	administrative	part	and	took	relevant	decisions	
about	 the	 length	of	 the	asylum	seekers’	 stays	and	 the	procedures	 to	 follow,	while	 the	
Eritrean	 social	 workers	 dealt	 with	 minor	 daily	 issues	 and	 had	 to	 report	 back	 to	 the	
Italian	 staff.	 These	 power	 relations	 were	 also	 spatially	 evident,	 with	 a	 clear	 space	
demarcation	in	the	form	of	a	glass	wall	between	the	offices	of	the	Italian	staff	and	the	
areas	where	 asylum	 seekers	 spent	 their	 days;	 furthermore,	 interactions	 between	 the	
Italian	 staff	 and	 the	 residents	 typically	 took	 place	 in	 the	 office	 spaces,	 and	 thereby	
acquired	an	official	 connotation.	 Interactions	between	 the	 Italian	staff	and	 the	asylum	
seekers	rarely	took	place	in	the	area	where	the	latter	socialised,	except	during	parties	
and	events.	On	this	matter,	Domenico,	the	director	of	the	refugee	centre,	argued:	
‘It’s	 important	 that	 they	 [the	 asylum	 seekers]	 perceive	 you	 as	 having	 a	
specific	role	as	the	director	of	the	centre,	rather	than	as	a	friend.	I	know	it	
sounds	 awful,	 but	 it’s	 better	 this	way	because	 you	need	 them	 to	 respect	
specific	 rules	 –	 even	 in	 their	 own	 interest	 –	 and	 this	 isn’t	 always	 easy.	
Some	of	them	are	used	to	behave	in	a	different	way	and	it’s	not	very	easy	
to	 deal	 with	 them,	 because	 they	 don’t	 always	 recognise	 your	 authority.	
Eritreans,	 for	 example,	 are	 very	 difficult	 to	 convince	 for	 instance	 when	
paperwork	needs	to	be	done	in	a	specific	way,	when	they	need	to	produce	
some	 documents	 or	 to	 sign	 papers…they’re	 very	 wary,	 they	 don’t	 trust	
you.	So,	sometimes	they	refuse.	Then	you	have	to	use	your	authority	as	a	
director.	You	see,	 if	 they	saw	you	as	a	 friend	 it	wouldn’t	work!	 […]	Their	
relation	 with	 the	 Eritrean	 staff	 and	 with	 Geometra,	 in	 particular,	 is	
different.	They	recognise	his	authority	as	he	 is	one	of	 them,	he’s	had	 the	
same	 experience,	 and	what	 is	more	 he	was	 also	 from	 the	military	 and	 a	
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former	 key	 member	 of	 the	 occupation,	 so	 he	 has	 a	 clear	 place	 in	 their	
hierarchy.	 If	 he	 says	 something	 they’ll	 do	 it.	He	knows	how	 to	deal	with	
them’.	
However	 this	 demarcation	 was	 perceived	 quite	 differently	 by	 my	 Eritrean	




provisions	 for	us,	or,	at	 least,	 that	 Italians	would	 facilitate	 the	procedure	




most	 frequent	 answers	 were:	 ‘because	 they	 don’t	 speak	 other	 languages,	 not	 even	
English...they’re	ignorant!’,	or	‘because	they’re	scared	of	us’,	or	‘because	they	don’t	care’.	
It	must	 be	 noted	 that	 the	 residents	 of	 the	 centre	 perceived	 the	 administrative	
staff	as	a	specific	kind	of	Italians,	Italians	with	ties	to	the	authorities	and	who	‘make	the	
asylum	process	very	difficult,	a	real	bureaucratic	hurdle!’,	using	the	words	of	Mekonnen.	
One	 can	 argue,	 therefore,	 that	 the	 experience	 of	 the	 asylum	 process	 resulted	 in	 a	
negative	perception	of	the	Italian	asylum	policies	and	(especially)	of	its	provisions,	and	
that	 it	 caused	 refugees	 to	 eventually	 associate	 the	 people	 who	 were	 in	 charge	 of	
administering	 the	asylum	process	with	 the	process	 itself.	 In	 the	eyes	of	 the	 residents,	






and	 the	 ‘racist	 ones’	 who	 ‘looked	 at	 them	 with	 contempt’.	 Interactions	 with	 the	
population	of	the	neighbourhood	were	encouraged	by	the	very	structure	of	the	centre,	
where	 there	 was	 no	 physical	 separation	 between	 the	 spaces	 intended	 for	 asylum	






(and	who	were	 inexorably	 defeated).	 Local	 visitors	 could	 also	 access	 the	 gym	 facility	
where	residents	worked	out,	for	a	small	fee.	Moreover,	there	also	existed	another	space	
of	 interaction	in	the	centre,	 in	the	guise	of	an	Eritrean	restaurant	that	was	frequented	
not	 only	 by	 residents	 (who	 ate	 for	 free)	 but	 also	 by	 people	 from	 the	 neighbourhood.	
Meals	 were	 prepared	 by	 Eritrean	 refugees,	 men	 and	 women	 hired	 by	 Daniel	 -	 	 an	
Eritrean	man	who	had	been	naturalised	Italian,	and	who	was	 in	charge	of	the	cultural	
aspects	 of	 the	 centre.	 This	 space	 was	 also	 used	 for	 events,	 mostly	 book	 launches,	
cultural	 evenings,	 ethnic	music	 shows	 and	 even	 parties.	Music,	 had	 a	 very	 important	
role	in	encouraging	exchanges	between	Italians	and	Eritreans	–	and	thus	in	promoting	
their	 integration.	 Daniel,	 a	 musician	 himself,	 set	 up	 a	 recording	 studio	 for	 Eritrean	
musicians	 in	a	spare	room	in	 the	centre,	which	was	 frequented	by	Eritrean	musicians	
(also	by	some	who	were	residing	in	other	European	countries	and	even	in	Canada	and	
the	US),	by	residents	of	the	centre	and	by	Italian	musicians.	Daniel	had	his	own	group	–	
the	 top	 singer	 was	 Selamina,	 who	 also	 worked	 as	 a	 cook	 in	 the	 restaurant	 –	 that	
performed	in	local	ethnic	festivals	and,	once	a	year,	in	the	Auditorium	(a	big	concert	hall	
in	 Rome).	 Attending	 the	 music	 sessions	 in	 the	 recording	 studio	 –	 to	 which	 I	 was	
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admitted	because	of	my	past	as	a	dancer	–	 it	was	not	 rare	 to	hear	discussions	among	
residents	and	guests	about	the	municipality’s	policies	towards	immigrants	and	asylum	
seekers,	or	about	welfare	provisions	 in	other	 countries,	or	about	 rumours	concerning	
the	 achievements	 or	 failures	 of	 friends	 elsewhere	 in	 the	 diaspora.	 Very	 interestingly,	





government	 spies:	 people	 are	 afraid	 to	 talk	 because	 they’re	 afraid	 that	
what	 they	 say	 could	 be	 reported	 back	 to	 the	 authorities	 and	 affect	 their	
possibilities	to	obtain	documents	or	their	families	back	home’.	
While	we	will	come	back	to	the	issue	of	control,	it	is	important	to	note	that,	in	the	
other	common	areas	of	 the	centre,	 interactions	(including	with	 Italians)	often	centred	
on	 practical	 issues,	 ranging	 from	 the	way	 to	 get	 a	 bus	 card	 for	 free	 to	 the	means	 of	
securing	 various	 forms	 of	 assistance.	 Interactions	with	 Italians	were	 considered	 very	
important	insofar	as	they	made	it	easier	to	understand	the	official	position	on	various	
matters	 of	 interest	 -	 such	 as	 asylum,	 reception	 and	 welfare	 benefits	 –	 by	 discussing	




arena,	 including	 the	 policies	 of	 various	 parties	 on	migration.	 I	was	 also	 considered	 a	
source	of	information:	because	of	my	international	experience	and	of	my	position	as	a	
PhD	 student	 in	 the	 field	 of	 asylum,	 they	 used	 to	 ask	 me	 questions	 about	 provisions	
elsewhere	 and	 clarifications	 about	 the	 Italian	 approach	 to	 these	 issues.	 Finally,	
interaction	with	 the	 ‘outside	world’	were	 also	 encouraged	 by	 the	 rules	 of	 the	 centre,	
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the	 construction	 business.	 The	 others	 were	 either	 unemployed,	 or	 occasionally	
employed	in	the	informal	economy.	
Because	 of	 the	 interactions	 described	 above,	 the	 Baobab	 centre	 can	 be	
considered	as	a	hub	for	the	creation	and	diffusion	of	perceptions.	Perceptions	about	the	
Italian	asylum	system,	Italians,	and	Italy	in	general	were	produced	and	reproduced	by	
discussing	 the	 news	 gathered	 in	 the	 ways	 described	 above.	 Among	 asylum	 seekers,	
discussions	on	whether	it	was	the	right	moment	to	leave	Italy	to	go	somewhere	else,	or	
about	what	to	do	in	relation	to	a	specific	problem	were	common.	Moreover,	due	to	the	
personal	 links	 between	 residents	 in	 the	 centre	 and	 those	 in	 the	 squat	 buildings,	
information	gathered	 in	 the	centre	was	regularly	 transmitted	 to	 those	outside	 it,	 thus	
influencing	their	perceptions	as	well.	For	instance,	on	more	than	one	occasion,	Eritreans	
staying	 in	 the	 squat	 buildings	 came	 to	 the	 centre	 to	 speak	 to	 Geometra	 or	 to	 other	
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residents	 about	 specific	 developments	 in	 their	 cases,	 and	 to	 ask	 whether	 they	 had	
‘heard’	something	as	they	had	a	readier	access	to	information.	Finally,	information	and	




5.2	 ‘Alternative’	 solutions	 for	 accessing	 housing	 and	 basic	 health	 care:	 some	
examples	
As	 we	 discussed	 above,	 one	 of	 the	 major	 issues	 faced	 by	 asylum	 seekers	 and	
refugees,	 in	addition	 to	unemployment,	 is	 the	problem	of	 finding	housing.	As	we	saw,	
the	Italian	system	has	no	provisions	for	long-term	accommodation,	and	there	is	a	lack	of	
reception	 facilities.	 This	 phenomenon	 explains	 the	 rise	 of	 the	 so-called	 ‘occupazioni’,	
that	 is	 the	 illegal	 occupation	 of	 buildings,	 and	 the	 emergence	 of	 a	 ‘parallel’	 housing	
system.		
As	Geometra	points	out,	occupation	is	a	way	for	asylum	seekers	to	cope	with	the	
shortcomings	of	 the	 Italian	 reception	 system	and,	 indeed,	 it	often	 represents	 the	only	
viable	solution	apart	 from	sleeping	 in	 the	streets.	 It	 should	be	mentioned	 that,	during	
my	fieldwork,	as	the	number	of	irregular	migrants	and	asylum	seekers	increased,	more	
and	 more	 buildings	 seemed	 to	 be	 occupied.	 In	 Rome,	 at	 least	 two	 buildings	 were	
occupied	in	2013,	one	close	to	the	Baobab	centre,	in	via	delle	Province,	and	one	close	to	
the	 Termini	 station,	 located	 in	 Piazza	 Indipendenza.	 This	 building,	 formerly	 called	






The	 occupations,	 however,	 are	 usually	 the	 outcome	 of	 interactions	 between	
Eritreans	and	Italian	associations,	rather	than	a	purely	Eritrean	initiative.	In	fact,	these	
occupations	 are	mainly	 organised	 by	 three	 groups,	 “Lotta	 per	 la	 Casa”,	 “Action”,	 and	
“Movimento	per	la	Casa”,	who	support	and	facilitate	sit-ins	by	migrants	in	order	to	draw	






















those	 associations.	 People	 from	 the	 ASL	 (health	 services)	 come	 here	
sometimes,	or	other	NGOs,	but	not	very	often’.	








occupied	 in	 Tiburtina	 in	 2013,	 residents	 of	 the	 Baobab	 centre	 participated,	 even	
providing	some	food	and	supplies	(which	were	provided	by	Italians	for	the	most	part).	
Very	interestingly,	most	of	the	mobilised	participants	to	the	‘enterprise’	were	in	regola,	
that	 is	 they	had	regular	papers	and	had	already	had	 their	 status	determined.	None	of	
them	was	waiting	for	family	reunification.	As	Geometra,	who	is	also	a	very	close	friend	
of	Yemane,	told	me,	
‘It’s	 especially	 people	 who	 can’t	 have	 legal	 problems	 that	 are	 asked	 to	
participate.	I	mean,	if	one	is	still	waiting	for	one’s	status	to	be	determined	
then	 it’s	better	not	 to	be	 involved,	you	never	know	what	might	happen…	




the	 risks	 and	 repercussions	 that	 could	 affect	more	 vulnerable	 participants.	 A	 similar	
strategy	determines	what	premises	 to	 occupy.	These	 can	be	divided	 into	 three	 types:	




office	 spaces	 were	 made	 available	 by	 the	 owners	 (public	 or	 private	 foundations)	 in	
exchange	 for	 the	 occupants	 paying	 certain	 bills:	 this	 for	 instance	was	 the	 case	 of	 the	
buildings	owned	by	the	Order	of	Malta	 in	Collatina.	The	occupations	of	private	houses	
are	 mostly	 demonstrative,	 and	 sit-ins	 tend	 to	 last	 for	 shorter	 periods	 as	 Italian	
authorities	 are	 compelled	 by	 law	 to	 vacate	 them.	 Finally,	 according	 to	 my	
respondents,164	 hotels	 are	 sometimes	 occupied	 following	 an	 agreement	 with	 their	
owners,	 who	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 clients	 decide	 to	 let	 refugees	 in,	 so	 as	 to	 ask	 the	
Municipality	of	Rome	for	compensation.	This	sort	of	agreements	are	usually	reached	by	








very	 wary	 of	 strangers:	 on	 the	 one	 hand	 they	 fear	 being	 controlled	 by	 the	 Eritrean	
government,	on	the	other,	they	mistrust	Italian	civil	servants,	members	of	associations	














So,	 I	 arranged	 a	 visit	 to	 Collatina	 on	 the	 pretext	 of	 visiting	 Selam	 and	 her	
husband,	Ephrem.	When	we	arrived,	we	entered	the	huge	building	(it	has	seven	storeys)	
and	 passed	 controls.	We	walked	 through	 the	 halls	where	 bicycles	 and	 strollers	were	
stored.	Of	course,	taking	pictures	is	strictly	forbidden.	In	the	building	there	are	several	
communal	areas	used	for	community	life:	a	meeting	room,	a	gathering	space	with	a	TV,	
a	 sort	 of	 theatre	 room,	 a	 leisure	 room	 with	 tables	 and	 a	 pool	 table.	 There	 are	 also	
several	illegal	economic	activities	being	carried	out:	there	is	an	Eritrean	restaurant	with	
pictures	of	the	dishes	served	that	day,	with	office	desks	covered	by	fancy	tablecloths	in	
paper;	 there	 is	 a	 small	 canteen,	 a	 bar	 with	 sodas	 and	 beers	 exhibited	 on	 a	 large	
bookcase,	as	well	as	a	hawala166	shop	to	send	remittances	back	home.	The	income	from	



















vary	 according	 to	 the	 size.	 A	 housing	market167	 of	 sorts	 has	 developed,	 with	 owners	





As	 we	 discussed	 earlier,	 this	 clearly	 shows	 how	 positive	 (but	 distorted)	
perceptions	of	life	in	Italy	become	reproduced	back	home.	
Occupied	 buildings	 are	 also	 the	 place	 where	 perceptions	 are	 reproduced	 and	
information	 is	centralised.	One	can	argue	 that,	because	of	 the	 isolation	 faced	by	 those	
living	 in	 these	 enclaves,	 their	 perceptions	 are	 shaped	 by	 their	 encounter	with	 Italian	
authorities	 during	 their	 asylum	 process,	 but	 in	 fact	 they	 are	 mostly	 the	 result	 of	














care,	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 register	 with	 the	 ASL	 (the	 national	 health	 care	 system)	 by	
providing	 an	 official	 address.	 However	 Eritreans	 living	 in	 the	 streets	 or	 in	 most	
occupied	buildings	cannot	provide	an	official	address,	complicating	their	access	to	basic	
health	care.	However,	by	navigating	the	system	many	Eritrean	respondents	figured	out	
how	 to	 overcome	 this	 problem.	 For	 instance,	 one	 afternoon	 at	 the	 Baobab	 centre	 a	
resident	 left	 in	 an	 ambulance	 that	 had	 been	 called	 by	 the	 Eritrean	 social	 workers;	 it	
seemed	he	was	in	a	lot	of	pain,	but	everyone	else	seemed	calm	and	unaffected.	In	fact	no	
one	 	paid	 the	 event	 any	attention,	nor	did	 they	 comment	on	 it	 (which	was	 rare).	The	
next	day,	when	I	returned	to	the	Baobab	centre,	I	asked	Geometra	what	had	happened.	




thought	 that	 it	 was	 maybe	 something	 I	 ate,	 but	 I	 was	 scared	 it	 was	
something	more	serious	due	to	the	way	I	was	 living.	 I	didn’t	really	know	
what	to	do,	until	another	man	from	Ethiopia	who	was	also	sleeping	there	














There	 is	 a	 general	 agreement	 in	 the	 literature	 that	 the	 Eritrean	 nation	 is	
essentially	 transnational	 (on	 this	 topic	 see	 amongst	 others	 O’Keane,	 Hepner,	 2011;	
Bernal,	2004),	with	a	 large	Eritrean	diaspora	scattered	across	Europe168,	 especially	 in	
Italy,	the	United	Kingdom,	Sweden,	Denmark,	Norway	and	Germany.	
As	I	mentioned	above,	by	the	time	I	carried	out	my	fieldwork,	there	were	about	
4,000	registered	Eritreans	 in	Rome.	You	notice	 their	presence	 if	 you	walk	around	 the	
area	 of	 Piazza	 Indipendenza,	 and	 in	 the	 city	 centre,	 close	 to	 Termini	 station,	 where	






residents	alike.	 In	spite	of	 this	cohesive	 façade,	a	closer	 look	at	 the	social	dynamics	at	
work	in	the	diaspora	reveals	that	it	is	not	monolithic	in	nature,	and	shows	that	there	are	
underlying	 tensions	 between	 different	 groups.	 This	 is	mostly	 due	 to	 two	 factors.	 The	
first	one	is	related	to	the	different	times	at	which	they	left	from	Eritrea.	The	declaration	
of	 independence	creates	a	divide,	which	can	help	us	to	identify	three	categories	in	the	
diaspora.	 Displaced	 by	 the	 conflict,	 many	 left	 the	 country	 during	 ‘the	 Struggle’	 but	
contributed	greatly	from	abroad	by	funding	the	fight	for	independence	and	by	drawing	
international	 attention	 to	 the	 conflict.	 In	 the	 following	 years,	 they	 also	 contributed	
through	 a	 huge	 inflow	 of	 remittances	 that	 helped	 the	 country’s	 reconstruction	 and	
																																																								
168	 According	 to	 the	 information	 available,	 as	 many	 as	 60,000	 Eritreans	 leave	 the	 country	 each	 year	
(www.unhcr.org/5671b969.html;	Horwood	and	Hooper,	2016).	
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strengthened	 Afewerki’s	 government	 (for	 an	 extensive	 analysis	 of	 the	 role	 of	 the	
diaspora	during	those	years,	see	Bernal	2004).	As	I	discussed	in	the	second	chapter	of	
this	 thesis,	after	 independence	 there	were	purges	and	arrests	of	opposition	members,	
which	 gained	 such	momentum	 that	 they	 became	more	 than	 a	 contingent	 and	 limited	
policy	 aimed	 at	 preserving	 stability,	 rather	 turning	 into	 a	 long-term	 strategy	 for	
repressing	dissent.	At	this	stage,	political	rivals	and	alleged	opponents	fled	the	country.	
As	 the	militarization	of	all	 sectors	of	society	 increased,	and	as	 the	notion	of	 indefinite	
compulsory	 leave	 was	 formally	 introduced	 in	 2002	 with	 the	 ‘Warsay-Yikealo	
Development	 Campaign’	 (Kibreab,	 2009),	 an	 increasing	 number	 of	 young	 Eritreans	
started	fleeing	forced	labour	and	abuses	in	the	military.	The	Eritrean	diaspora	therefore	
includes	both	supporters	of	the	regime,		opponents	to	it,	and	a	cohort	of	young	asylum	
seekers.	 The	 latter	 are	 considered	 ‘traitors’	 to	 the	 revolution	 by	 older	 Yikealo	 in	 the	
diaspora,	and	by	those	who	contributed	to	the	fight.	Estefanos’	statement	illustrates	this	
very	well;	 as	a	well-reputed	member	of	 the	diaspora’s	 first	wave	of	migrants,	 the	64-
year-old-man	considers	that	
‘Those	 who	 are	 arriving	 now	 should	 be	 ashamed.	 They’re	 not	 asylum	
seekers.	 They	 betrayed	 their	 country	 because	 they	 don’t	 want	 to	 take	
responsibilities.	 They	 are	 selfish	 and	 want	 better	 economic	 prospects.	
That’s	who	they	are’.	
Note	that	these	tensions	 in	the	community	are	not	openly	disclosed	to	the	non-
Eritrean	 public.	 Instead,	 both	 long-timers	 and	 new	 asylum-seekers	 tend	 to	 give	
strangers	 the	 impression	 that	 theirs	 is	 a	 cohesive	 community.	 However,	 different	








through	 embassies	 and	 cultural	 institutes.	 An	 example	 of	 how	 this	 control	 expresses	
itself	 is	 the	 2%	 income	 tax	 that	 is	 paid	 to	 the	 government	 through	 the	 Eritrean	
consulates.	 This	 tax169,	which	 is	 paid	 by	most	Eritreans,	 fills	 different	 purposes:	 it’s	 a	
precondition	to	have	a	passport	issued	or	renewed	–	and,	therefore,	to	be	entitled	to	go	
back	 to	 Eritrea	 –	 and	 also	 to	 be	 allowed	 to	 bring	 relatives	 out	 of	 the	 country	 –for	
instance,	 through	a	process	of	 family	reunification.	 It	also	 improves	the	status	of	 their	
families	back	home,	reassures	migrants	that	their	relatives	will	not	have	any	problems	
and	will	generally	not	be	harassed	by	the	government.		















common	 among	 my	 asylum-seeker	 informants,	 and	 conditioned	 their	 behaviour,170	
often	leading	to	a	certain	degree	of	paranoia.	
Furthermore,	relations	between	long-timers	and	new	asylum	seekers	in	Italy	are	
also	 strained	 by	 structural	 constraints,	 such	 as	 access	 to	 the	 job	 market.	 As	 Collyer	
(2005)	points	out	in	his	study	of	the	use	of	social	capital	networks	by	Algerian	asylum-
seekers	having	moved	to	the	UK,	migration	restrictions	limit	the	possibilities	of	having	
‘strong	networks’	based	on	 family	 ties	 that	could	support	new	migrants.	 In	 the	 Italian	
case,	 the	 lack	 of	 welfare	 provisions	 for	 asylum	 seekers	 makes	 them	 dependent	 on	
support	 from	 others.	 However,	 the	 problems	 that	 previous	waves	 of	migrants	 had	 in	
accessing	the	job	market	means	that	they	do	not	have	the	possibility	to	give	support	to	
new	 migrants.	 This	 reason,	 combined	 with	 the	 mistrust	 they	 feel	 towards	 well-
established	 members	 of	 the	 Eritrean	 community,	 pushes	 asylum	 seekers	 to	 rely	 on	
looser	or	‘weak’	networks171	to	acquire	social	capital172,	to	obtain	relevant	information	
or	to	satisfy	basic	needs	such	as	accommodation	or	finding	a	job	in	the	informal	sector.	
For	 the	 same	 reasons,	 some	 of	 my	 informants	 appeared	 not	 to	 be	 very	 keen	 to	
encourage	others	to	reach	them.	






relations	 with	 relevant	 members	 of	 the	 established	 community,	 for	 example	 in	 order	 to	 find	
accommodation,	since	many	Eritreans	are	involved	in	the	‘parallel’	housing	system.		
172	Social	capital	 is	defined	by	Bourdieu	as	 ‘the	aggregate	of	the	actual	or	potential	resources	which	are	















All	 these	 reasons,	 as	 I	 have	 mentioned,	 fostered	 the	 development	 of	 weak	
networks	 in	 the	 capital.	 These	 networks	 were	 not	 only	 local,	 but	 were	 developed	
transnationally	 through	 social	 communication	 platforms	 such	 as	 Facebook	 and	
Whatsapp.	These	were	considered	‘more	secure’	means	of	communication,	beyond	the	
reach	of	the	‘regime’s	spies’.	The	expansion	of	this	kind	of	networks	is	explained	by	the	
instrumental	 use	 that	 asylum	 seekers	make	of	 them,	 since	 they	use	 them	 to	 circulate	
relevant	 information	 and	 to	 inform	 perceptions.	 As	 Burt	 (1992)	 highlights,	 light	 ties	
(‘structural	 holes’)	 among	 individuals	 in	 the	 network	 facilitate	 the	 circulation	 of	 new	
information	 and	 resources,	 whereas	 thicker	 networks	 tend	 to	 convey	 redundant	 or	
irrelevant	information.	
Following	Portes’	classification,	social	networks	among	Eritrean	asylum	seekers	
rely	 on	 both	 consummatory	 and	 instrumental173	 motivations	 to	 make	 resources	
available,	 and	 they	 are	 bounded	 by	 solidarity	 and	 reciprocity.	 Solidarity	 comes	 from	
finding	themselves	in	a	similar	situation.	For	instance,	in	Geometra’s	words,	
																																																								












who	 need	 access	 to	 social	 capital	 (in	 order	 to	 obtain	 information	 and	 to	 change	
perceptions,	as	we	said)	than	to	social	capital	holders,	 that	 is,	 those	who	already	have	
access	 to	 valuable	 information.	 However,	 the	 findings	 from	 this	 study	 suggest	 the	
opposite.	 Sharing	 information	 and	 informing	 perceptions	 is	 also	 beneficial	 for	 social	




importance,	 since	asylum	seekers	 live	 in	a	permanent	need	of	relevant	 information	 in	
order	to	adapt	to	changing	circumstances	and	to	contingency	and	to	ensure	a	positive	
outcome.	Moreover,	 given	 the	nature	 of	 the	European	 asylum	 system,	 a	 network	 that	
extends	to	different	countries	 increases	the	reliability	of	 information.	As	we	discussed	
in	 the	previous	 chapter,	more	 reliable	 information	means	 that	 through	a	process	 that	

















perceptions,	 thereby	providing	 them	with	elements	 to	elaborate	strategic	 solutions	 to	









set	 of	 recurrent	 expectations.	 As	 we	 saw	 in	 Chapter	 two,	 perceptions	 of	 Italy	 were	
mostly	 conveyed	 through	 Eritrea’s	 colonial	 heritage	 and	 oral	 histories.	 Visual	 cues	 of	
the	 former	 Italian	 colonial	 domination	 are	 emotional	 material	 that	 shape	 the	
perceptions	 of	 Eritreans,	 especially	 in	 urban	 areas,	 where	 Italian	 architecture,	
toponymy	and	its	general	influence	on	the	urban	space	have	a	strong	impact	on	people	
who	 live	 there	 or	 who	 frequently	 visit,	 creating	 and	 reproducing	 perceptions	 of	 an	
existing	 affinity	 between	 the	 two	 countries.	 However	 modernist	 architecture	 gives	
many	 Eritreans	 a	 misleading	 impression	 of	 grandeur,	 of	 economic	 prosperity,	 which	
	 267	
does	not	correspond	to	 the	current	economic	situation	 in	 Italy	and	to	 its	high	 level	of	
unemployment.	 In	 rural	 villages,	 perceptions	 are	 mostly	 reproduced	 by	 listening	 to	
older	people’s174	oral	accounts,	which	help	to	transmit	perceptions	from	one	generation	
to	the	next.	 In	both	cases,	 there	 is	a	strong	emotional	dimension	to	these	perceptions,	
that	 generates	 a	 feeling	 of	 proximity	 between	 Italy	 and	 Eritrea.	 The	 collective	
imagination	of	younger	generations	is	shaped	by	the	perceptions	of	their	elders	as	well	




and	 Eritrea.	 Italian	 colonialism	 left	 a	 deep	 mark	 on	 Eritrea	 and	 influenced	 its	
relationship	 to	 Italy	 and	 the	 way	 this	 relationship	 is	 understood	 in	 both	 countries.	
Whereas	Eritreans	 feel	 that	 there	exists	a	special	relationship	between	both	countries	
(which	 influences	 the	expectations	 they	have	about	 Italy	 and	Rome),	 this,	 as	we	have	
seen,	 is	not	 true	of	 Italians.	Having	 their	 expectations	of	 cultural	proximity	 frustrated	
changes	 aylum	 seekers’	 perceptions	 of	 themselves,	 of	 the	 country,	 and	 of	 their	 own	
relation	to	Italy,	thereby	leading	to	the	elaboration	of	new	courses	of	action	in	order	to	
cope	with	 the	 asylum	system.	 It	 is	 clear	 in	 this	 respect,	 that	 government	policies	 and	
possibilities	and	constraints	that	are	intrinsic	to	Italian	institutional	settings	impact	on	
migrants’	 emotional	 dynamics	 shaping	 their	 perceptions	 and	 their	 interactions	 with	
locals.	 A	 very	 important	 point	 is	 that,	 as	 in	 the	 examples	 illustrated	 in	 the	 thesis,	
migrants’	 transnational	 emotional	 engagements	 act	 as	 a	 platform	 through	 which	
changing	 perceptions	 are	 conveyed	 to	 other	members	 of	 the	Diaspora	 or	 back	 home.	
																																																								






border	 crossings.	 In	 this	 respect,	 the	 role	 of	 employees	 at	 places	 of	 departure	 and	
arrival	as	well	as	social	workers	in	refugee	centres	is	pivotal	in	shaping	asylum-seekers	
perceptions	of	the	country.	At	the	same,	as	Domenico’s	narrative	about	his	specific	role	
as	 Baobab’s	 director	 highlighted	 in	 Chapter	 Five,	 Italian	 social	 workers	 also	 perform	





negative	 changes	 in	 asylum-seekers’	 perceptions	 of	 Italy,	 thus	 even	 impacting	 their	
integration	trajectories.	
The	 second	major	 finding	 concerns	 the	 role	 of	 emotions,	 and	 the	 circulation	of	
rumours	 and	 information	 as	 resources	 that	 asylum	 seekers	 can	 draw	 on	 when	 their	
circumstances	change.	The	examples	I	have	used	in	this	research	illustrate	how	asylum	
seekers	develop	different	 strategies	 at	 various	points	of	 their	 journey,	 and	how	 these	
strategies	are	shaped	by	an	 interaction	between	emotions	and	perceptions.	Moreover,	
the	 examples	 also	 show	 that	 the	 circulation	 of	 rumours	 and	 information	 change	
perceptions.	 The	 interview	 material	 and	 my	 observation	 of	 participants	 reveal	 that	
emotions	 represent	 an	 ‘existential	 toolkit’	 that	 links	 personal	 problems	 to	 broader	
issue,	 thereby	 eliciting	 responses	 that	 are	 adequate	 in	 order	 to	 overcome	 these	
problems.	 When	 individuals	 find	 themselves	 in	 a	 situation	 that	 violates	 their	
expectations	 of	 reality,	 emotions	 amplify	 the	 perception	 that	 the	 situation	 is	 indeed	
unfamiliar.	 Their	 emotional	 response	 then	 helps	 individuals	 to	 recognize	 how	 their	
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behaviour	relates	to	a	wider	interactional	context	that	they	usually	take	for	granted	and	
that	 shapes	 their	 experience	 (Reed,	 2004:	 665).	 This	 typically	 happens	when	 asylum	
seekers	 feel	 that	 they	 are	 in	 the	 hands	 of	 forces	 beyond	 their	 control.	 In	 this	 way,	
emotions	help	individuals	who	find	themselves	in	unknown	circumstances	to	re-define	
their	 situation,	 to	 determine	 possible	 courses	 of	 action,	 and	 thereby	 to	 overcome	 the	
situation.	 In	other	words,	emotions	help	 to	 interpret,	 construct	and	 transcend	a	given	
situation.	 Moreover,	 they	 help	 to	 determine	 the	 severity	 and	 urgency	 of	 a	 given	
problem,	 to	understand	what	actions	will	be	 feasible	and	efficient	as	a	 response,	 and,	
ultimately,	to	determine	how	to	transcend	their	earlier	perception	of	their	environment	
in	 order	 to	 re-evaluate	 their	 actions	 (Reed	 2004:	 666).	 In	 the	 specific	 case	 of	 the	
accounts	 of	 asylum	 seekers,	 hope	 and	 fear	were	 the	 two	 predominant	 emotions	 that	
helped	 them	 to	 shape	appropriate	 courses	of	 action.	Hope	had	an	empowering	effect:	
for	instance,	hope	to	find	better	life	possibilities	elsewhere	was	a	leitmotive	accounting	
for	 the	decision	 to	 leave	or	 to	move	 further	 in	 the	migration	 trajectory.	As	 shown	by	
many	examples	throughout	the	thesis,	hope	also	helped	respondents	to	develop	coping	
strategies	 to	 face	 difficult	 periods	 through	 the	 elaboration	 of	 fictional	 futures.	 Fear,	
instead,	 in	 some	 cases	 thwarted	migration	 projects,	 but	 it	 in	 other	 cases	 encouraged	
respondents	to	take	action.	
As	 to	 the	 circulation	 of	 rumours,	 the	 accounts	 of	 Eritrean	 asylum	 seekers	
highlight	 the	 great	 extent	 to	which	 news	 circulates	 among	 them:	 by	 influencing	 their	
perceptions	 of	 certain	 problems,	 rumours	 shape	 their	 agency.	 Asylum	 migration	
movements	 represent	 a	 very	 favourable	 environment	 for	 the	 emergence	 of	 rumours.	
These	movements	are	triggered	by	problematic	situations	over	which	individuals	have	
little	control.	When	asylum	seekers	project	their	expectations	about	what	may	or	may	
not	 happen	 onto	 the	 wider	 environment,	 they	 become	 sensitive	 to	 all	 the	 cues	 that	
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might	 be	 relevant	 in	 order	 to	 understand	whether	 their	 expectations	 are	 going	 to	 be	
fulfilled.	When	expectations	are	not	fulfilled,	the	need	to	adjust	their	perceptions	of	the	
environment	 becomes	more	 pressing,	 since	 it	 is	 a	 prerequisite	 for	 the	 formulation	 of	
new	and	adequate	responses.	The	need	for	action	may	arise	very	quickly,	 leading	to	a	
very	rapid	circulation	of	rumours	among	the	relevant	audience.	Moreover,	this	research	
identifies	 a	 peculiar	 characteristic	 of	 rumour	 construction	 in	 the	 context	 of	 asylum	
migration:	 as	 individuals	 realise	 that	 they	 are	 all	 in	 the	 same	 difficult	 situation,	 they	




once	 they	 arrive	 in	 Italy,	 to	 cope	 with	 the	 various	 obstacles	 they	 encounter	 in	 the	
asylum	and	reception	systems,	and	their	reliance	on	information	and	rumours	obtained	
through	‘weak’	networks.	For	the	respondents,	coping	mechanisms	were	valuable	tools	
to	 survive	 the	 hostile	 environment	 they	 found	 themselves	 in.	 These	 strategies	 were	
heavily	 dependent	 on	 their	 human	 capabilities	 and	 assets.	 In	 this	 sense,	 there	 is	 an	






the	 same	 relational	 network	 to	 also	 leave.	 These	 ties	 are	 mostly	 based	 on	 strong	
relations	 among	members,	 although	 respondents	 also	 used	 looser	 networks.	 In	 Italy,	
instead,	 tensions	 within	 the	 diaspora	 –	 mostly	 due	 to	 different	 attitudes	 towards	
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Afewerki’s	dictatorial	regime	and	towards	the	widespread	forms	of	control	exerted	by	
the	 Eritrean	 government	 over	 Eritreans	 abroad	 –	 led	 to	 issues	 of	 trust	 and	 created	
divides	 between	 long-timers	 and	 new	 arrivals,	 which	 privileged	 the	 development	 of	
weak	networks	in	Rome.	These	networks	were	then	expanded	transnationally	through	
the	 extensive	 use	 of	 social	 communication	 platforms.	 The	 expansion	 of	 this	 kind	 of	
networks	 exponentially	 increased	 the	 possibility	 of	 circulating	 relevant	 rumours	 and,	
therefore,	to	influence	each	others’	perceptions.	
These	findings	all	point	to	the	importance	of	devoting	more	attention	to	asylum	

















or	 written),	 and	 information	 about	 my	 policy	 of	 anonymity	 (ask	 if	 he/she	 wants	 to	
choose	 a	 name	 for	 him/herself);	 explain	 what	 confidentiality	 means/entails;	 explain	
that	it	is	possible	to	cut	the	interview	short	at	any	time.	 	
2)	General	information:	could	we	start	with	you	telling	me	a	little	about	your	life	in	your	
home	 country,	where	you	grew	up	and	what	 your	 experiences	were	before	you	were	
forced	to	leave	the	country?		
3)	Life	previous	to	the	departure:	 Why	did	you	 leave?	How	did	you	decide	to	 leave?	
Did	 you	 discuss	 this	 decision	 with	 someone?	 How	 did	 you	 decide	 where	 to	 go?	 Any	






during	 the	 flight?	How	did	you	decide	your	next	step	 in	 the	 journey?	On	what	kind	of	






What	 do	 you	 think	 about	 Italian	 authorities?	 What	 do	 you	 think	 about	 the	 asylum	
procedure?	Did	you	have	problems	 in	accessing	housing	and	health	care	or	any	other	
provision	that	was	relevant	to	you?	Did	you	plan	to	move	further?	If	so,	why	and	where?	
























































































A	 general	 strike	 is	 organised	 by	 a	 movement	 of	 workers	 and	
intellectuals	 with	 broad	 popular	 support,	 and	 crushed	 by	 Ethiopian	
emperor.	
	






















































2000	 Ceasefire	 and	 peace-talks	 between	 Ethiopia	 and	 Eritrea,	 entail	 the	
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